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## Southeast Asia Report

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13 February 1985

## SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## CAMBODIA

Leaders Send Thanks to SRV Counterparts (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 23 Jan 85) .....	1
Leaders Thank Lao Counterparts for Condolences (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 24 Jan 85) .....	2
Hun Sen Thanks Phan Van Dong for Greeting (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 28 Jan 85) .....	3
VODK Carries Message to UN Secretary General (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, Jan 85) .....	4
VODK Carries Sihanouk's Thanks to UN Chief (Samdech Norodom Sihanouk; Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 26 Jan 85) .....	7
CGDK Foreign Ministry Charges SRV Taking Food (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 25 Jan 85) .....	8
VODK Editorial Attacks SRV Policy on Camps (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 24 Jan 85) .....	10
Clandestine Radios Report Battlefield Activities (Various sources, various dates) .....	12
Kompong Chhnang Township 'Liberated'	12
8 Kompong Cham Villages 'Liberated'	12
Battle Reports for 18-24 Jan	12
SRV Tanks Run Down Monk	15
5 Battambang Villages 'Liberated'	15
18 Jan Battle	15
21 Jan Leach Battlefield Activities	16
Prek Kdam Ferry Crossing Attacked	16
2 Siem Reap Attacks	17
7 Kompong Thom Villages 'Liberated'	17
Company of Cambodians 'Released'	18

Briefs		
'Bandits' Killed, Wounded		19
1984 Activities Report		19
GDR Delegation Leaves		19
Sihanouk's Message of Thanks		19
INDONESIA		
Change in FRETILIN Policies Necessary To Hasten Settlement		
(Joao Mesquita; EXPRESSO, 8 Dec 84) .....	20	
Biographic Information on Indonesian Personalities		
(Various sources; various dates) .....	25	
LAOS		
Editorial Notes Economic Achievements		
(PASASON, 1 Dec 84) .....	27	
Vientiane Province Coop Development, Tension Noted		
(PASASON, 13 Dec 84) .....	30	
PRC Blamed for Thai Intransigence on Border Talks		
(PASASON, 13 Dec 84) .....	31	
Editorial Hails 40th Anniversary of VPA		
(PASASON, 22 Dec 84) .....	33	
Briefs		
Houa Phan District Banking	37	
MALAYSIA		
Problems Related to Moving Up General Elections Viewed		
(KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS, 4 Dec 84) .....	38	
Commentary Blames Racial Prejudice for 'Lion Dance' Problem		
(KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS, 7 Dec 84) .....	40	
Expansion Trend of Ethnic Chinese Businesses Discussed		
(KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS, 10 Dec 84) .....	42	
Importance of Labuan's Development Stressed		
(KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS, 14 Dec 84) .....	44	
Comments on Musa's Suggestion That MCA Leave National Front		
(Various sources, 18 Dec 84) .....	46	
National Front Unity		
MCA Temporarily Leaving National Front		

## THAILAND

Analysts View Intelligence Community Reorganization (SU ANAKHOT, 29 Nov 84) .....	50
Sitthi Receives EC Declaration on Cambodia (THE NATION REVIEW, 26 Jan 85) .....	54
Perez de Cuellar Calls on Prime Minister Prem (Bangkok Domestic Service, 26 Jan 85) .....	55
Sitthi Begins Talks With Perez de Cuellar (BANGKOK WORLD, 26 Jan 85) .....	57
Spokesman on Sitthi-Perez de Cuellar Talks (Bangkok Domestic Service, 28 Jan 85) .....	59
Mukdahan Police Chief on Narcotics Trade, Arms Traffic (Seri Temiyawet Interview; MATICHON, 26 Nov 84) .....	60
Six Communist Suspects Charged; Hearing Set 1 Feb (THE NATION REVIEW, 25 Jan 85) .....	64
VOFA Criticizes SRV Attitude Toward Refugees (Voice of Free Asia, 23 Jan 85) .....	66
Prasong on Relief Aid to Cambodian Refugees (THE NATION REVIEW, 28 Jan 85) .....	69
UN Agency To Study Laos-Vietnam Road Project (BANGKOK POST, 24 Jan 85) .....	71
Police Say Malaysians Fire on Fishing Boats (THE NATION REVIEW, 26 Jan 85) .....	72
Athit Speaks on Armed Forces Day 25 January (Athit Kamlang-ek; Bangkok Domestic Service, 25 Jan 85) ..	73
Athit Kamlang-ek Inspects Cambodian Border Areas (Bangkok Domestic Service, 26 Jan 85) .....	75

## VIETNAM

### MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VPA Journal Praises Le Duan Speech (Editorial; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 10, Oct 84) ..	76
Importance of Teaching Army's Traditions Emphasized (Dang Vu Hiep; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 10, Oct 84)	78

Experiences of Artillery Troops in Fighting Chinese Related (Nguyen Dinh Thach; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 10, Oct 84) .....	91
Problems of Wartime Mobilization Discussed (Trieu Huy Hung; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 11, Nov 84)	95
ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE	
Province Gets More State, Cooperative Stores, Counters (NHAN DAN, 11 Dec 84) .....	111
Socialist Commerce Reinforced, More Tax Collected (NHAN DAN, 12 Dec 84) .....	113
Editorial Stresses Need To Develop Socialist Commerce (NHAN DAN, 12 Dec 84) .....	115
AGRICULTURE	
Provinces Start Winter-Spring Work Following Harvest (NHAN DAN, 11 Dec 84) .....	118
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE	
Briefs	
Expansion of Broadcasting Network	120
PUBLICATIONS	
Table of Contents of October VPA Journal (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 10, Oct 84) .....	121

CAMBODIA

LEADERS SEND THANKS TO SRV COUNTERPARTS

BK240544 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 23 Jan 85

[Text] Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State; Comrade Chea Sim, chairman of the National Assembly; and Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRK, sent a message of thanks to Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee; Comrade Truong Chinh, chairman of the Council of State; Comrade Pham Van Dong, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Comrade Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the SRV National Assembly. The message says:

We would like to express our profound thanks to the CPV Central Committee, the National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers of the SRV, and the fraternal Vietnamese people for their condolences and for sending a high-ranking delegation to attend the funeral of Comrade Chan Si, member of the KPRP Central Committee Political Bureau. Concerning the death of Comrade Chan Si, who was a loyal revolutionary combatant and a devoted leading cadre, the Cambodian party, government, and people are determined to transform this grief into a strong force aimed at achieving the strategic tasks of defending the Cambodian fatherland, and constructing it so as to produce prosperity, actively contributing to the defense of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and preserving and strengthening militant solidarity among Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

Once again, the Cambodian party, government, and people would like to express their gratitude to the Vietnamese party, state, and people for their support in the international proletarian spirit for the cause of the defense and construction of the PRK.

CSO: 4212/37

CAMBODIA

LEADERS THANK LAO COUNTERPARTS FOR CONDOLENCES

BK240734 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 24 Jan 85

[Text] Recently, the party Central Committee, the Council of State, the National Assembly, and the PRK Council of Ministers sent a message to thank the party Central Committee, the Supreme People's Council, and the LPDR Council of Ministers for their condolences on the death of Comrade Chan Si, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers.

The message says: Facing this loss, the PRK party, government, and the people throughout the country are determined to transform this grief into a strong force aimed at achieving all revolutionary tasks in order to build socialism successfully and to defend the PRK--the beloved fatherland. The PRK party, government, and people have made every effort to strengthen and develop the militant solidarity, special friendship, and multifaceted cooperation between our two peoples as well as among the three peoples--Cambodian, Lao, and Vietnamese--for the cause of the defense and construction of their fatherlands and for peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world.

The PRK party, government, and people would like to express their profound thanks to all comrades for your assistance and support with the warmest revolutionary spirit.

CSO: 4212/37



CAMBODIA

HUN SEN THANKS PHAM VAN DONG FOR GREETING

BK280649 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 28 Jan 85

[Text] Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, has recently sent a message of thanks to Comrade Pham Van Dong, chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers. The message reads in part:

I sincerely thank you for extending revolutionary salutations and warm congratulations on my appointment as chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers.

I noted with satisfaction that the bonds of special friendship, militant solidarity, and all-round cooperation that exist between our two parties and peoples based on the principles of the Cambodia-Vietnam Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation are developing with every passing day and winning great victories over the perfidious maneuvers of the enemies of all stripes.

I pledge to forever preserve and strengthen the bonds of special friendship, militant solidarity, and cooperation of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos which are factors for the development of revolution in each country and contribute to defending peace, independence, democracy, and social progress in Asia and the whole world.

Availing myself of this occasion, I wish you good health and greater victories in your noble mission.

CSO: 4212/37

CAMBODIA

VODK CARRIES MESSAGE TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL

BK260621 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Open letter from Cambodian people to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar--date not given]

[Text] All the Cambodian people, who have been suffering seriously from the cruel, barbarous acts of oppression and genocide by the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressor troops, are hopeful and feel greatly encouraged upon hearing the warm assurance of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar as stated in his reply to Democratic Kampuchean President Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's message. In this reply, the UN secretary general says that during his coming visit to some Southeast Asian countries, he will personally inquire, to the best of his ability, about direct means to step up humanitarian activities for the Cambodian refugees and propose a study of conditions leading to a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian question. In his reply, the UN secretary general also stresses that only by restoring peace in Cambodia can all the heart-rending humanitarian problems stemming from the current war in Cambodia be permanently resolved.

The Cambodian people are very happy to hear this warm statement by the UN secretary general. They hope that during his visit to some Southeast Asian countries, the UN secretary general will make every effort to end rapidly the Cambodian people's misery caused by the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors' acts of aggression and genocide.

During the war of aggression and genocide against the Cambodian race, lasting over 6 years, the Cambodian people--young and old, men and women alike--have suffered untold misery, and the Cambodian national resources and the people's property have been devastated. This is unprecedented in Cambodia's thousands of years of history. Because the Hanoi Vietnamese have nurtured a dark design to annex Cambodia as they did Kampuchea Kraom in the past, they have carried out a scorched-earth policy--burning everything, destroying everything, and killing everyone--against our people in all areas. In implementing this extremely fascist, cruel, and barbarous policy wherever they go, the Vietnamese aggressor troops shell and strafe our Cambodian people, thus killing them in dozens and even hundreds in each area.

At the same time, they destroy our people's property and production tools and rob our people of their property, money, rice, cattle, and fowls. They have accused, arrested, shot, and killed our people in a most cruel, barbarous manner. They have arrested, tortured, and jailed our people. They have tortured our people by kicking them, pouring fish sauce into their throats, releasing electric current into their bodies, hanging them by their feet, and dipping their heads in water. Moreover, they have contained our people in villages and detained them in strategic hamlets to prevent them from moving out to till the land or earn a living. Many Cambodians have died of starvation.

Worse still, the Vietnamese have used toxic chemicals against our people by pouring these toxic substances in streams, ponds, and wells that supply our people with water and have mixed poison in food and cakes on sale in markets and in medicine, killing thousands of our people. In some areas, whole families have died after consuming this poisoned food. This cruel, barbarous oppression and these acts of massacre have caused heart-rending misery among our Cambodian people.

Thus, hundreds of thousands of our people--young and old alike--have been compelled to leave their beloved houses and hometowns to flee through the most dangerous terrain--long ranges of mountains and deep forests--to live in the mountains and forests and in various camps along the Cambodian-Thai border in order to avoid being massacred by the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressor troops. Despite the fact that the Cambodian people have fled to seek shelter in these areas, still the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressor troops have pursued and attacked them by shelling their camps, killing many Cambodians every year and every season.

In the 1984-85 dry season, the Hanoi Vietnamese sent thousands of troops escorted by dozens of tanks and artillery to launch successive attacks on the Cambodian refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai border, killing or wounding hundreds of Cambodians in a most miserable manner. The survivors in hundreds of thousands, along with their aging parents and small children, fled in disarray. From November 1984 to January 1985 alone, over 160,000 Cambodians were attacked and compelled to flee to Thai soil by the Vietnamese troops. Their houses and meagre property left in the camps were either burned or destroyed by the Vietnamese troops.

These are the extremely barbarous, criminal acts committed against the Cambodian people by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. They have killed and destroyed the property of the Cambodians living under their control as well as that of those who fled from the interior of Cambodia to the border area. Their aim in doing so is totally to exterminate the Cambodian nation and race so as to annex Cambodia to Vietnam.

During the past over 6 years, the Cambodian people have suffered untold misery. Thus, the Cambodian people, desiring peace and happiness, want a rapid end to this misery so that they can return to live peacefully in their beloved hometowns and fatherland and to reunite with their families. As

mentioned in the UN secretary general's reply, only by restoring peace in Cambodia can all these heart-rending miseries of the Cambodian people be permanently eliminated. Only with the total, unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese aggressor troops from Cambodia and respect for the Cambodian people's sacred right to self-determination free from any outside interference in accordance with the UN resolutions can peace be restored in Cambodia.

The Cambodian people hope that the UN secretary general, known for his kindness and mercy toward the Cambodian victims, will use his influence to persuade the Hanoi Vietnamese to withdraw their troops totally and unconditionally from Cambodia so as to let the Cambodian people decide their own destiny in accordance with the six UN resolutions. Only with Vietnam implementing these six UN resolutions in full can peace be restored in Cambodia and can peace and stability be restored in the whole of Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Cambodian people would like to appeal to all peace- and justice-loving countries to intensify their pressures on the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors so as to force them to implement the UN resolutions, thus rapidly ending the miseries of the Cambodian people.

CSO: 4212/37

CAMBODIA

VODK CARRIES SIHANOUK'S THANKS TO UN CHIEF

BK270446 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 26  
Jan 85

[20 January message from Democratic Kampuchean President Samdech Norodom  
Sihanouk to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar]

[Text] To His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar, secretary general of the  
United Nations, United Nations, New York:

On behalf of Democratic Kampuchea and in my own name, I have the great honor  
to express profound thanks to your excellency for your message full of  
kindness and for the generous measures you arranged on behalf of the United  
Nations in order to enable the unfortunate Democratic Kampuchean people to  
receive more aid and relief and to bring about a just settlement--within the  
framework of restoring independence and peace in Cambodia--of the lamentable  
problem of the Cambodian refugees who are victims of the current war in  
Cambodia.

I wish your excellency total success in your most significant mission in  
Southeast Asia.

Please, excellency, accept my fraternal and most cordial regards.

[Signed] Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea, Pyongyang, 20  
January 1985

CSO: 4212/37

CAMBODIA

CGDK FOREIGN MINISTRY CHARGES SRV TAKING FOOD

BK260341 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in  
Cambodian 2315 GMT 25 Jan 85

["25 January statement of the CGDK Foreign Ministry condemning the Hanoi  
Vietnamese aggressors' policy of starving Cambodian people"]

[Text] This year, the Cambodian people have suffered from serious shortages  
of food due to the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors' systematic policy of starva-  
tion. In an attempt to starve our Cambodian people, the Vietnamese enemy  
aggressors have carried out a most cruel, barbarous, and fascist policy as  
follows:

1. They have forced the people at gunpoint to live in concentration villages  
along the roads far away from their villages, have forced the people to build  
fences around these villages, and have banned the people from moving out of  
these villages to earn their living or till their land. They kill or jail  
anyone who dares leave a village by accusing him of having contacts with the  
Democratic Kampuchean army and guerrillas.
2. They have forced the people--young, old, men, women, and children alike--  
to leave their rice fields and go out to clear brush along national highways,  
railroads, and other transport routes. At harvest time, they have banned the  
people from returning home to harvest their crops. They have plundered the  
meagre crops produced by the people to feed their aggressor troops. They  
have forced the people in the eastern part of Cambodia, such as Svay Rieng,  
Prey Veng, Kratie, Kompong Speu, and Takeo Provinces, to cross the country  
from that part to clear brush along Routes 3, 4, 5, and 6; along the rail-  
roads; and in the western part of Cambodia. They have forced the people to  
clear brush along Route 12 from Kompong Thom to Preah Vihear and from Kralanh  
to Samraong and Oddar-Meanchey, along Route 10 from Battambang to Pailin, and  
in the forest area in the vicinity of Angkor Wat.
3. They have forced the people in all provinces to provide them with rice--at  
an average of 10 kg per month from each family. They ransack the houses and  
villages of those inhabitants who have no rice to give them.

This is the fascist policy pursued by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in an  
attempt to starve the Cambodian people to death by plundering their food for

use in feeding their aggressor forces. This is also an attempt to exterminate the Cambodian race and to annex Cambodia to Vietnam. The fact that the Cambodian people have suffered serious shortages of rice was not brought on by drought or flood as claimed by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in an attempt to fool the world. In fact, this shortage was caused by the policy of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and race exterminators as mentioned above.

The CGDK Foreign Ministry vehemently condemns this Vietnamese enemy aggressors' policy of starving the Cambodian people. We call on world public opinion and all the international humanitarian organizations in particular to pay attention to these Vietnamese crimes of robbing the people's food and starving the Cambodian people. We call on them not to provide aid to the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in Phnom Penh so as to prevent them from using this generous aid for feeding their aggressor troops in Cambodia in their war of genocide against Cambodia.

[Signed] The Foreign Ministry of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Kampuchea, 25 January 1985

CSO: 4212/37

CAMBODIA

VODK EDITORIAL ATTACKS SRV POLICY ON CAMPS

BK290351 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24 Jan 85

[Station editorial: "The Vietnamese Aggressors' Criminal Attacks on Cambodian Refugee Camps Along the Thai-Cambodian Border Show the Entire World Even More Clearly the Brutal and Fascist Nature of the Hanoi Vietnamese Enemy in Exterminating the Cambodian Race and Nation"]

[Text] Since the Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors sent hundreds of thousands of troops to commit aggression and occupy our Cambodian territory, they have sown great destruction and carried out great criminal activities against our Cambodian nation and people in a most brutal and savage manner. During the past more than 6 years, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have been massacring our people using every means from arrest and summary execution, plunder of our people's property, and starving our people to the use of all kinds of toxic chemical weapons. It is through these great Vietnamese crimes that over 2.5 million of our innocent people have tragically died. Furthermore, hundreds and thousands more of our Cambodian people have been forced to pitifully abandon their villages and land inside the country and live in refugee camps in jungles and mountains along the Cambodian-Thai border in order to escape the Vietnamese enemy aggressors' oppression, repression, and massacre. However, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and race exterminators have pursued and massacred our people inside refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai border in a brutal and fascist manner.

Since mid-November 1984, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have gathered their troops, tanks, and artillery pieces to attack and destroy our Cambodian refugee camps, burn down the refugees' property, and massacre innocent and unarmed civilian people in a most brutal and savage manner. These cruel and savage Vietnamese attacks on refugee camps have killed or wounded many people. Hundreds of thousands more--including elderly and disabled people, pregnant women, and children--have been forced to flee in panic and in great distress to escape these Vietnamese enemy aggressors' attempts to exterminate them. What kind of acts are these Vietnamese crimes in attacking and destroying Cambodian civilian refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai border?

In the past, the world was well aware of the hideous face and the true deceitful nature of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, particularly since the time they sent hundreds of thousands of troops to openly attack and occupy Cambodia at the end of 1978. Through the Vietnamese crimes of attacking Cambodian refugee camps, the world now even more clearly realizes the true



nature of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors' war of aggression in Cambodia which is a war to completely exterminate the Cambodian nation and race. In other words, the world not only knows the hideous face and the deceitful nature of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors but it is now also more aware of their brutal and fascist nature to massacre and exterminate people, which is unprecedented in Cambodian history and that of the world. Furthermore, the world also clearly sees the strategy of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to annex Cambodian territory without any consideration for international law, the UN Charter, the principles of the Nonaligned Movement, and the vigorous and firm demand and protest of the international community.

Therefore, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors' concrete actions in brutally and savagely attacking Cambodian refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai border show the world more clearly the true nature and strategy of the Vietnamese which is as follows:

1. The world realizes that the Vietnamese have been waging a war of aggression, annexation of Cambodian territory, and extermination of the Cambodian race and nation.
2. The Vietnamese are implementing a strategy to annex Cambodia to set up a small Indochinese Federation and commit aggression against the Thai border in order to set up their medium Indochinese Federation.
3. The Hanoi Vietnamese enemy aggressors are attempting to annex Cambodia to set up the small and medium Indochinese federations so that the Soviets can use them as a springboard to expand further into Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region in accordance with the Soviet world expansionist strategy in the region.

The Vietnamese criminal, savage, and brutal acts of attacking civilian refugee camps along the border have greatly angered the entire world. The international community has further raised its voice in condemning the Vietnamese, has firmly demanded that the Vietnamese stop their savage activities against innocent Cambodian people, and has demanded that they unconditionally withdraw all their forces from Cambodia in accordance with the UN resolutions to peacefully resolve the Cambodian issue. This could end all kinds of suffering and hardship of the Cambodian people and ensure that the Cambodians have the right to determine their own destiny without any outside interference.

As for the entire Cambodian nation and people, the entire Democratic Kampuchean National Army, all the Cambodian resistance forces, and the CGDK, these brutal and savage activities of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have angered us even more. The Cambodian people, the entire Democratic Kampuchean National Army, all the Cambodian resistance forces, and the CGDK are determined to unite as one, consider as sacred the national interest, and continue to hold aloft the banner of struggle and fight against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and race exterminators until they are all chased out of our Cambodian territory so that our Cambodian nation and race survives. This will contribute to safeguarding peace, security, and stability in Southeast Asia and world peace.

CAMBODIA

CLANDESTINE RADIOS REPORT BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITIES

Kompong Chhnang Township 'Liberated'

BK250236 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 24 Jan 85

[Text] On 20 January, we successfully attacked and liberated (Kaoh Ktei) Township in Kompong Tralach District, Kompong Chhnang Province. We killed or wounded a number of Vietnamese enemy soldiers, seized six weapons, and liberated four villages: (Dei Pralich), Tamil Kraom, Tamil Leu, and (Kaoh Ktei). We liberated the area between (Kompong Lop) and Kompong Ta Ches. We are putting pressure on Kompong Prasat Township, causing the Vietnamese to scatter in confusion.

8 Kompong Cham Villages 'Liberated'

BK250240 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 24 Jan 85

[Text] On 20 January, we attacked a Vietnamese commune office at Sopheas in Stoeng Trang District, Kompong Cham Province. In a 15-minute battle, we killed a Vietnamese soldier and wounded another; destroyed a commune office, a ricemill, a trade warehouse, and a rice stock containing 15 sacks of rice; seized four AR-15's, an SKS, a carbine, five sacks of rice, and some ammunition and materiel; and liberated eight villages: Sopheas Khang Kaeut, Sopheas Khang Lech, (Srap), Toap, Angkaeul, (Por Srak), Sambo, and Trapeang Chrey.

Battle Reports for 18-24 Jan

BK250616 [Editorial Report] (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian and (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian broadcast the following battle reports during the reporting period 18-24 January:

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 18 January reports that between 31 December and 10 January, Democratic Kampuchean troops killed 130 Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded 115 others on the Pailin-Route 10, Kompong Speu, Leach, Ratanakiri, and Kampot battlefields. They destroyed 29 weapons, 4 barracks, 3 commune offices, 936 meters of railroad tracks, 9 trucks, a C-46 radio, a ricemill,

and some materiel. They also seized 28 weapons and liberated 10 villages on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

VODK at 2330 GMT on 18 January notes that between 28 December and 15 January, DK combatants killed or wounded 571 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Kampot, Koh Kong Leu, Samlot, South Sisophon, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, Kratie, and Chhep battlefields. They destroyed 191 weapons, a tank, a truck, 3 boats, 3 C-25 radios, 3 ricemills, 2 ammunition depots, 2 paddy stocks, 3 medicine stocks, a rice stock, 4 warehouses, 178 trenches, 196 barracks, 10 commune offices, and some materiel. They also seized 54 weapons and some materiel. They liberated Rumlong Township along Route 6 in Baray District, Kompong Thom Province, Baray Commune, and 29 villages.

According to VONADK at 2315 GMT on 19 January, DK troops on the Battambang-Sangke River, Kratie, Siem Reap, Samlot, South Sisophon, Battambang, and Preah Vihear battlefields killed or wounded 346 Vietnamese enemy soldiers from 7 to 15 January. They destroyed 107 assorted weapons, 44 barracks, 22 trenches, 4 commune offices, a trade service office, a cloth warehouse, a salt storage, 3 trucks, a C-46 radio set, and a quantity of documents, ammunition, and war materiel. They seized 15 assorted weapons, a typewriter, and some war materiel. They also liberated 17 villages on the Battambang-Sangke battlefield and 2 villages on the Siem Reap battlefield.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 20 January says that between 1 and 18 January, DK forces killed or wounded 374 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Moun-Pursat, Koh Kong Leu, Samlot, Leach, Pailin-Route 10, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, South Sisophon, North Sisophon, Kompong Speu, Route 4, and Kampot battlefields. They destroyed (?55) weapons, 3 barracks, 300 trenches, a commune office, 2 warehouses, a ricemill, 1,772 meters of railroad tracks, a bridge, 2 trucks, and other materiel. They seized four weapons, a C-25 radio, and some ammunition and materiel. They also rescued 150 people.

VODK at 2330 GMT on 20 January says that between 4 and 15 December, DK troops killed or wounded 359 Vietnamese soldiers on the Samlot, South Sisophon, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Preah Vihear battlefields. They destroyed 107 weapons, 7 trucks, a field radio, 2 ricemills, 29 trenches, 54 barracks, 5 commune offices, some warehouses, and a bridge. They seized 29 weapons and some ammunition. They also liberated some villages on the Battambang battlefield.

According to VONADK at 2315 GMT on 21 January, DK troops killed or wounded 231 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Preah Vihear, Sisophon-south of Route 5, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Kompong Thom, and East Battambang battlefields from 1 to 18 January. They destroyed 62 assorted guns, a truck, 49 trenches, and a quantity of military materiel. They seized six guns and some ammunition and military materiel. They also liberated two enemy positions on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield and four villages on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

VODK at 2330 GMT on 21 January states that from 1 to 18 January, DK forces killed or wounded 364 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Kampot, Lompong Speu,

Route 4, Koh Kong Leu, Leach, Samlot, Pailin-Route 10, Sisophon-south of Route 5, Sisophon-north of Route 5, Siem Reap, and Preah Vihear battlefields. A total of 48 assorted weapons, 5 trucks, a rice milling machine, a C-25 radio, 2 rice and paddy storehouses, 303 trenches, 3 military barracks, a commune office, and a quantity of military materiel were destroyed. DK troops cut 52 sections of railway tracks for a total of 1,272 meters on the Moung-Pursat battlefield. DK forces seized 10 assorted weapons and some ammunition and military materiel. They also liberated a Vietnamese platoon position on the Samlot battlefield and 10 villages in Stoeng Trang District, Kompong Cham Province.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 22 January reveals that from 7 to 19 January, DK troops killed or wounded 343 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Sisophon-south of Route 5, Samlot, Moung-Pursat, Kompong Cham, Kampot, and East Battambang battlefields. They destroyed 255 assorted guns, 3 commune offices, 21 trenches, 4 military barracks, a truck, a tractor, 2 rice milling machines, a paddy storehouse, and a quantity of guns, ammunition, and military materiel. They cut 22 sections of railway tracks for a total of 550 meters and 2 bridges, seized 33 assorted guns, a map, and some ammunition and military materiel. They also liberated two Vietnamese platoon positions and seven villages on the Kompong Cham battlefield and five others on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

According to VODK at 2330 GMT on 22 January, DK troops killed or wounded 236 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Kompong Som, East Battambang, Sisophon-south of Route 5, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, and Chhep battlefields from 1 to 18 January. They destroyed 56 assorted weapons, a truck, 74 trenches, and some military materiel. They seized a quantity of weapons, ammunition, and military materiel. They liberated and occupied two Vietnamese positions in Koh Kong Province and liberated four villages in Kompong Thom Province.

VONADK at 2315 GMT on 24 January reports that between 1 and 21 January, DK forces killed 165 Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded 178 others on the Pailin-Route 10, Siem Reap, Koh Kong Leu, North Sisophon, South Sisophon, Mondolkiri, Kompong Thom, Kompong Chhnang, Kampot, and Samlot battlefields. They destroyed 18 weapons, 7 barracks, 33 trenches, 4 commune offices, 170 meters of railroad tracks, warehouses, and 4 trucks. They seized 16 weapons, ammunition, and other materiel. They also liberated four villages in Kompong Tralach District, Kompong Chhnang Province, and eight others in Stoeng Trang District, Kompong Cham Province.

According to VODK at 2330 GMT on 24 January, DK troops killed or wounded 212 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the Kampot, Pailin-Route 10, West Battambang, and South Sisophon battlefields from 15 to 21 January. They destroyed 15 weapons, 7 trucks, 75 trenches, 4 barracks, 4 commune offices, and 315 meters of railroad tracks. They seized 45 weapons and some materiel. They also liberated 2 platoon positions on the Samlot battlefield and 10 villages.

SRV Tanks Run Down Monk

BK260531 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 25  
Jan 85

["News commentary": "The Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Ran Their Tanks Over  
Inhabitants of Oudong District, Killing 21, Including 1 Monk"]

[Text] On 30 December on the road leading to Kompong Luong in Oudong District  
of Kompong Speu Province, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors ran their tanks over  
inhabitants--killing 21, including a monk--for no reason at all as these  
inhabitants were driving their ox-carts on the road.

Our Cambodian people living in the Vietnamese-controlled zone, both in the  
towns and in the countryside, have been oppressed and massacred by the  
Vietnamese enemy aggressors. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have often  
killed our people on the roads by running their tanks, cars, and motorcycles  
over them. Despite their crimes against our people, the Vietnamese enemy  
aggressors have shamelessly clamored that they have come to salvage the  
Cambodian people. They have committed these crimes in an attempt to extermi-  
nate the Cambodian race.

5 Battambang Villages 'Liberated'

BK250506 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24  
Jan 85

[Text] On the night of 20 January, our national army and guerrillas attacked  
a Vietnamese commune office at Phnom Toch on north Battambang battlefield. In  
a 15-minute battle, we killed a Vietnamese enemy soldier and wounded two  
others; destroyed 3 office buildings, 10 trenches, a warehouse, 3 cans of  
gasoline, 2 cans of diesel fuel, and a motorcycle; seized an AR-15, a map,  
documents, and some war materiel; and liberated 5 villages: Phnum Toch Khang  
Cheung, Phnum Toch Khang Tbong, Thnal Bat, Paoy Ta Sek, and Prey Totoeng.

Long live our valiant and courageous national army, guerrillas, and people on  
the north Battambang battlefield!

18 Jan Battle

BK250452 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24  
Jan 85

[Text] On 18 January, our national army and guerrillas attacked a Vietnamese  
commune office at Russei Krang on Moug battlefield [Battambang Province].  
After a 10-minute battle, we liberated and completely controlled this commune  
office. We killed a Vietnamese expert and wounded 3 others and destroyed a  
commune office, 10 trenches, and some war materiel. We also seized an SK  
rifle and two mines. We liberated five villages: Thnal Bal, Thnaot Khang,  
(Srah Cheaneang), Tuol Taphem, and Tuol Neak Kru.

Long live our valiant and courageous national army, guerrillas, and people on the Mounge battlefield!

#### 21 Jan Leach Battlefield Activities

BK250430 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24 Jan 85

[Text] On the morning of 21 January, the Vietnamese enemy gathered its forces from Banteay Petsep on Leach battlefield [Pursat Province] to attack and push us toward the west. However, we repulsed the Vietnamese attack. The Vietnamese attacked us a second time; this attack was also repulsed. The Vietnamese successively attempted to attack us again. All the Vietnamese attempts--six altogether--to attack us on 21 January were repulsed by our forces.

We killed 77 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded many more. We destroyed many weapons and seized 2 DK-75 guns, a 12.7-mm machinegun, 7 B-40 rocket launchers, 19 AK's, and some war materiel.

On the afternoon of 21 January, five Vietnamese trucks carrying 105-mm and 130-mm shells from Anlung Reap to Banteay Petsip were ambushed and destroyed by our national army.

Long live our courageous and valiant national army, guerrillas, and people on the Leach battlefield!

#### Prek Kdam Ferry Crossing Attacked

BK280102 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 27 Jan 85

[Text] At 2300 on 25 January, our national army attacked and liberated the Prek Kdam Township and ferry crossing about 30 km northeast of Phnom Penh. At the same time, we continued to attack and sweep the Vietnamese enemy and liberate market places between the Prek Kdam ferry crossing to Cheung Chhnok, including Sambo and Tang Srang communes.

1. The Prek Kdam ferry crossing and township: We killed 12 Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded many others; the remaining soldiers fled. We destroyed 8 weapons, 3 Soviet ferries, 10 big boats, 6 37-horsepower boat engines, 7 row boats, 2 250 kilowatt generators, 45 barracks, and the Prek Kdam commune office. We seized five AK's, four SKS's, a carbine, two AR-15's, two typewriters, and other materiel including ammunition. We completely liberated the Prek Kdam Township and five villages: Prek Kdam Ti Muoy, Prek Kdam Ti Pi, Thnal Bat, Sasei, and Kaoh Chen.

2. Sambo Commune: We completely destroyed the Vietnamese commune office at (Ta Poy) Thmar Keng. We killed or wounded a number of Vietnamese soldiers. We destroyed two trucks, two D-16 tractors, a gasoline station, a crate of AK

loaders, and some war materiel. We liberated five villages: (Ty Poy) Thmar Keng, (Kakeut), Real, Balang, and Sambo.

3. Tang Srang Commune: We destroyed the Tang Srang Commune office at Cheung Chhnok market place. We killed four Vietnamese enemy soldiers and wounded another. We destroyed some war materiel. We seized two AK's and liberated four villages: Cheung Chhnok, Phnum Del, Tang Chouk, and AK Triem. We also freed 20 people who were imprisoned by the Vietnamese.

## 2 Siem Reap Attacks

BK270518 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] At 2315 on 20 January, our National Army attacked the Kompong Kdei populated area, which is the district town of Chikreng District in Siem Reap Province, with the following results:

1. We killed four Vietnamese soldiers and wounded six others. We destroyed 4 AK's, 7 AR-15's, 1 radio receiver, 10 telephone sets, 1 truck, 1 district office, 1 cloth storage facility containing 8,000 meters of cloth, 10 barracks, 10 bicycles, and 3 ricemills containing 65,000 bushels of paddy for feeding the Vietnamese troops. We set fire to a district trade service facility. The fire was still burning on 22 January.

2. We seized 3 AK's, 1 carbine, 250 rounds of AK ammunition, 120 carbine bullets, 9 hammocks, 6 rolls of cloth, 3 typewriters, 1 telephone set, and some war materiel.

On 13 January, our National Army attacked the Varin District town located at Kouk Dong in Siem Reap Province. After a 15-minute fight, we freed this district town. We killed 13 Vietnamese soldiers; wounded 7 others; destroyed 10 AK's, 1 82-mm mortar, 1 60-mm mortar, 1 C-25 radio set, 1 telephone set, 6 barracks, 10 trenches, and some war materiel; and seized 5 AK's, 1 B-40, 1 RPD, 6 B-40 rockets, 300 rounds of AK ammunition, 300 meters of telephone cable, and some war materiel.

## 7 Kompong Thom Villages 'Liberated'

BK260644 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2339 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Text] On the night of 22 January, we launched a 3-pronged attack on the populated area in Chey Village, Sandan District, Kompong Thom Province. The first prong was aimed at the Vietnamese platoon position on the bank of the Stoeng Sen River; the second at the paddy store; and the third at the commune office and trade service storage. After 25 minutes of battle, we totally liberated and took control of this populated area. We killed 7 Vietnamese soldiers and wounded 5 others; destroyed 5 AK's, 2 B-40's, 12 AR-15's, 2 paddy stores containing 300 metric tons of rice, a cloth store containing 50 rolls

of cloth, a material store, a commune office, a large rice milling machine, 15 bicycles, and 2 barrels of gasoline; and seized 2 rolls of cloth, a map, 3 hammocks, and some war materiel.

On the night of 20 January, we attacked a Vietnamese commune office at Khum Ngon in Sandan District, Kompong Thom Province. We killed a Vietnamese soldier; destroyed a commune office, a house of the Vietnamese security forces, and some war materiel; seized two AK's, an AR-15, and some ammunition and war materiel; and liberated seven villages: Phum Ngon, O Tnaot, Samphi, (Salau), Trap, (Rongkus), and Veal Pring.

Company of Cambodians 'Released'

BK260556 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Text] On 21 January, we attacked Vietnamese commune offices in Mepring Commune, Cheung Prey District, Kompong Cham Province. We killed or wounded some Vietnamese soldiers; destroyed 2 commune offices, 8 barracks, 10 trenches, and some documents and war materiel; seized an AK, 6 AK pouches, and 1,800 rounds of AK ammunition; liberated 2 villages--Phum Mepring and Tang Aleav--and released and sent home a company of Cambodian soldiers.

CSO: 4212/37



CAMBODIA

BRIEFS

'BANDITS' KILLED, WOUNDED--Our forces in Kampot Province recently launched operations to smash the enemy hiding in hilly areas, dealing them heavy blows. We killed or wounded more than 40 of them, took a prisoner, and seized a quantity of weapons and military materiel. This has scattered the Pol Pot bandits and weakened them. Security forces in every locality in Kampot Province pledge to heighten their combat spirit and are always ready to wipe out the Pol Pot bandits to ensure peace for the people. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 22 Jan 85]

1984 ACTIVITIES REPORT--In 1984, security forces in Kompong Thom Province closely cooperated with Vietnamese volunteer troops and launched sweeping operations against the Pol Pot bandits who hid in the jungles. The bandits were seriously defeated. During that period of time, our forces killed over 400 enemy soldiers, wounded more than 260 others, and captured 123 others. They also seized a large quantity of assorted weapons and military materiel. Furthermore, our combatants appealed to misled persons in the ranks of the Pol Pot-Sihanouk-Son Sann bandits to return to the fold. Due to the effort to propagate the party's clemency policy to the enemy's ranks, in 1984 Kompong Thom Province received 469 misled compatriots who presented themselves with their weapons to the revolutionary state power in various localities. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 24 Jan 85]

GDR DELEGATION LEAVES--On 24 January, the delegation from the GDR's Socialist Unity Party Central Organizational Department--led by its vice chairman, (Walter Lorenz)--returned home after a successful 1-week visit to the PRK. Seeing the delegation off at Pochentong airport were Chey Saphon, member of the party Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Organizational Department; and Prach Sun, vice chairman of the party Central Commission for External Relations. GDR Ambassador to the PRK Gunter Horn was also present. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 24 Jan 85 BK]

SIHANOUK'S MESSAGE OF THANKS--On 13 January Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea, sent a message of thanks to His Excellency Veselin Djuranovic, president of the SFRY. After thanking His Excellency Veselin Djuranovic for the new year wishes sent to him in Pyongyang, Samdech, on behalf of the Cambodian people and in his own name, wished His Excellency Veselin Djuranovic happiness and success in his historic mission as president of the SFRY. Furthermore, the Samdech expressed high appreciation and profound gratitude for the noble, vigorous, and constant support of the glorious SFRY for our national liberation. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 24 Jan 85]

CSO: 4212/37

INDONESIA

CHANGE IN FRETILIN POLICIES NECESSARY TO HASTEN SETTLEMENT

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 8 Dec 84 pp 12-R & 13-R

/Article by Joao Mesquita: "Time for Change"/

/Text/ Today, the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia is 9 years old and Fretilin confirms a major change in its strategy. Are we any closer to the resolution of this conflict?

For some people this is a new strategy, less radical but still insufficient. For others this is only a new attempt to achieve peace by sacrificing some basic positions for this purpose which until a short time ago were considered non-negotiable. For everybody however the thing that is at stake is an endless war which has to be ended. FRETILIN /Revolutionary Front for East Timor Independence/ obviously does not want to be left out of any negotiated solution. This is why it is prepared to pursue to the utmost the contacts with the UDT /expansion unknown/ which were interrupted in 1975 and which were resumed at the beginning of this year -- even though in its official position statements it called that organization a "puppet" and "reactionary" on various occasions.

The recent peace proposals from FRETILIN are the logical consequence of a plan that dates back to 1983. During that year, specifically on 23 March, FRETILIN for the first time submitted to Indonesia -- in conversations conducted at that time -- a plan to end the war which had been ravaging Maubere territory since 1979.

Implying an immediate cease-fire, to be controlled by a multinational force from the UN, this plan calls for the broadening of conversations to include Portugal with a view to the establishment of a transition administration and direct voting by the people.

As Abilio Araujo, the FRETILIN leader abroad, confirmed for us again today, his movement's proposal was aimed at obtaining a definition of peace in this martyred territory. At the same time it was accompanied by an appeal to the unity of all those who oppose occupation by Indonesia "independently of the disagreements that may arise on the way thereafter."

The cease-fire did take effect but not for long. The Indonesians did not waste any time in resuming hostilities, thus frustrating the plans of FRETILIN.

#### "A Parliamentary and Multiparty System"

In October of this year, FRETILIN decided to pick the proposal up again, this time with an additional point: recognition of the right to free political expression in the territory after the end of the war.

At that point, preparations were already in progress for another United Nations General Assembly where the problem of East Timor once again was not up for discussion. Parallel to that, conversations had already been started between Portugal, as the theoretical administering power, and Indonesia, as the occupation power.

In this context, the new proposal submitted by FRETILIN above all was intended to widen the movement's elbow room with a view to its immediate participation in the conversations. While it is true, as we have once again been told by Abilio Araujo, that "there will not be any peace without the consent of FRETILIN," it also appears to be true that the removal from the negotiations of the only force that is fighting Indonesia with weapons in hand does significantly reduce its operating leeway, thus making it more difficult to find a satisfactory way out.

On the other hand, the addition to the March 1983 plan would have to make it clear that FRETILIN is not claiming that it is the exclusive representative of the people of Timor. Probably to make sure that there would be no further doubt on that score, Abilio Araujo told us that his movement is even ready to accept in East Timor "a multiparty parliamentary system."

But what would be the political significance of this proposal which the FRETILIN representative found it necessary to explain in Lisbon? Is this "a useful and necessary strategic change," intended "to strengthen the international credibility of FRETILIN" and "to unify the representation of the movement abroad and the men who fight in the mountains," as was noted by Manuel Tilman, the former chairman of the parliamentary commission for watching the situation on East Timor?

First of all, FRETILIN seems to have acquired a clear awareness of the losses which the war is inflicting on it. It was not by chance that Ramos Horta -- although saying that his movement is in a position "to resist as long as necessary" -- in the end admitted that the current situation implies "great suffering for the parties involved."

At the same time, FRETILIN has realized the consequences of the conflict on the geostrategic level. Although blaming the whole thing on Indonesia, Ramos Horta himself admits that the conflict has become a "source of instability in the area."

Finally, FRETILIN arrived at the conclusion that it "will not find a military solution to the war." It was Ramos Horta again who said, when it comes to arriving at a conclusion, that "since Indonesia will never win," the only way out is "the way of negotiation."

#### "FRETILIN Must Change More"

The question now is what FRETILIN is ready to do to achieve a situation which Ramos Horta himself defines as "neither winning, nor losing."

According to the movement's representative at the UN, priority will go to the construction of a platform "of all those who want independence for East Timor." Among these he mentions the leadership of the UDT in Australia, and the Catholic sectors connected with the former bishop of Timor, Monsignor Martinho Lopes.

Nevertheless, Ramos Horta was not talking about the representatives of the UDT in Portugal, nor the MNLTD (National Movement for the Liberation of Timor-Dili). Regarding the former, he has an alibi: he says that they are only delegates. As for the latter -- with whom EXPRESSO has not been able to establish any contact -- he says that this is an organization which "does not represent any refugee." However, he is still ready to reverse his position if the MNLTD "manages to bring ten persons to the table."

All of these proposals however are insufficient for Manuel Tilman. In his opinion, FRETILIN "has to change much more to get international credibility," something which he believes to be perfectly possible, since "it does not want to lose contact with the rank and file" and for the latter the movement's abbreviation "means National Front" of all those who resist the invader.

From Tilman's viewpoint, FRETILIN would achieve that credibility by beginning "to talk to all of those people from Timor who are abroad, regardless of whether they are with the UDT or the APODETI /expansion unknown/." This is far from the view he holds at this time since, as we saw, FRETILIN only seems inclined to negotiate with the top leadership of the UDT in Australia.

On the other hand, the former ASDI /expansion unknown/ deputy, who is a native of Timor, stresses the need for FRETILIN, in his opinion, developing "a more constructive approach toward the Portuguese state." As direct criticism of Ramos Horta, Tilman says that it is impossible to propose negotiations and "after arriving in Lisbon, to say that Portugal did nothing to solve the situation of the people of Timor." According to Manuel Tilman, one cannot "confuse Portugal and the Portuguese people with a government and a minister of that government." This is another criticism which he has directed at FRETILIN.

Finally, the former chairman of the parliamentary commission for watching the situation in East Timor considers it absolutely necessary for FRETILIN to have "a fixed strategy," divided into three essential phases: "immediate demilitarization of Timor; creation of a policy of joint intervention between Portugal and Timor to control the cease-fire; holding a referendum for the population within a period of 3-5 years."

Under the provisions of this proposal, it would be necessary to vote on the "matter of national sovereignty" only after the referendum was held and on the basis of its results.

But while this is the strategy proposed by Tilman, the way FRETILIN is ready to go turns out to be different. The movement is first of all particularly concerned with the preparation of a mini-summit of its representatives abroad, scheduled for the middle of January in Maputo; the objectives of that gathering involve the planning for the entire action during the year 1985.

In the light of new proposals that might possibly be taken up in Maputo, Ramos Horta nevertheless already hinted to us that the movement would launch an offensive in view of the meeting of the human rights commission to be held in February or March at the UN. With the objective of preparing that meeting, the FRETILIN representative at the United Nations is to go to Scandinavia at the end of January after a renewed visit to Australia, where he will continue contacts with the UDT.

Ramos Horta also informed us that the UDT leadership in that country is already holding briefing sessions for its rank-and-file supporters to discuss the proposals presented to it by FRETILIN.

The ultimate objective of this entire effort, according to Ramos Horta himself, is a "Congress of the People of East Timor" abroad.

More important than all of this however seems to be the significance which FRETILIN assigns to the international conference on East Timor to be held in June in Portugal. As we know, this conference was called by the foreign affairs ministers of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries meeting in Bissau last August; it only remains for FRETILIN to designate the precise time and place for that meeting.

On the results of this conference -- already scheduled for the middle of next January in Lisbon, precisely in order to make use of the pre-election campaign time -- will to a great extent depend FRETILIN's subsequent strategy.

Regardless of whether sectors linked with the movement do or do not put up a presidential candidate (as EXPRESSO admits in its latest edition), it appears quite credible that other "presidential hopefuls" will use this moment to raise this issue.

Now, this circumstance, plus the commitment which the five Portuguese-speaking African countries appear to be making toward the solution of the conflict, can confront the Portuguese government with the need for revising its strategy on this issue. Right now, that strategy seems to call for not recognizing FRETILIN, as expressed by its deliberate exclusion from the conversations with Indonesia or the excuse given by the office of the minister of foreign affairs who, on our request, commented on the new proposal which Ramos Horta was to present in Lisbon.

Sectors connected with FRETILIN are perfectly well aware of that and it is therefore no coincidence that the movement's delegate at the United Nations confided to us that, because of this, he would not even ask for any audience with the minister. "For our part, new contacts with the Portuguese government can come only after the Maputo conference," Ramos Horta told us.

So far, FRETILIN believes that attack is the best defense. This is why, while strengthening its links with the "five" countries, it is pursuing a diplomacy of its own whose ultimate objective is to gather support for the submission of a proposal during the next General Assembly of the United Nations addressing the problem to the court at The Hague.

Ramos Horta himself admits that this is a way of gaining time. But he did not fail to stress the importance of enabling the movement to get to the General Assembly of the United Nations with an opinion favorable to its cause, although the ruling of the court at The Hague is merely consultative.

In any case, it is clear that the movement will only get full advantage out of stressing this orientation in talking to the Portuguese Government. But it remains to be seen whether FRETILIN is ready to go to Necessidades Palace or whether, on the contrary, it will stick to the addition to the peace plan which Ramos Horta disclosed during his trip to Portugal.

In the opinion of Manuel Tilman, a man who advocates a wider opening, the former would be the only possible way since, in his opinion, "if Portugal continues not to receive it, FRETILIN will not have any strength." As for FRETILIN as such, it will be necessary to wait to see what the "new language" that Ramos Horta talked to us about is really like. In the meantime, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been hinting at some "plans" outlines are still in the realm of imagination.

5058

CSO: 3542/72

INDONESIA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON INDONESIAN PERSONALITIES

[Unless otherwise noted, the following information on Indonesian personalities has been extracted from Indonesian language sources published in Jakarta.]

MASJCHUN SOFWAN--President Soeharto has reappointed Master of Laws H. Masjchun Sofwan, governor of Jambi Province, to a second term, to run from 1984-89. Masjchun Sofwan was born in Blitar, East Java, on 7 September 1927. He obtained his law degree from the University of Gadjah Mada in 1962. He had previously been deputy governor of Central Java and regent of Magelang Regency. [Excerpts] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 15 Nov 84 p 1] 5170

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (MARINES) SOEKANDA--Recently, Colonel (Marines) Soedarno, the chief of staff of the Surabaya Garrison, representing the commander of the Surabaya Garrison, installed Lieutenant Colonel (Marines) Soekanda in office as assistant for operations to the commander of the Surabaya Garrison, replacing Lieutenant Colonel (Marines) Mulyadi. The ceremony took place in the meeting hall at the headquarters of the Surabaya Garrison. Lieutenant Colonel Mulyadi will be assigned as commander of the Marine Corps Logistics Administrative Depot in Surabaya. Lieutenant Colonel Soekanda had previously been a staff officer at Marine Corps Headquarters in Jakarta. Lieutenant Colonel Soekanda has been a Marine Corps officer since graduating from the Navy Academy in 1964. In 1971 he was assigned to the antiaircraft artillery battalion at the Navy and Marine Corps Training Center. From 1979 to 1982 he was commander of the Air Defense Artillery Battalion. From 1982 to the present he was a staff officer assigned to Marine Corps Headquarters in Jakarta. Decorations he holds include the Satya Lencana Penegak, the Satya Lencana Dharma, the Dwija Sista, and the Satya Lencana Kesetiaan (16 years). [Excerpt] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 15 Nov 84 p 6] 5170

R. A. J. LUMENTA--R. A. J. Lumenta, the new managing director of Garuda Indonesian Airways, is an old hand at this government-owned airline. Together with Wiweko Supono, who was appointed managing director of Garuda in 1968, Lumenta participated in building and developing the airline as secretary of Garuda since 1975. In 1979 he was assigned to duty as managing director of Merpati Nusantara Airlines (MNA), a subsidiary of Garuda. He temporarily turned over his duties at MNA to Sukardjo Jonohadi on 9 May 1983 when he had to undergo medical treatment in the Netherlands. After his health improved, Lumenta returned to his duties as managing director of MNA on 5 October 1983, while Sukardjo returned to his post on the staff of the managing director of Garuda. Lumenta was born in Surabaya on

26 February 1933. He has six children. He graduated from elementary school in Magelang [Central Java] in 1945, from junior high school in Bandung in 1949 and from senior high school in 1950. He attended the Higher Technical School in Rotterdam the Netherlands, in 1953, attended a DC-8 aircraft school in 1965, and the W. Ascott Management Course, also in 1965.

Lumenta began his working career as a vehicle mechanic in the Army Materiel Inspectorate in Bandung in 1950. Some 5 years later he was an assembly worker and technician at the Alam Railway Car Factory in Rotterdam. He began to work for Garuda in 1957, at a time when the airline was in the process of taking over maintenance work from Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). Lumenta entered the Technical Service of Garuda in December 1957 and became chief of the Aircraft Daily Repair Section in the Technical Service, prior to being promoted to be chief of the Bureau of Standards Supervision in January 1959. In January 1969 he was appointed chief of production in the Technical Service of Garuda. In 1971 he became Technical Manager. He became secretary of Garuda in March 1975, while also serving as logistics manager. [Excerpt] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 17 Nov 84 p 12] 5170

ENGR KARNO BARKAH--Engr Karno Barkah, managing director of the Jakarta-Cengkareng Airport Company, was born in Temanggung (Central Java) on 26 December 1922. His last previous position had been that of director of the Jakarta International Cengkareng Airport Project since 1980. The working career of this father of two children began in 1943, when he entered the Railway Service. From 1945 to 1947 he was a railway machinist in the Railway Service. He holds a bachelor's degree from Bandung Technical University (now known as Bandung Technological Institute). He also obtained a degree in machinery engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and did post graduate work at MIT Aero in the U. S. A.

In addition to working for the Railway Service he served from 1950-54 as a flight officer, as chief of the Airworthiness Service of the Department of Communications (1950-62), as managing director of civil aviation in the Department of Communications (1963-68), and as deputy permanent Indonesian representative to the International Civil Aeronautics Organization in Canada (1968-76), before being appointed secretary of the Directorate General of Air Communications, where he served from 1976-80.

This scholar who speaks English, French, German, and Dutch was made an officer of the French Legion of Honor for his services on behalf of cooperative relations between France and Indonesia. When he was awarded this decoration by French Ambassador Jean Soulier in Jakarta, senior Indonesian Government officials were in attendance. [Excerpt] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 17 Nov 84 p 12] 5170

CSO: 4213/83



LAOS

EDITORIAL NOTES ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 1 Dec 84 pp 1, 3

[Editorial: "Highly Uphold Spirit of 2 December National Day" A shorter KPL English version of this item was published in FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific Book 7 December 1984 p 16]

[Excerpt] The historic day of 2 December, which marked the collapse of the corrupt old regime, is the day which opened a bright new era for our Lao nation [in which] to advance to socialism, and it has come around once more. This year is the ninth anniversary.

The past 9 years have been a period to test the determination and steadfastness of the honored members of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), of the young government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) and of our multi-ethnic people in protecting and building the nation on the path to socialism which bypasses capitalist growth. [Capitalist growth] is a period of serious class conflict to settle the problem of "who will conquer whom" between the two paths of socialism and capitalism. In addition these have been 9 years of strong growth for our new system; it has been improved and strengthened in the socialist revolutionary struggle unceasingly, which attests to the correctness of the policies of the LPRP, which is led by the respected and loved Comrade Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane.

The past 9 years have been years in which our entire party, our entire army and our entire people have increased their revolutionary will without let-up, have surmounted every obstacle, have firmly protected the fruits of the revolution, have overcome the wounds of war, have rebuilt and expanded the economy and culture to the best of their ability and have achieved great successes in all areas. This has caused the complexion of the country to change, and the standard of living of the people has improved. The position and influence of our revolution and country in the international arena have steadily risen. This is especially true in the past 3 years; under the [guiding] light of the resolutions of the Third Party Congress of the LPRP and the various important resolutions of the Party Central Committee of our country there has been a turn-around and many new things have appeared.

Our system of the dictatorship of the proletariat which functions under the leadership of the party, the administration of the state and the collective

ownership of the people has constantly been made more efficient. The various circles [of the hierarchy] from the center to the grassroots are getting stronger every day. The rank and file of cadres are getting stronger every day. The rank and file of party cadres and state cadres are improving and increasing greatly; they have been improved politically, ideologically, professionally and culturally. They have steadily increased their decisive role in the administration of the state, the economy and the society.

The two big branches of agriculture, crop cultivation and animal husbandry, have done nothing but expand. If production in 1983 is compared with 1980, rice production has increased 4.4 percent, corn 12.5 percent, coffee 20.4 percent, peanuts 10 percent...the number of buffalo has increased 7.3 percent, cattle 8.7 percent, swine 17 percent, poultry 51 percent. At the end of June 1984 there were 2,402 agricultural cooperatives throughout the country. Of these 700 were model cooperatives. During the last 4 years we have been able to produce an average of 1.1 million tons of rice per year.

Industry and forestry did not stop at their old levels. The production of plywood in 1983 was 6.6 times as great as that of 1980, hingao [glue] was 3.5 times as great, tobacco increased 1.3 percent, baked clay 4.4 percent, agricultural tools 7.4 percent, and electric wire [production] was 41 times as great. Construction in 1983 was 41.3 percent higher than in 1980 and was better able to handle large projects than in the past; eight large bridges were built, another 267 kilometers of roads were paved and 50 kilometers were paved with gravel. Communication and transportation expanded rapidly in 1983. When compared with 1980 the volume of trade increased 51.1 percent. Passenger travel increased 23.4 percent. Trade improved and expanded. Rice purchases in 1983 surpassed those of 1980 by 10.5 percent. Exports increased 71.5 percent and imports increased 71 percent. In addition the expansion of education, culture and public health was decisive in making our new system, the LPDR, strong. Now we have wiped out illiteracy for 96 percent of the population.

Especially in the last year under the [guiding] light of the fourth, fifth and sixth resolutions (third session) of the Party Central Committee and the various resolutions of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, we have been able to achieve resounding victories in many areas. These have primarily been in production, raising the standard of living, and defending the nation and the peace. On the agricultural production front we strove to fulfill the goal of 2.5 tons per hectare and strove to produce 1.3 million tons of rice. On the front to protect the nation and the peace we have been able to crush the destructive schemes of the enemy; we crushed the schemes of the Chinese great power expansionists and the rightwing reactionaries running Thailand who sent Thai soldiers to seize three Lao villages in Sayaboury Province. They wanted to occupy Lao territory for a long time, to create tension and to fight in our country; they were dealt an important defeat. This victory has broad and deep political significance both within [this country] and for the world. It caused our feeling of collective mastery over our nation and our people to increase and caused every branch of activity of cadres, state employees, soldiers and every ethnic group of our people to expand after this period of testing. It also caused the influence and reputation of the LPDR

government and those who were true to this endeavor to rise in the international arena.

In order to hold on high the spirit of that historic day of 2 December in doing our duty of protecting and building the nation and progressing steadily toward socialism, our entire party, our entire army and all the people should advance bravely with the movement of socialist struggle. They should work to increase production, be cautious and be prepared to counter every trick and every destructive move of the imperialists, the Chinese greater power expansionists, the right-wing reactionaries among the Thai power holders and all reactionary influences so that they are promptly defeated. This consists primarily of carrying out their two military duties as much as they can, and these are: protecting the country and building the socialist nation so that it is a great success.

Now more than ever before the Lao nation, we Lao people, have vitality. This is the combined vitality of a country which is independent and unified, which has found the truth and has strong convictions, which will not surrender and has achieved close solidarity so that it is able to resist invaders and defeat many reactionaries including those which are like vipers. We have the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the socialist system of collective mastery, and of the correct and creative policies of our party, a party which began with the communist parties of Indo-China and is a real Marxist-Leninist party. We have the strength of the entire party, of the entire army and of all the people, which have joined in solidarity as one. We have the strength of the special solidarity among Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia and between Laos and the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the other revolutionary movements in the world. It is certain that we must go forward to successfully complete the historic task which the party has assigned.

8149

CSO: 4206/62

LAOS

VIENTIANE PROVINCE COOP DEVELOPMENT, TENSION NOTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Dec 84 p 2

[Article: "The Growth and Expansion of Agricultural Cooperatives in Vientiane Province"]

[Excerpt] There have been more improvements in and conversions to agricultural cooperatives in Vientiane Province in 1984 than in the previous year because province officials sent cadres to live at the grassroots level to cooperate closely with the agricultural cooperative units, the local administrative units and all members of the agricultural cooperatives. This also accounts for the five model cooperatives in Vientiane Province. Before achieving model cooperatives like these one goes through [a stage] of arousing the farmers with many illustrations and examples which cover the depth and breadth of cooperation for individuals and families. As a result many villages voluntarily established labor exchange teams and cooperative work units. In the initial stages they met difficulties and confusion. A number of farmers became discouraged and lost heart. At this point it can be said that the struggle between the two classes and the two paths, socialism and capitalism, "becomes a matter of who will conquer whom." This was rather serious, but with encouragement and real leadership the province was able to overcome this and concentrate on solving some basic problems such as: irrigation, applying technology to production, and establishing suitable administrations for cooperatives and production. Because of this the people understood and agreed with cooperativization thereafter. As regards the cooperative production units of farmers throughout Vientiane Province there were 104 units which were comprised of 728 families and 14 villages primarily concentrated in two districts: Thoulakhom District and Keo-oudom District.

Comrade Sivilai Sulivong of the committee for the Agriculture, Irrigation and Agricultural Cooperatives Service of Vientiane Province gave the following details: in 1984 there were 66 agricultural cooperatives throughout the province. Of these 13 were new. They were comprised of 8,864 people and 1,707 families. They had 4,902 primary workers and 919 secondary workers. [They had] 1,689 hectares of rice fields and estimated their production would be 5,093 tons; they were able to produce 2.8 tons per hectare. An agricultural cooperative member averaged 503 kilograms of rice paddy, which is 10 percent more than in 1983. It appears that the agricultural cooperative members will have enough to eat and that they will be able to stockpile 90 tons and have 18 tons to fulfill their obligation to the state.

LAOS

PRC BLAMED FOR THAI INTRANSIGENCE ON BORDER TALKS

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Dec 84 p 3

[Column: "The Atmosphere Is Still Not Right"]

[Text] With a firm commitment to good will from beginning to end [we] want the good neighborly relations between Laos and Thailand which have existed since ancient times even though Thailand is still using its soldiers to hold some Lao territory in the vicinity of the three villages of: Ban Mai Village, Ban Kang Village and Ban Savang Village in Paklai District, Sayaboury Province. And they have not proceeded according to the statement which Mr Sitthi Savetsila gave to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition they have continued to harass and threaten this area regularly by firing artillery and blasting the region of Houei Naseng, the area of the three villages, and the area which they encircled on 10 December 1984 herding off the Lao inhabitants to the Khi Ma area and refusing to let them return to their old homes. Nevertheless the government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic is still firmly committed to its position which is correct and positive, calling on the Thai side to return to the conference table again with the goal of solving the problem of the three Lao villages peacefully and allowing Lao-Thai relations to return to what they were before 6 June 1984. Unfortunately the response to the Thai side was contrary to the desires of the people of the two nations, Laos and Thailand, and was a response characteristic of a commander in the rear who said: "The atmosphere is not right for talks with Laos at this time." The newspaper, THE NATION, of 29 November 1984 referred to the matter as follows: "The Lao proposal has been rejected."

The circumstances of the rejection of this reasonable proposal of the Lao side for settling the problem of the three Lao villages in addition [to solving] an official rejection by letter from Mr Sitthi Savetsila to Mr Khamphai Buppha, our deputy foreign minister, also [involved] remarks by some high Thai officials who said: "There is nothing else to talk about" or "It is not the right time," etc.

The remarks of these responsible Thai officials is difficult to understand, for what is the atmosphere which is not suitable? Every destructive and hostile act has been perpetrated by the Thai side. It was the Thai side which used a military force of more than 2,000 men supported by artillery,

armored vehicles and tanks to invade, seize and occupy Lao villages for more than 4 months. It is not the case that Laos invaded Thai territory at all. Nevertheless, ever since the beginning of the incident of the three Lao villages, the Lao side has made every effort to solve the problem peacefully and has not sought this tension in Lao-Thai relations. The talks which have been held twice so far have not been successful because Thailand unilaterally announced an end to them. Laos still wants to resume them. The period from that time [of the stop] until now has been marked by an atmosphere caused when the Thai reactionaries created hardships for the Lao people in the area of the three villages on Lao territory, herding them up and compelling them to go to the Khi Ma area. This did not satisfy the Thai side at all, and they dared to say that "the atmosphere is still not right" in various ways. In this sort of a situation when would that which is called "atmosphere" be right for the Thai side for talks to solve the problem of the three Lao villages? Or are they waiting for orders from Beijing from the big boss, the commander in the rear, because the Thai are not their own boss. They just wait for direction from outside. This has been observed, as [we] will describe--every time the Thai invade and interfere in Laos they have just been following a plan from outside. From the time when fascist Japan invaded Indochina until the time of the French colonialists and the American imperialists, Thailand has relied on these invaders to invade and interfere in Laos, and now Thailand is relying on the Beijing reactionaries to destroy the good relations since ancient times between Laos and Thailand. In this situation it is certain that opportunities will be difficult for Thailand to find because everything depends on the commander in Beijing directly.

It is unfortunate that although Laos and Thailand have similar customs and languages and can hold talks between the representatives without interpreters, [they] cannot understand what is said. [They] cannot understand a reasonable proposal from the Lao side and merely say that the atmosphere is not right. [They] are probably waiting to see if some day the Beijing reactionaries will give permission; then Mr Sitthi Savetsila will be ready for talks.

8149

CSO: 4206/58

LAOS

EDITORIAL HAILS 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF VPA

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Dec 84 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "40 Years of Growth, Strength and Victories for the Heroic VPA"  
A shorter English version of this item was carried by Vientiane KPL 0000 GMT  
22 Dec 1984 and was published in the FBIS Asia and Pacific Daily Report  
26 Dec 84 pp 12, 3]

[Text] Forty years ago today, on 22 December 1944, the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh ordered the setting up of a propaganda unit for the liberation of Vietnam, and that date has been taken as the founding anniversary for the military forces of Vietnam. Today on 22 December 1984 the Lao people of ethnic groups are most happy to joint the fraternal Vietnamese people in celebrating the 40th anniversary of the heroic Vietnamese People's Army in an atmosphere of peace, independence, and complete freedom for our nations. Ours is a great victory in the struggle to defend our nations and to construct socialism.

The Vietnamese People's Army is a new type of army of the working class organized by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh, who was a born leader and was trained and grew up in the peak of the long and fierce struggle of the Vietnamese people's national liberation against the French colonialists, and who drove away the Japanese fascists. The Vietnamese People's Army through a 40-year period of construction, combat, growth, and strength and had glorious victories under the glorious flag of the former Indochinese Communist Party, and later the Communist Party of Vietnam. The army and the fraternal Vietnamese people achieved great all-round victories with historical significance in the profound era of uprising and successful revolution in August 1945, and established the Vietnamese Democratic Republic, the first nation of the working class and farmers in Southeast Asia, and whose heroic deeds at Dien Bien Phu echoed throughout the five continents. They won the old colonial war of the French imperialists and liberated half of the country. Later, the army and the Vietnamese people completely defeated the new and most cruel colonial war of the American imperialists and liberated South Vietnam in 1975, thereby unifying the whole nation and advancing to socialism. Early in 1979 they obtained a great victory in the fight against the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. They firmly defended their country and succeeded in their lofty international duty in helping the fraternal Cambodian people fight against and defeat the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-

Kheo-Samphan reactionaries who are Beijing's reactionary henchmen. They saved the Cambodian people from the danger of genocide by heavy hammering against Chinese expansionism. This resulted in a strong foundation for defending the independence and sovereignty of the three nations in Indochina, Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea, and together they have advanced to socialism and have become socialist outposts in Southeast Asia.

When we recall the 40 years of growth and glorious victories, it is clear that the VPA has faithfully carried out the teachings of the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh, who said, "Be faithful to the nation and the party, love the people, and be ready to make sacrifices for national independence, freedom, and socialism." All the duties which they were assigned to, e.g., training for combat, struggling to protect the peaceful work of the Vietnamese people, constructing the economy, or fighting against natural disaster, although they had to encounter difficulties and fierce hardship, the VPA succeeded beautifully in all of its duties as befits the admiration of the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh, who said, "Succeed in all duties, endure all difficulties, and defeat all enemies."

The victorious strength and the excellent heroic deeds of the VPA are the combined force and victories of the army and the people in the three fraternal countries of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, who have shared weal and woe, stood together side by side and fought in the same ditches, and obtained victories in the struggle for independence, freedom, and socialism. They took an important part in nurturing and increasing the militant solidarity, great friendship, and also the brilliant and rare special solidarity which is a matter of life and death and the expansion of the revolution in the three fraternal countries in Indochina.

The VPA has always assisted the Lao people. The brilliant spirit between the Vietnamese internationalist combatants and our Lao people and Lao army brightens the correctness of the great militant solidarity between the armies that truly believe in Marxism-Leninism and promotes rare, pure, firm, and strong ties so that they will grow, strengthen, and endure forever. This was correctly confirmed in the speech of General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane, respected by the party and our people, who said, "We maintain that every success scored by the Lao revolution had a direct contribution from the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese internationalist combatants and the Lao cadres and combatants and Lao people of ethnic groups shed their blood on every battlefield of our beloved country. The contribution of Vietnam to Laos has been most valuable; the friendship of the Vietnamese people toward the Lao people is most profound. Our cadres, combatants, and Lao people and our nation will always remember their great contribution and their deepest and firmest friendship."

Now the world situation is extremely tense because the American imperialists are insanely engaging in the arms race and are carrying out schemes to push humanity into a destructive nuclear war. They are increasing their military interference and are seriously threatening the peace and security of nations. In Southeast Asia the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are colluding with the American imperialists and other reactionary cliques and are still stubbornly



following their old schemes to weaken the three nations in Indochina, hoping to swallow up these nations so that they can open a route to expand their power into Southeast Asia. From early this year until now they have colluded with each other, and have encroached upon several border locations. They conducted serious crimes against the Vietnamese people, and provoked and created tension along the Vietnamese-Chinese, Lao-Chinese, Lao-Thai, and Cambodian-Thai borders. In June this year in particular the Thai ultrarightist reactionaries, in collusion with and encouraged by the Beijing reactionaries, sent their regular army to attack three Lao villages in Paklai District, Sayaboury Province, increasing military pressure to a new level and hoping to use this region as a lever to invade Laos. However, they were properly punished by the army and the Lao people. These evil acts of the enemies show that there has been no change in their strategy to destroy the revolution of the three Indochinese nations; on the contrary, it is worse and deeper than before.

Because of this situation the people and military forces of the three fraternal countries of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia must increase their cooperation, special solidarity, military relations, and great friendship. We must also increase all-round cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. We must unite with the world revolution and build up united forces to resolutely defeat every kind of destructive war of the enemies, to achieve socialist [goals], and to firmly protect our socialist countries.

On the occasion of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the heroic VPA we are even more grateful to the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh for bringing the light of Marxism-Leninism to illuminate the path of revolution and liberation for our two nations. He carefully built up relations and special solidarity between Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. He trained the Vietnamese military forces and the Vietnamese people in brilliant proletarian internationalism to unconditionally help Laos in every way, from their blood and sweat to [money], since the beginning of the revolution until now. We would like to pay homage to the spirit of the many groups of cadres, combatants, and Vietnamese people who came to help the Lao revolution. They sacrificed their lives bravely for the revolution of the Lao people of ethnic groups, for the benefit of militant solidarity, and for the life and death [struggle] of our two nations of Laos and Vietnam.

We would like to express our deep gratitude to the party, the government, and the people of the SRV throughout the period of almost half a century for their excellent all-round assistance in the national liberation of the Lao people, and for their present enduring all-round cooperation in defending the nation and in successfully constructing socialism.

We would like to express our deep gratitude to the heroic VPA, the victorious army that is the mainstay of Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia militant solidarity. We wish the VPA and the fraternal Vietnamese people further greater success in national defense and socialism and in the efforts to make the plenum of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam a reality, in taking part in defending socialist outposts in Southeast Asia, and in the common struggle of nations for national independence, sovereignty and socialism.

May the great Chairman Ho Chi Minh forever remain in our revolution.

May the special solidarity, militant relations, and enduring all-round cooperation between Laos and Vietnam, and among Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia remain forever.

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CSO: 4206/67

LAOS

BRIEFS

HOUA PHAN DISTRICT BANKING--From January until the present the cadres, soldiers and multi-ethnic people of Viangsai District, Houa Phan Province took the money they had saved from selling various items of production and deposited it in their district's branch of the state bank as part of a drive. It totalled more than 138,000 kip. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Dec 84 p 1] 8149

CSO: 4206/58

MALAYSIA

PROBLEMS RELATED TO MOVING UP GENERAL ELECTIONS VIEWED

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Commentary: "Worries Over National Front's Speedup of General Elections"]

[Text] Our general elections are held once every 5 years. After the 1982 elections, the next one should theoretically be held in 1987--more than 2 years to go. However, reports are already out that the coming elections may be moved up to the early or middle part of 1986.

If this were the case, a number of problems would be worth our pondering and study. One of them is: Would it be appropriate to hold the general elections in 1986?

According to the prevailing situation, if the general elections were moved up, it would be disadvantageous to the National Front, particularly because the three major parties--the UMNO, MCA and GERAKAN--are currently faced with thorny and unresolved problems.

As the National Front's most senior member, the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] is confronted with the threat of the spreading influence of the Islamic Party [PAS] in Kedah and Kelantan. In an effort to regain its past prestige, this party is vigorously launching its attacks against the UMNO in the above-mentioned two states, particularly its fierce challenge concerning the problem of Islam religion. It is clear that the PAS' moves are designed to wrest the votes of Muslim followers in the two said states.

This point has worried the UMNO. In reality, although UMNO won the previous elections in Kedah and Kelantan, the votes gained by the Islamic Party were not far behind. This shows that the Islamic Party's influence there is not to be taken lightly.

The Islamic Party's ultimate aim is to grasp the right to be in power in the two states as its operational base to expand its power.

The factional fight within the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] has been dragging on and on without a satisfactory formula for solution. The longer it continues, the more ill effects it will bring to the party. As a matter

of fact, this infighting has confronted the party with a serious split, and if it cannot be resolved within a short period, it is believed that the party's vitality cannot be regained.

If the factional fight cannot be resolved outside of the law court, the situation within the MCA can go from bad to worse. The problem is not only the MCA's, but also concerns the National Front coalition government. If MCA loses in the coming general elections, it will also mean a loss to the National Front. This is why it would be unacceptable to say that Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir, in his capacity as chairman of the National Front, does not show any concern over MCA's partisan war.

Traditionally, MCA's biggest foe in general elections has been and still is the Democratic Action Party [DAP], because each party aims at getting a victory in Chinese-dominated electoral districts, so it can justly claim the right to representation for the Chinese nationals.

At the previous general elections, the DAP was badly beaten by the MCA in many electoral districts. It has vowed to revenge in the coming elections. Now that the MCA is involved in a factional war, the DAP is taking advantage of its opponent's weak point. If the MCA cannot put its house in order, the DAP is bound to get the upper hand in the coming elections.

As to the Malaysian People's Movement [GERAKAN], it is also facing the same disintegrative situation as the MCA. If the grudges between the Lim Keng Yaik faction and the Michael Chen Wing Sum faction cannot be thrashed out, it is believed that GERAKAN cannot give full play to its strength in the next general elections, especially in the Penang district where it is likely to encounter greater pressures from opposition parties.

In addition, the loan scandal at the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance, the national economic problem and the Sam Poh Hill incident, plus the uncovering of a drug cache at Kaban, can become issues to be utilized by the opposition parties.

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CSO: 4205/13

MALAYSIA

COMMENTARY BLAMES RACIAL PREJUDICE FOR 'LION DANCE' PROBLEM

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 7 Dec 84 p 2

[Commentary]

[Text] On some festive occasions or any national celebration day, the Chinese community is regularly faced with the problem of lion dance performances. Admittedly, the "lion dance" cannot be performed during a national celebration on account of racial prejudice, yet it meets with police obstruction or prohibition even for the purpose of celebrating a Chinese festival. Consequently, Chinese society members are invariably worried over this issue.

As a matter of fact, a lion dance performance was never a complicated affair in the past. However, due to the increasing seriousness of ethnic polarization and the deviation of certain government functionaries in executing their tasks, applications by the Chinese for a "lion dance" permit are often made difficult, and certain extremist elements even arbitrarily drawn up their own rules to make things more complicated.

Therefore, the pretext that lion dance performances can upset public peace and order neatly indicates that the authorities have no uniform rules and regulations governing such performances, while policemen act on their own. In point of fact, there has been no record since independence to show that a lion dance has caused any unpleasant incident. Consequently, the numerous official restrictions are totally based on racial prejudice.

It is an undeniable fact that our nation is made up of three major nationalities. In pushing forward our national development, we cannot lack any one of the nationalities or deliberately erase the contributions of any one of them. Prime Minister Dr Mahathir has repeatedly stressed that if the United Malays National Organization [UMNO] lose the support of non-Malays such as the Chinese or the Indians, this government would not be able to function.

This being so, there is no reason for us to muscle out any nationality. By the same token, we have no reason to disavow the culture of any nationality.

It cannot be denied that the lion dance is a cultural relic originating from China, and it is correct for Chinese nationals to accept this art of "lion dancing." The reason is that we are descendants of the legendary Yellow Emperor, to whom our roots belong, just as the cultures of the Malays and Indians originated from Indonesia and India. Even American culture cannot detach itself from English culture. Therefore, in handling and implementing any policy, we cannot let art and culture be dragged into another country, because this would be an extreme manifestation of racial prejudice.

The ethnic-Chinese nationals treat the lion dance purely as a traditional art, just as we treat the arts and cultures of the Malays and the Indians as their traditional art. But we do not regard them as belonging to Indonesia and India.

As the history of Malaysia's national construction is still short, it is unavoidable that within the arts and cultures of our three major nationalities still exist the patterns of the countries of origin. But as long as we respect and emulate one another, a new generation of the true Malaysian culture will be molded with the passing of time. At the same time, the true Malaysians of the new generation will, under the impact of history, naturally blend the essence of the cultures of the three major races and mold it into their own culture.

Therefore, in dealing with the "lion dance" art of the Chinese, the authorities should not adopt a hostile attitude with prejudicial factors. They should treat it as a part of the traditional artistic culture of the nation.

We are astonished that the lion dance has become not only a problem for the Chinese, but of the nation as well. Yet, the government has not formulated a uniform set of regulations, thereby prompting a number of policemen to draw up their own rules. This is a deplorable thing indeed.

We hope that in drawing up the regulation for the lion dance, the government will consider the organizational structure of our nation, respect the traditional arts and cultures of the nationalities and refrain from imposing many restrictions against the lion dance. Then the "lion dance" problem will exist no longer.

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CSO: 4205/13

MALAYSIA

EXPANSION TREND OF ETHNIC CHINESE BUSINESSES DISCUSSED

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 10 Dec 84 p 2

[Commentary]

[Text] In the past, most Chinese loved family-style businesses, hence the criticism that things move very slowly and their businesses can never develop into big enterprises.

This kind of criticism is accurate. We must admit that such method of doing business is out of date. In other words, it no longer fulfills the requirements of the times. If we stand still and refuse to make progress, we are bound to be relegated one day.

Along with the transformation of the times, commercial and industrial enterprises have become modernized. This modern management has brought about a speedy development, which is beneficial to the nation.

We are gratified to learn that the Chinese way of doing business has undergone changes in the 1980's, leaping from the family-style to entrepreneurship, such as forming a new holding company, buying over a public company or restructuring the internal organization of a firm.

It may be said that the establishment of the MCA's Multi-Purpose Holding Company in the 1970's served as a driving force, a curtain raiser--leaving aside whether or not it has scored some accomplishments.

In the wake of the establishment of the Multi-Purpose Holding Company, many Chinese associations, alumni clubs and commercial groups have formed holding companies or cooperative societies one after another. Such enthusiasm carries a special significance. For instance, the capitalization of a number of these companies are collected from among small merchants, and their participation has naturally led them to become concerned with the economic development of the nation.

On the other hand, the formation of these companies serves well as pioneers for the ethnic-Chinese merchants to march toward entrepreneurial endeavors.



The main businesses of these holding companies and cooperative societies are manufacturing and plantation. Affected by worldwide economic recession, however, their business record has fallen below expectations, although we cannot mention this point in the same breath with the true aims of their establishment. We should not retreat from Big Business just because of this setback, but we should establish more similar companies and continue to march forward, because this is a movement for our economic struggle.

In addition, we also notice that a number of Chinese entrepreneurs have steadily begun to expand and modernize their own businesses.

To fight to become a public company is an indication to expand and modernize one's business, because by "going public," the company can absorb more capital from outside to aid its speedy development.

A number of Chinese enterprises have "gone public" one after another in recent weeks, such as Hap Eng Steel Manufacturers, Kong Thai Industries, Kean Joo Tin Poh Keang Engineering Company and Kim Tee Industry and Commerce. At the same time, some Chinese industrialists have bought over a number of public companies, such as Teo Kock Lim purchasing Dragon Horse Holding Company, Wee Kee Tat purchasing Kuala Lumpur Industries, Perak Holding Company purchasing Lean Hap Industries, Yeo Tiong Lee purchasing Hong Kong Tin and Teo Teck Lim purchasing Mah Glass Company. All these amply prove the change in the way the Chinese are doing business.

The 1980's may be described as a turning point for Chinese entrepreneurship. This is only the beginning. If we expect to be able to compete with others in the future, we should start making greater efforts now.

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CSO: 4205/13

MALAYSIA

IMPORTANCE OF LABUAN'S DEVELOPMENT STRESSED

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 14 Dec 84 p 2

[Commentary: "Do Not Neglect Labuan's Development"]

[Text] After listening to various reports and making on-the-spot observation on the condition of Labuan during his 2-day visit there, Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam was most dissatisfied about the development in this Federal Territory area. He said: "What I have seen is no different from the time before Labuan was announced to become a Federal Territory. This shows that Labuan has been completely stagnant. If, as an area of the Federal Territory, Labuan remains in such a backward condition, this is a kind of national disgrace."

Labuan was proclaimed as the second Federal Territory area on 16 April this year. Before the agreement was signed, extremists vigorously raised sabotage and opposition, inciting the local populace to object to the government decision. If no change has been made to the conditions in Labuan during the past 6 months, this would really provide a good excuse for the extremist elements to criticize the government.

At the signing ceremony, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir remarked that the government would strive to make Labuan a center for administration and tourism and subsequently plan to turn this free port into a major commercial center for ASEAN countries by coordinating it with the nation's development. Thus, it can be seen that the federal government attaches great importance to Labuan.

Yet, in his first inspection of Labuan 6 months after it has been proclaimed a Federal Territory, Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam dismissed the development there with a sneer, for what he found was totally the opposite of the government's intentions. No wonder Musa was highly disappointed.

To realize the government's original promise, Musa announced, the Labuan Federal Territory will be developed into an economic center, and a major commercial center and a naval and air military base as well, because it is situated at a strategic point.

Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam has appointed a coordinating official to coordinate, plan and guarantee that Labuan's development plan will be

smoothly carried out. Through the meticulous planning and implementation of this coordinator, it will not be difficult to turn Labuan into a speedily-growing economic center, as Labuan has great potentials for development. If they are properly utilized, success can be realized.

It is, of course, a gigantic engineering ideal to develop Labuan comprehensively into a commercial and economic center, especially because our national economy is still not fully recovered. So it is not a project that can be easily carried out. Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam has also considered this problem in bringing up the government's proposal. Therefore, he has reminded the public that all plans must be based on national interests as a starting point, and not for Sabah, Sarawak or Peninsular Malaysia alone. All plans must first undergo a thorough study and then be handled according to the true conditions and priorities, because we cannot implement our plans all at once due to our financial limitation.

Luban is located between the peninsula and Sabah-Sarawak, just a little over 100 km from Kota Kinabaru. Although it has potentials as a center for commerce, industry, tourism, transportation, public relations and services, it is still an island which thrives on agriculture. Consequently, for its development, home industry and small-scale industries must get top priority for consideration, and thence proceed to replace agriculture with development commerce and industry and other fields.

We believe that with the great potentiality of Labuan as a Federal Territory, it should not be a difficult matter to develop it into an economic center and major commercial harbor after careful planning and a systematic, steady coordination strategy.

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CSO: 4205/13

MALAYSIA

COMMENTS ON MUSA'S SUGGESTION THAT MCA LEAVE NATIONAL FRONT

National Front Unity

Selangor KIN KWOK in Chinese 18 Dec 84 p 2

[Commentary: "Maintain National Front Unity"]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam has proposed that the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] temporarily leave the National Front until it has resolved its factional fighting, and then rejoin the front. Furthermore, he stressed firmly that his suggestion be put into effect.

Of course, this is merely a suggestion. The MCA has the absolute right to accept or reject it. At the same time, as a National Front member, it has the right to bring up the matter to the front's highest authority for discussion.

Some people think that the deputy prime minister's suggestion is something to be expected, while others differ. At any rate, it is not a good thing to both the MCA and the National Front, because the suggestion adversely affects the front's efforts toward unity.

The National Front coalition government is made up of the United Malays National Organization [UMNO], the MCA, the Malaysian Indian Congress [MIC], etc toward the establishment of a prosperous and harmonious Malaysia. In the past, its membership were united in a spirit of mutual understanding and tolerance. This spirit should be maintained and nobody shall be allowed to break it.

Naturally, a nation's leader and its people do not want to see their own country torn asunder, because such a condition would bring no good toward the building of a prosperous and harmonious Malaysia.

To the National Front, the inability of MCA leaders to resolve their factional fighting up to now is puzzling and distressing, because the government intends to move up the date for the next general elections. To score good results at polling time, all disadvantageous things and incidents must be resolved beforehand. The MCA infighting could become the stumbling block, that is why National Front leaders are most anxious to have it peacefully settled as early as possible.

In fact, National Front leaders have stressed that the MCA factional war is an internal matter which ought to be settled by the MCA membership. The fact that the National Front's secretary general, Kawa Baba [phonetic], has tried to mediate in the dispute indicates that the front attaches great importance to the case.

What has caused National Front leaders to be disappointed is that the MCA infighting has been dragging on for 9 full months, and as long as it remains unresolved, it does not do any good to the National Front.

Musa Hitam's suggestion may be an enlightenment, or it could be a friendly warning.

However, what has made us feel restless is that this suggestion has evoked negative reactions and bad effects. First, this suggestion bluntly shows the National Front's interference in MCA's factional fighting, which has displeased MCA authorities. Second, the timing of Musa's suggestion is inappropriate, because it came at a time when the MCA infighting is nearing its final phase of solution. Now the problem may have been made more complicated by the factor of Musa's suggestion.

At the present stage, the two factions involved in the infighting are finding it more difficult to handle the solution. If they agree to become reconciled now, outsiders might think that the reconciliation is reached only because of pressure from a certain source, which would affect MCA's prestige and reputation.

In sum, while the deputy prime minister's suggestion may have been made in good faith, it has nevertheless complicated the problem of the factional war within the MCA.

#### MCA Temporarily Leaving National Front

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 18 Dec 84 p 24

[Commentary: "The Problem of MCA Leaving National Front Temporarily"]

[Text] Worms breed only when things have already started rotting; when you make a fool of yourself, you become a laughing stock for others. The partisan war within the MCA, which remains unsettled after having dragged on for 9 months, has laid bare its long-standing abuse and humiliated itself most thoroughly since the party's founding.

The other day Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam even suggested that the MCA temporarily leave the National Front and rejoin the front only after the infighting has been resolved.

He said that the feeling in the UMNO leadership is getting stronger and stronger that it would not be a bad idea if the MCA chose to quit the front for the time being.

Judging by the series of problems cropping up in the MCA recently, Musa Hitam's talk was, to a certain extent, a kind of pressure against both the Neo and Tan factions to settle their bitter quarrel within a short period.

However, the suggestion for the MCA to leave the National Front on a temporary basis is really not an appropriate way to settle the matter, for this might lead to bad consequences.

It is most unfortunate that the MCA infighting is still deadlocked, in spite of separate efforts of mediation by Datuk Lee San Choon, MCA's former president; Tan Sri Wee Boon Ping, president of the Malaysian Chinese Federation of Chambers of Commerce; Datuk Wong Tok Chai, deputy president of the same federation; and Kawa Baba, an UMNO elder statesman. If the MCA is compelled to leave the National Front at the present moment, it might result in a serious and unfortunate problem of dissension within the said front. This is an untoward event which National Front leaders must closely guard against.

As a Chinese-based political organization, the MCA is innocent. If its leaders are impotent enough to settle the party's internal problems, it is logical for National Front leaders to take the initiative or accept an invitation to help mediate and come to the rescue of a member party--all this on the basis of National Front unity.

As a matter of fact, those who are involved in the factional fight are merely leaders of both the Neo and Tan factions and their loyal followers. Therefore, the way to resolve the difficulties should revolve around the factions involved, but not through the MCA as a political organization.

It may be recalled that when the MCA was embroiled in a factional quarrel, which developed into a serious stage, way back in 1973, the authorities adopted an appropriate action and settled it in time. Why can't the National Front leadership of today take appropriate measures to help solve the problem, instead of choosing to ask the MCA to leave the front for the time being?

If Neo Yee Pan and Tan Koon Swan are the stumbling blocks to solving the MCA infighting, surely the National Front has the authority and the way to remove them.

The National Front was founded by the late Prime Minister Tun Razak in the wake of the "13 May Incident." He regained national peace and order and solved numerous major problems of the country. In the present situation, leaders of the National Front should respect the legitimate position of its member parties on the premise that the right to political representation of all nationalities must be respected. Otherwise it would be meaningless for the MCA to remain within the National Front, and it would accomplish nothing for the Chinese nationals to take part in politics through the MCA.

After the remarkably original and forceful talk by the deputy prime minister, we hope that both Neo Yee Pan and Tan Koon Swan will do a soul searching, wake up, face the facts and accept the formula concerned for solution. This would make one and all happy. Otherwise, if they remain obstinate and stubborn till the very end, the UMNO may be glad to see a third person emerging to clear up the mess and to lead the MCA.

9300

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THAILAND

ANALYSTS VIEW INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REORGANIZATION

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 29 Nov 84 pp 16-17

[Article: "National Intelligence Bureau: A Problem If Only the Name Changes"]

[Text] The cabinet agreed and issued measures on 18 September to set up the National Intelligence Bureau in accordance with the proposals of the National Governmental and Administrative Reform Commission.

It is widely known that the Department of Central Intelligence is the party that has been pushing these principles. Therefore, now that the royal decree transferring the powers, duties and administrative work of the Department of Central Intelligence has been completed, we will have a new National Intelligence Bureau with these responsibilities:

1. Carry out national intelligence and counterintelligence work and protect public security along with communications intelligence;
2. Follow up domestic and international situations that impact national security and report them to the prime minister and the National Security Council;
3. Disseminate intelligence that impacts national security to involved governmental working units or state enterprises, as appropriate;
4. Study, analyze and develop national intelligence and counterintelligence work and protect public security to increase efficiency in performing the work;
5. Being the national intelligence and counterintelligence coordinating center and protect public security and other domestic intelligence units;
6. Being the principal unit for coordinating national intelligence and counterintelligence work with other nations' national intelligence units in matters related to national security;
7. Proposing policies and measures, including consultations in the national intelligence and counterintelligence areas and safeguarding civil security for the prime minister and the National Security Council;



8. Perform other duties designated by the prime minister, the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

Concerning information about the reorganization of the National Intelligence Bureau, it is said that there is nothing strange or new about Thailand's intelligence activities mentioned above, [which] emphasize that its capabilities will be "limited" by the budget. The budget factor might make the National Intelligence Bureau rely on foreign nations more than being an internal coordinator, which is alarming. For those interested in Thai intelligence, when compared with other nation's intelligence units, are we able to protect the national interests of our nation freely? And if not freely, then what will happen?

The essence of intelligence work in each country is always the morale, motivation and spirit of all its secret agents and whether they perform their duties completely and fully. Intelligence agents have become the victims of counterintelligence and also have been bribed by the opposition, as England's intelligence units have regularly experienced.

In addition, how is the National Intelligence Bureau going to guarantee that there will not be any "deep throat" type of individuals or the kind who use classified intelligence as connections for leaking intelligence to the newspapers in order to promote "policies" that they think are important for the secret work that they are doing in the organization? These will create problems of intelligence leaks being publicly published, which is a problem of control.

In addition, how can there be trust when the set-up in Thailand is infiltrated and enemy or opposition moles have crept into national intelligence units.

"Agents" as well as groups carrying out their duties in the National Intelligence Bureau will surely be openings for international or internal enemy spies to come in and steal our vital secrets through enemy secret agents employing so-called "intelligence exchange" methods, which are popular in every country. Before we know that the person that we are exchanging intelligence with is actually "enticed" or "paid" by the enemy to gather intelligence, a lot of intelligence has already leaked out.

The more it is a Thai style national intelligence bureau which has a very limited budget, the more difficult to create those kind of people who, as intelligence agents, will be dedicated and work with spiritual dedication, with discipline and in a system that will guarantee the accuracy of their data.

"Taking only intelligence leaks from enemy channels is already troublesome for Thailand," a source involved in security opined to SU ANAKHOT concerning intelligence operations.

"Some information that enemies or neighboring countries that are our enemies release to Thai sources or informat-on channels has created conflicting intelligence and by tricky methods deceived our intelligence officials."

In addition, the fact that Thailand has an official administrative system that oppresses middle- and lower-ranking civil servants or that civil servants have special political advantages sometimes creates cases of collaborating with other information sources to generate waves of information to influence the situation.

"[If] even the CIA has a hard time to keep secrets within its organization, what do you expect? In America, the invasion of Cuba or the U-2 plane crash incident were intelligence leaks. Setting up a national intelligence bureau like ours resembles the CIA in its responsibilities, especially its principal responsibilities, in line with the 1947 National Security Act of the United States of America. [This act] has detailed explanations about the unclassified responsibilities of a centralized intelligence agency," the military specialists opined to SU ANAKHOT.

The National Intelligence Bureau should be under the National Security Council, which is the supreme organization that examines problems involving national interests and has the responsibility for intelligence planning, along with being an important source of information about security.

But when the National Intelligence Bureau must also be under the Office of the Prime Minister, and if the prime minister reports to the parliament and the government is from political parties, isn't it as if the parliament has the power to set up a commission to coordinate with this intelligence bureau?

And another point is that politicians will surely be targets of this intelligence bureau for detailed biographical and background [information]. The problem is, that if the prime minister has political parties as his foundation, he might use this organization as a tool to search for secrets of the opposition or in other situations that would impact the government more than the country, that deep down are matters of personal or party gain more than proper national matters of keeping secrets.

Another thing that might emerge in press circles is using information from classified files. [As for] forbidding the use of information--which in England is done by employing the technique known as sending a "D-Notice" to publishing houses which effectively controls classified information--in Thailand, the government might order the National Intelligence Bureau to circulate a "D-Notice" for the interests of a person in the government, which might be a use of power to intrude into the press.

The press will suffer. The problem that all intelligence work in the United States as well as in Russia, England, etc., experiences is bureaucratic, because right now there are plenty of high level intelligence units in Thailand; some reports correspond, some do not, and to coordinate them will be "hard to carry off."

[This is] especially [true] in an atmosphere like Thailand's. If the intelligence unit of the prime minister and the intelligence unit of the army each release intelligence or conflicting intelligence, intelligence work will be "fun" because of conflicting interests.

As for the present, to change the name of the Department of [Central] Intelligence to be the National Intelligence Bureau sounds extravagant, but the matter of trusting evaluations of the country's situation or the political situation is hard to estimate because even Thailand's intelligence channels sources at this time are simply a mess. Each channel of each area does the intelligence with which it is most skillful. For example, concerning the devaluation of the baht incident, the government's information tended to differ from the military's. If there were a disaster, the turmoil would likely lead to an information struggle that would create splits and it might become the norm to be in conflict, leading to disclosures of important national intelligence.

How can these problems be solved, or if they are solved, will it be when intelligence is running amok in all directions, so that it is impossible to determine what is false, what is true, what is rumor, and what is propaganda? Some people release information on their own to counter government intelligence, and the people who control this secret intelligence network, we are certain have already passed security checks."

A National Intelligence Bureau, which has never been in the news, might be in the news regularly, as long as national intelligence reform is just a "change of name."

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CSO: 4207/71

THAILAND

SITTHI RECEIVES EC DECLARATION ON CAMBODIA

BK260234 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 26 Jan 85 p 5

[Excerpt] Italian Ambassador to Thailand Francesco Guariglia yesterday morning conveyed to Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila a declaration by the political committee of the European Economic Community (EC) which condemns the Vietnamese military campaigns in western Kampuchea and renews a call for Hanoi to accept a political solution to the six-year-old conflict.

Foreign Ministry sources said that the declaration would also be handed over to Hanoi by the Italian ambassador accredited there.

The declaration says that the stepped-up military activities by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea this current dry season could escalate the Kampuchean conflict and further aggravate tensions in Southeast Asia.

Following the recent developments at the Thai-Kampuchean frontier with "great concern," the "Ten" condemns "The serious violations of human rights and of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter that spring from the growing intensity of the attacks by Vietnamese troops against refugee camps," and the "violation of Thailand's territorial sovereignty by the Vietnamese troops," according to the text of the declaration made available to the press yesterday.

The ten EC members also stress the "urgent necessity," of a global political solution to the Kampuchean crisis and called on Hanoi to stop the current military campaigns in Kampuchea to pave the way for a political solution in accordance with relevant UN resolutions.

Foreign Ministry sources also said that Italian Foreign Minister and EC President Giulio Andreotti told the European Parliament on January 16 that Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea continues to threaten the stability of Southeast Asia.

"We believe that any political solution to the problem must be based on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, the right of the Kampuchean people to decide freely on their own future, respect for Kampuchea's independence, neutrality and non-alignment and a commitment by all states not to interfere in its internal affairs. Under these conditions, we believe that a peaceful solution can be found that will coincide with the legitimate security concerns of all the states of the region," Andreotti was quoted as saying.

CEJ: 4200/463

THAILAND

PEREZ DE CUELLAR CALLS ON PRIME MINISTER PREM

BK261435 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 1300 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] At about 1500 today Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN secretary general, and his party paid a courtesy call on and held discussions with Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanon at Government House for about 30 minutes. After the discussions, Sawanit Khongsiri, director general of the Foreign Ministry Information Department, disclosed that the meeting proceeded in a friendly atmosphere. During the discussions, the prime minister said the UN secretary general's visit is timely as he will be able to observe the Thai-Cambodian situation. He asked the UN official to inform the world about Vietnamese actions, particularly the current Vietnamese suppression of Cambodian civilians near the border which has caused them hardships. The prime minister emphasized the importance of the position of the UN secretary general and the United Nations in achieving peace and asked the UN secretary general to use his office and responsibility to campaign for peace in Southeast Asia.

The prime minister informed the UN official that Cambodian refugees have created a heavy burden for Thailand. Thailand is not a wealthy country and it wants to carry out national development and help its people who still suffer from hardships. Thailand has to shoulder this refugee burden out of humanitarian concerns and its pledge to the United Nations.

In addition to the Cambodian refugee problem, Thailand faces the problem of Vietnamese violations of its sovereignty, which adds another burden to it because it is forced to strengthen its military capability to protect its sovereignty and territory. The prime minister asked the UN secretary general to inform Vietnamese and Lao leaders that Thailand has never launched armed aggression against another country and because it cherishes peace, will use arms only to safeguard its sovereignty and territory.

The prime minister said the Thai Government and people have pity for Cambodians who had to flee to Thailand and do not know what is in store for them. They are hungry and Cambodian children have no opportunity to obtain education. Although Thailand is not wealthy, it has complied with UN resolutions because it is a good member of the United Nations. Because Thailand has complied with UN resolutions, the UN secretary general was asked to convince the Vietnamese leaders to also comply with UN resolutions, as this will bring peace.

Finally, the prime minister said every country ought to allow the Cambodian people to live peacefully and enjoy the right to self determination. Other countries should not become involved or try to dictate to Cambodia. For this reason, Thailand wants the Cambodian problem to end as soon as possible and requests the UN secretary general to inform Vietnamese leaders of the plight of the Cambodian people and ask them to let the Cambodian people live in peace.

Sawanit also disclosed that the UN secretary general informed the prime minister that he is aware of Thailand's burdens regarding Cambodia, and he promises to persuade other countries to help Thailand caring for the refugees. He also pledged to try his utmost to bring peace to Southeast Asia, which is his direct duty.

According to Sawanit, the prime minister also informed the UN secretary general about Thai-Lao relations, saying Thailand and Laos have close ties and are like relatives. Thailand cannot tolerate a third country destroying this long-standing relationship with Laos.

At the meeting, an agreement was reached for Thailand to lease land where the ESCAP headquarters is located and for the United Nations to build a conference hall for ESCAP at Santitham hall.

CSO: 4207/117

THAILAND

# SITTHI BEGINS TALKS WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR

BK261119 Bangkok BANGKOK WORLD in English 26 Jan 85 p 1

[Excerpts] UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar today began wide-ranging talks with ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi Sawetsila which included a call for all member countries to recommit themselves to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The two-hour talk was held at the Foreign Ministry and ended shortly before noon.

Apart from ACM Sitthi, present were Minister of the Prime Minister's Office Dr Kramon Thongthammachat, National Security Council Secretary-General Sqdn Ld Prasong Sunsiri, Supreme Command Chief-of-Staff Gen Pathom Soemsin, Deputy Permanent Secretary of Interior Charoenchit na Songkhla, Deputy Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Asa Sarasin and Thai Ambassador to the UN M.L. Phiraphong Kasemsi.

Details of the talks were not immediately known but the Foreign Ministry spokesman Sawanit Khongsiri and the UN chief spokesman Francois Guilian briefed the press on behalf of ACM Sitthi and Mr Perez de Cuellar.

Mr Sawanit said that the UN chief and ACM Sitthi had exchanged wide-ranging views on politics and the military situation in Southeast Asia.

Besides these topics they also talked about poverty in Africa, drug trafficking, piracy and the UN aid to developing countries.

Mr Sawanit said that the refugee problem was also discussed but in addition to refugees who had fled into Thailand during the Vietnamese offensive illegal immigrants from Laos were referred to.

Besides this, Mr Sawanit said that the talk also emphasised on calling member countries to recommit themselves to the principles of the UN Charter as this world body was going to celebrate the 40th anniversary of its founding.

He said that each member country had to take an oath of commitment to the principles of the Charter after becoming a member of the UN.

So when this body turned 40, a recommitment to the principles should be taken, he said.

On other explosive issues, Mr Sawanit said that the two sides had also talked on the role of the United Nations Security Council, particularly towards problems in Cyprus, Lebanon, Namibia and Central America.

In reference to Mr Perez de Cuellar's trip to the border zone, the UN spokesman said that Mr Perez de Cuellar would only visit Khao I-Dang resettlement camp.

CSO: 4200/463



THAILAND

SPOKESMAN ON SITTHI-PEREZ DE CUELLAR TALKS

BK280439 Bangkok Domestic Service in English 0000 GMT 28 Jan 85

[Text] Visiting United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar yesterday held wide-ranging talks with Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawesila. Foreign Ministry spokesman Sawanit Khongsir said both sides exchanged views on politics and the military situation in Southeast Asia.

Foreign Minister Sitthi explained to the UN secretary general why Thailand decided not to be present during the recent Mekong Committee meeting with Vietnam and Laos. Both sides also touched on the question of Lao crossing into Thailand and on related questions of repatriation. Mr Sawanit said foreign Minister Sitthi and Mr Perez de Cuellar discussed other world issues which are concerns of the UN Security Council in which Thailand is a new nonpermanent member.

On the topic of piracy, Foreign Minister Sitthi assured Mr Perez de Cuellar of Thailand's continued cooperation with the program to combat piracy. Mr Sawanit added that drug trafficking and UN aid to developing countries were also discussed during the meeting.

CSO: 4200/463

THAILAND

MUKDAHAN POLICE CHIEF ON NARCOTICS TRADE, ARMS TRAFFIC

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 26 Nov 84 p 4

[Interview with Police Col Seri Temiyawet, the police superintendent of Mukdahan Province; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Would you tell us about the arrest of MPs and senior government officials in Mukdahan Province?

[Answer] The police learned that Mr Chalio Diwong, a Social Action Party MP, had been operating a gambling casino in his home for a long time. The game played most often was hi-low. Every time that Mr Chalio was at home and not away in Bangkok or in some other province, he played, too. We know the identities of the other people who have gambled at his home. We have constantly investigated this matter in an effort to make arrests. The police have acted in accord with the policy of the Ministry of Interior. Just after Mukdahan became a province, we met with gamblers, casino operators and those who operate illegal lotteries in order to explain the ministry's policy to them and ask them to stop engaging in such activities.

Following that, the police took such resolute action that no one dared gamble. The only casino left was the one at this MP's house. We sent undercover agents there to participate in the activities and gather information. After we found out what was going on, we discussed ways to suppress this. Then at that particular moment, a boat trip on the Mekong River was arranged. Tickets for the boat trip were sold secretly. But we knew that the passengers were going to gamble. They tried to keep police officials and reporters from finding out about this.

After we learned that there was to be gambling, we formulated a plan. We knew that these gamblers would definitely participate and so we made a plan to suppress this. It was essential that we make the arrests and gather evidence. Because if people gamble at a house, it is difficult [to make an arrest]. Also, they usually play late at night and so it is difficult to investigate this and make arrests. People at that level take many precautions to protect themselves. Thus, when we found out that they were going to gamble on the boat, we made a plan to arrest them.

[Question] Who were the suspects?

[Answer] The suspects included an MP, merchants, lawyers, police officials and a border patrol police official.

[Question] Would you tell us about the seizure of weapons at the home of another MP?

[Answer] As for the seizure of weapons at the home of Mr Chaloemyot Saenwiset, a Thai Nation Party MP, actually, we had received information that gambling and lottery activities were going on at his home. We were told that Mr Chaloemyot was issuing lottery numbers to the villagers. On 16 November, the villagers were told to assemble at the home of Mrs Lek Saenwiset, the wife of Mr Chaloemyot, at 1000 hours. Maps were drawn. Thus, we had to go investigate. This was not leaked to the press. If we had gone any earlier or any later, we might not have been able to make the arrest. We had to go at the time stated by the agent.

But by the time the police arrived, the lottery tickets had already been delivered to the ringleader. However, we did find pieces of partially burned tickets. And there were a few tickets mixed in among some paper. When they were searching the house, the officials found weapons and war materials in a room there. A preliminary check showed that there were more than 100 rounds of 20mm anti-aircraft ammunition and other items.

The officials waited for the MP to return home before conducting a more thorough inspection. They waited until quite late and when he did not return home, they went ahead and searched the house. The kamnan and village headman were asked to come witness the search. The officials found a few war weapons. These included a carbine rifle, a 38mm pistol and another four to five types of ammunition. The other things found were all part of mines, which dated from the time he served as the head of a provincial ISOC force. This group used these weapons at that time. It is my understanding that he had not yet returned all these weapons when he ran for office.

The real ringleader of the lottery operation was Mr Chaloemyot's daughter. She has been fined 25,000 baht, sentenced to six months in prison and put on 2 year's probation. As for the case involving war weapons, we are in the process of gathering evidence and finding witnesses.

[Question] In general, what is the situation in the province like with respect to influential people?

[Answer] Formerly, Mukdahan was a district in Nakhon Phanom Province. The terrain is mostly jungle and so terrorists hid in the area south of Na Kae. In the past, most officials here were people who had been banished to this remote area. There were many communist terrorists

in this area. When assigned here, officials became lax in carrying out their duties. They lived from day to day and did not use their knowledge or talents to develop or improve their operations. Some looked for ways to profit; others took steps to secure a transfer. Anything was possible with money.

Opposite us is Savannakhet Province in Laos. In the past when we still had friendly relations, the smuggling of timber, narcotics, particularly marijuana, and other contraband items was rampant. Government officials, particularly police officials, participate in this, too. Otherwise, one merchant who is now very well known would not have been able to raise himself from poverty and become one of the leading merchants in Mukdahan Province. He did this by constantly violating the laws, with government officials serving as his underlings. Because they were negligent in carrying out their duties, he was able to become one of the province's leading merchants even though he had only 500-600 baht when he first came here from Bagkok. But instead of conducting himself properly [after becoming wealthy], he has continued in his evil ways.

When Mukdahan became a province and officials were selected for posts here, I was given a position of trust. I have made a great effort and am confident that I can build a fine police force here. I have formulated an operations system and a system for training police officials and developing the various units. Efforts have been made to use people's knowledge and talents. Now, I feel confident in saying that the police force in Mukdahan Province is the equal of any other in the country. The crime suppression statistics show that we have hit the targets set by the Police Department. But besides that, we have been first in the northeast for 2 consecutive years since we became a province in September 1982. In 1983, we were first in criminal arrests. And up to September 1984, we were first in suppression and crime reduction. In administration, things are proceeding well. Police officials have good discipline. There have been virtually no complaints against police officials for acting in a dishonest or improper manner. There have been just a few against officials at the NCO level.

As for influential people, since coming here, in fact, ever since I was the deputy police superintendent in Nakhon Phanom, I have constantly suppressed these people. We know who these people are. I once held a meeting with those who operate casinos and lottery rackets. I told them what our policy was and asked them to stop engaging in such activities. I took a gentle approach at first. But after that I began suppressing such activities lawfully. I have never used extralegal powers. People have criticized me for being too strict. I think of this as a game. That is, if they engage in such activities, I will arrest them. There is no reason to get angry. I have warned people. I have gone to every district and held meetings with gamblers, casino operators, lottery racketeers and other influential people. I met with these people and told them to stop. There are regulations and laws. Any policeman who

is swayed by money or who fails to carry out his duties will be criticized by the people.

As for marijuana traffickers, in the past, the growers, or people who induced the villagers to grow marijuana, came from Nakhon Phanom Province. At that time, there was an American air base there and these people grew marijuana and smuggled it out by air. The people in that area had good incomes and could afford to buy cars. The economy improved. When the police learned of this, they made arrests and tried to suppress this. Thus, the criminals began expanding their activities to other areas such as Muang, Don Tan and Dong Luang districts in Mukdahan. Sometimes they grew marijuana in areas infiltrated by terrorists. I began suppressing this resolutely in 1982. I launched suppression operations on an unprecedented scale. Then, an influential marijuana traffickers died. I also got rid of those police officials who were cooperating with the merchants by establishing a committee to investigate matters. In a clash with a marijuana caravan, three people were killed. After that, these people were afraid to get into a fight with us and so such activities have declined steadily.

At the beginning of November, forces were sent out on patrol, and they seized a quantity of fresh marijuana. Two more suppression operations will be launched in an effort to eliminate marijuana completely. The only place that marijuana is still being grown is in Dong Luang District. When I was still the deputy superintendent of Nakhon Phanom Province, we destroyed marijuana belonging to the then president of the provincial council. This ruined him. He had to sell his Volvo, return his pickup truck and stop construction on a 2-3 million baht house. We suppressed a casino at his council residence. I have never feared influential people.

11943

CSO: 5300/4359

THAILAND

SIX COMMUNIST SUSPECTS CHARGED; HEARING SET 1 FEB

BK250305 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 25 Jan 85 p 2

[Text] Six communist suspects, including three alleged senior members of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), were formally charged in the Military Court yesterday, informed sources said.

Among the six are Phirun Chatwanitkun, Manot Methangkun and Prasong Arunsantirot, who are alleged to be members of the Central Committee of the CPT.

The charges facing them include being members of the outlawed party and supporting its activities. The charges were filed by the military prosecutor.

The other three defendants are Rangsan Sae Chi, Sawat Ananpanyakun and Sa-nguan Thipyasing.

The Military Court set February 1 for preliminary hearing of the case.

The six defendants are among 22 Communist suspects rounded up by police in a series of raids in the city last July. It was initially expected that 14 of them would be charged in the Military Court.

The sources said the eight other suspects, including Phirun's wife Chonthira Sattayawatthana and newspaperman Chatcharin Chaiwat, will be released because of insufficient evidence against them.

They said the eight are expected to be set free on February 1 when the Military Court holds the preliminary hearing. The six others who will be set free are Suchit Yingkitsathawon, Mrs Ari Thanthalechon, Mrs Prathum Taphianthong, Krawin Chutima, Mongkon Wutthisingchai and Saiyut Sapansit.

Chatcharin, Mongkol and Mrs Chonthira are already free on bail.

The prosecution of six of the suspects came after more than six months of investigation which drew criticisms from domestic and international human rights organizations.

The remaining suspects who had earlier been given "conditional freedom" are university lecturer R Pricha Piamphongsan, Mrs Bunsong Arunsantirot, Pradit Pakdibamrung, Mrs Surirat Wiriyakun, Chuchai Arunsantirot, Phibun Arunsantirot, Prawing Uthaithawip and Loet Chaichamon.

With the exception of Dr Pricha, the other seven will have to undergo a "re-education programme."

CSO: 4200/463

THAILAND

VOFA CRITICIZES SRV ATTITUDE TOWARD REFUGEES

BK261155 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in Thai 1000 GMT 23 Jan 85

[Station "Article": "Vietnam Lies"]

[Text] If one is to speak about lies by Vietnam, one would have plenty to talk about as that is what the Hanoi leaders always do. The same goes for the Vietnamese mass media under the control of the Hanoi leaders. It is equally capable of making distortions in favor of Vietnam. It is confident that no one can make the truth known. Anyway, the truth is always the truth and it is impossible to keep it under cover to deceive people forever. One day the truth will become known.

On 18 January, VNA cited an 18 January NHAN DAN article attacking Thai authorities for banning Vietnamese refugees in Thailand from attending this year's Vietnamese new year festivities at the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok. The article accused Thai authorities of having ill feeling toward the Vietnamese people. It said that the Vietnamese Embassy sought official authorization from the Thai Foreign Ministry and said this is not a violation of Thai law. The article pointed out that this reflects Thailand's unfriendly attitude toward Vietnam.

This is ridiculous. Vietnam charged Thailand with being unfriendly toward it. What about Vietnam's nearly 200,000 soldiers sent to Cambodia for aggression and occupation 6 years ago and the Vietnamese forces posted along the Thai-Cambodian border in confrontation with the Thai units at present? Vietnam has no reason to be at the Thai-Cambodian border. Moreover, Vietnamese soldiers intruded into and Vietnamese shells landed on Thai territory in violation of Thailand's sovereignty. Is this what Vietnam considers a friendly gesture? It would be better to have no friends at all if this is what friends are.

The NHAN DAN article also made several distortions. Without any substantiation, the article claimed that the Thai authorities had prohibited Vietnamese refugees from attending the new year festivities even though their travel would in no way violate Thai law. The facts are as follows: Vietnamese refugees who have registered with the Thai authorities are entitled to travel anywhere, including attending the new year celebrations. Those refugees meant by the Vietnamese Embassy to attend the new year festivities are those who illegally entered Thailand. In other words, they are Vietnamese citizens



forced out from their country either by land or by boat because of hardships from the oppressive regime in Vietnam. They left Vietnam without any destination to seek refuge in other countries, and they arrived in Thailand. Thailand is not happy with the arrival of those refugees and has never granted them any legal status for alien residence in Thailand. Thailand takes those people purely on humanitarian grounds. They are here illegally. The Thai Government sent word to the Vietnamese Government and even negotiated with the Vietnamese Government to take those people back. However, the Vietnamese Government was not ready to take them back--or was it because the Vietnamese Government was not willing to take them back. No one knows. As a result, those Vietnamese people still remain in Thailand and they are thus subject to the regulations for the control of illegal immigrants imposed on all illegal immigrants residing in Thailand no matter what their nationality.

What the article in question forgot to mention is Thailand's sympathy for those Vietnamese refugees and its permission to let them earn a living for their and their families' survival. They are, however, required to remain in the respective restricted areas of their provinces. NHAN DAN's claim that travel by these people is not in violation of Thai law and its call for the Thai authorities to comply with the demand are blatant interference in the internal affairs of Thailand. It is also a lack of respect for the law of Thailand.

It is suspicious why the Vietnamese authorities have suddenly shown their concern for the fate of Vietnamese people outside Vietnam and their concern that those people might not be able to attend new year celebrations with representatives of the Vietnamese Government despite the fact that it was the oppression and cruelty of that government which forced them to leave their own country in the first place. If one is to guess the reason for such an attitude, it may be because Vietnam wants to make use of the Vietnamese refugees as a tool to publicize other countries' unfair treatment of Vietnamese refugees abroad in order to distract world attention away from the harsh realities of living conditions in Vietnam and the Vietnamese leadership's mistreatment of its own people, not to mention Vietnamese maltreatment of the Cambodian people. One can judge oneself from the direction taken by the refugees--do they flee to or from Vietnam?

While interfering in Thailand's internal affairs and trying to mislead public attention on facts about oppression in Vietnam, Hanoi still refuses to take back those refugees despite the fact that Thailand is always ready to send them back. Anyway, there should be some concern for those refugees--what kind of a life they would face back home--a regime of oppression, lack of freedom, and economic recession? In fact, the Vietnamese refugees send what they earn abroad to their home country. This must be one factor why Vietnam, which is on the brink of economic collapse, refuses to take those refugees back. And the Vietnamese Government also wants to please those refugees because of their financial contributions to the home country. Vietnam wants to do them a favor by getting authorization from Thailand to have them attend the embassy celebrations. If the move was successful, Vietnam would certainly tell the refugees that it was Vietnam's favor and nothing to do with humanitarian

feelings by Thailand. If Vietnam got what it wanted, it is sure the embassy would seek permission for an increasing number of Vietnamese refugees to leave their restricted areas for activities in the interest of the Vietnamese authorities.

If it sincerely has concern for the Vietnamese refugees, the Vietnamese leadership should do its best to turn the country into a livable place by refraining from acts of oppression and cruelty and by taking those people back home. The Thai Government is ready, even today, to cooperate with Vietnam in sending them back, and we would like to see whether Vietnam would treat its people as kindly as it has demanded that Thailand should treat them during their stay here. Unless Vietnam can prove that the same kindness would be given to its people once they are back home, then Vietnam is not entitled to act big and poke its nose in the internal affairs of Thailand. A government whose acts of oppression cause its people to flee for other countries and which has sent armed forces on aggression against its neighbor senselessly and mercilessly, is it entitled to demand that other countries treat its people the way it wants despite the fact that it has never tried or ever wishes to do anything to improve the living conditions of the people? The Vietnamese leadership should stop deceiving and lying to the world and turn to join hands with other countries to restore peace, stability, and tranquility in Southeast Asia and serve the interests of the Vietnamese people.

CSO: 4207/117

THAILAND

PRASONG ON RELIEF AID TO CAMBODIAN REFUGEES

BK280315 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 28 Jan 85 p 1

[Text] Prachinburi--Donor countries will meet in New York late next month to discuss the necessity of starting a new relief fund to help Thailand feed and house Khmer civilians who have fled into Thai territory from the Vietnamese, a top security official said yesterday.

National Security Council (NSC) Secretary General Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri told reporters that the emergency aid in reserve had now gone down to about U.S. \$4.5 million and would be used up at the end of next month.

The relief aid had been donated by 17-18 donor countries, including ASEAN members and their dialogue partners to help Thailand cope with the refugee influx during the Vietnamese dry-season offensive.

Thailand now accommodates and feeds about 162,000 Khmer refugees on a temporary basis and it is feared that the emergency aid donated by donor countries would not be sufficient to sustain relief operations until the end of the dry season particularly if more refugees flee across the frontier as a result of further Vietnamese attacks.

Prasong was speaking to reporters while accompanying visiting UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to the border to inspect the refugee situation. The UN chief was asked by Thai government leaders to exercise his "good offices" to procure additional relief aid from donor countries.

The NSC secretary general also said that Vietnamese troops will never destroy Khmer resistance guerrillas during the current military drive against the resistance forces near the Thai-Kampuchean frontier.

"What Vietnam could do is to militarily pressure Khmer fighters into abandoning their bases, but the Khmers are waiting for a chance to return to their bases," he said.

He added that a negligible number of Khmer resistance guerrillas were killed and wounded in the Vietnamese military thrust which, however, destroyed the resistance bases.

The Vietnamese are looking for a border position to set up a permanent base, according to the NSC secretary general.

He said that the Khmer refugees on Thai soil are expected to cross the border back into Kampuchea in the next one or two months when fighting subsides.

CSO: 4200/463

THAILAND

UN AGENCY TO STUDY LAOS-VIETNAM ROAD PROJECT

BK240639 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 24 Jan 85 p 2

[Text] Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon opened the ESCAP [Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific] meeting of Asian and Pacific communications ministers yesterday.

The two-day meeting, attended by ministers from 20 regional countries, aims at finding ways to improve transport and communications development cooperation.

ESCAP Executive Secretary S.M. Kibria said the meeting would focus on fresh joint efforts to improve facilities in the region over the next decade.

Among the projects proposed for implementation in the first two years is a UN-sponsored feasibility study on a road between Laos and Vietnamese ports on the South China Sea, including Da Nang.

Another plan to promote energy conservation in the transport sector is a survey of the Dhaka-Chittagong railway electrification project.

CSO: 4200/463

THAILAND

POLICE SAY MALAYSIANS FIRE ON FISHING BOATS

BK260223 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 26 Jan 85 p 3

[Text] Satun--A Thai fisherman was wounded in an attack by Malaysian patrol boats on six Thai fishing trawlers near Malaysian waters on Tuesday, a senior policeman reported yesterday.

Provincial police chief Pol Col Krit Suthakritchareok, said two of the Thai fishing boats were damaged in the attack near Taru Tao and Lang Kawwi islands.

The fisherman who was wounded was identified as Sa-at Salangsi, the skipper of "So Thepthongchai" fishing trawler which was riddled with bullet holes.

Pol Col Krit quoted the fishermen as saying that the two Malaysian patrol boats started firing at the six Thai trawlers without any warning.

They said they fled to Taru Tao Island but the Malaysian patrol boats followed them and continued firing.

Chief of the marine police, Pol Lt Col Bunsuang Klapsiri, said he was told by Malaysian authorities that the two Malaysian patrol boats were based in Penang and they fired at the Thai trawlers to warn them off the Malaysian waters.

However, Pol Col Krit said judging from the damage, the Malaysians appeared to want to sink the Thai trawlers rather than warn them.

He said a similar incident took place in February last year and he had complained to Malaysian authorities during a meeting in Malaysia.

CSO: 4200/463

THAILAND

ATHIT SPEAKS ON ARMED FORCES DAY 25 JANUARY

BK260942 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 2056 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Speech by Supreme Commander General Athit Kamlang-ek on Armed Forces Day, 25 January--recorded]

[Excerpts] The Army has strengthened its forces in accordance with the armed forces development plan with the goal of being able to cope with both internal and external threat. Regarding internal threat, the Army has tried to develop paramilitary forces, such as the ranger volunteers. The Army formed the ranger volunteers in 1978 in order to have the capability to fight and defeat insurgents and to replace the ordinary soldiers whom the Army planned to withdraw in order to develop their combat readiness for genuine national defense tasks.

Regarding external threat, the Army has strengthened its conventional forces in accordance with the armed forces development plan so that they can promptly defend the country in all types of aggression. The existing units have been strengthened to be as complete and as combat ready as possible. The important and essential units have been developed. The infantry and cavalry divisions have been strengthened to become complete divisions. The special war command unit, the special combat division, the artillery division, and the army engineering division were established along with other necessary units, such as the Phra Mongkutklao medical center, to strengthen the Army's efficiency in the medical field to match that of civilized countries.

In addition to strengthening its combat forces, the Army has also engaged in production of essential war materials in accordance with the self-reliance program in order to make up for the reduction of assistance from friendly countries and to comply with the national economic situation. The Army now operates several production plants. The important ones are the light weapons plant, the small arms ammunition plant, the explosive plant, the rocket plant, the military vehicle construction and repair plant, the dry cell plant, the small communications equipment plant, the uniform plant, the artillery and RPG plant, and the artillery shell plant. In sum, the Army has undertaken development to strengthen its forces in accordance with the previously set program amidst shortages, particularly budget shortage. If the Army receives sufficient budgetary support, it will be able to better achieve combat readiness and provide a more complete guarantee for national defense.

In the air defense task, the Air Force now has F-5E fighter-interceptors, which have high capabilities and performance, but it has only a few. It is necessary to obtain more such aircraft. Regarding air attack tasks, the Air Force now has only light attack aircraft which were developed from training and reconnaissance aircraft. They are suitable only for internal terrorist suppression missions and cannot be effectively used in conventional warfare missions. Therefore, it is necessary to acquire a number of attack aircraft. However, due to the very high cost of aircraft and budget limitations, acquisition of both types of aircraft at the same time is a difficult task. The Air Force has thus decided to acquire only a single type of aircraft that possesses effective combined interceptor and attack capabilities. A comparison of the combat efficiency and capability, and maintenance requirements of various types of combat aircraft and a study of the threat facing the country showed the F-16A to be the aircraft that best corresponds to the Air Force's tactical demands. For this reason, Air Force has a project to acquire F-16A's.

In the project to develop the air defense warning system, most of the Air Force's current radar stations, which monitor and warn about movements of hostile aircraft on 24-hour basis, use old systems of low capability insufficient for coping with the threat of modern combat aircraft. This is because the air defense distance from the border to Bangkok is very short. Modern combat aircraft could penetrate it in 10 minutes. Therefore, it is necessary to develop the capability and efficiency of the radar system simultaneously with the development of the fighter-interceptor aircraft. The Air Force now has a project to develop the control and air defense warning systems to be computer-based automated systems.

CSO: 4207/117



THAILAND

ATHIT KAMLANG-EK INSPECTS CAMBODIAN BORDER AREAS

BK261427 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 1300 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] Supreme Commander and Army Commander General Athit Kamlang-ek this afternoon inspected the border situation in Chanthaburi Province. He went to Ban Noen Din Daeng in Pong Nam Ron District which is about 1 km from the Cambodian border. Vietnamese-Heng Samrin forces have moved into the Cambodian area opposite the Thai village to suppress Khmer Serei forces. The Thai border might be affected when the suppression campaign starts and therefore it is necessary to be on the alert as a precaution.

Gen Athit told newsmen after his inspection of the border that the situation along the Cambodian border posed no threat at this time but it is necessary for our forces to be ready as a precaution because most of Pong Nam Ron District is flat. The Chanthaburi-Trat forces, which comprise marines, ranger volunteers, Border Patrol Police, and air force personnel, are ready to defend the country and have good morale.

In Ta Phraya District, Prachin Buri Province, heavy weapons were fired at Cambodian refugee camps outside Thai territory on 24 January, causing 16 Cambodian deaths and 26 wounded. There were also minor skirmishes in the area opposite Nong Ian village, Aranyaprathet District, which caused no casualties.

Artillery shells were fired at O Bok pass on hill 472 in Buriram Province, killing a Thai soldier at about 0200 today. Soldiers from the Suranari forces have been dispatched to verify the situation at An Ma pass in Nam Yun District, Ubon Ratchathani Province. Results are not known at this time. Gen Athit said Thai people living along the Cambodian border have good morale and confidence in the Thai authorities concerned. This is because soldiers have never deserted the people but have always protected them.

CSO: 4207/117

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VPA JOURNAL PRAISES LE DUAN SPEECH

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 84 pp 1-2

[Editorial: "A Document of Very Great Theoretical and Practical Value"]

[Text] At the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee General Secretary Le Duan delivered an extremely important speech titled "Firmly Grasp the Laws, Renovate Economic Management."

It is a document of our Party that has very great theoretical and practical value.

It is the recapitulation and generalization of matters of a law-like nature of the socialist revolution in Vietnam, which is a country with an agricultural economy in which small-scale production is prevalent, which does not have modern industry, and which has been devastated by many prolonged wars of aggression and is advancing to socialism by bypassing the phase of socialist development.

The matters that were brought out -- very inspiring and meaningful-- in the common line of socialist revolution and the line toward building the socialist economy at the fourth and fifth party congresses were developed by comrade Le Duan with relative completeness and were applied in the renovation of economic management.

It is the theoretical and ideological basis of the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee and, it may be said, of preparations for the Sixth Party Congress and of the mission of drafting the 1986-1990 five-year economic-social program.

Study to firmly grasp the basic arguments of that document will also provide our cadres with scientific economic thinking in order to fully understand the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee and the future resolutions of our Party. Only thereby is it possible to correctly understand and creatively resolve the specific, real problems in the socialist revolution, in building the socialist economy in general, as well as in renovating economic management and resolving the problems of economics and life specifically. As comrade Le Duan said, "If we fail to clearly understand the matters of a law-like nature or fully understand the basic problems of the lines, we cannot have correct decisions regarding economic management."

Studying that document will help our army's cadres not only to correctly understand the problems of the Party's socialist revolution line and its economic line, as well as those in renovating economic management, but also understand and correctly resolve problems regarding the consolidation of national defense, building the army, and combining the economy with national defense in the present phase of the revolution in our country.

5616

CSO: 4209/150

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### IMPORTANCE OF TEACHING ARMY'S TRADITIONS EMPHASIZED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 84 pp 40-52

[Article by Lt Gen Dang Vu Hiep: "Teach, Forge and Develop the Working Class Nature and Fine Traditions of the People's Army in the New Revolutionary Phase"]

[Text] I. Unifying Knowledge and Viewpoints

The successful building of the new regime and the new economy has a decisive effect on the appearance of the new culture and the new man. On the other hand, the building of the new culture and the new man is a "great motive force which furthers the process of building the new regime and the new economy." (1)

Creating the new man is a major content and must be carried out by means of comprehensive measures, among which education regarding the working class nature and fine traditions occupy an extremely important position. The Fifth Party Congress pointed out that in order to create the new man it is necessary to "pay all-out attention to teaching national traditions and revolutionary traditions." (2) The directive of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee regarding the 30th anniversary of the Dien Bien Phu victory and the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Army also stipulated that it is necessary to "carry out deep and wide propaganda and education among the people and the armed forces of the entire nation regarding the tradition of opposing foreign aggression and spirit of determination to fight and win, self-reliance, and spirit of revolutionary offensive of our nation and the people's armed forces."

That is because the working class nature, revolutionary tradition, and combat tradition are among the basic factors which created the fighting strength of our people. Therefore, teaching, forging, and developing that nature and those traditions throughout the period of the resistance war for national salvation in the past, as well as in the present phase of building and developing the homeland, has played and will play an extremely great role in inculcating in the cadres and men political values and the necessary virtue to ensure the fulfillment of the combat and development missions assigned by the state and the people.

Speaking of traditions and education regarding traditions, comrade Le Duan wrote, "The Vietnamese people have always been very heroic and have had a

tradition of uniting to oppose foreign aggression. If that were not true we would not have been able to defeat an enemy 10 times stronger than we are."(3) Therefore, "We must base the ideological work on those traditions."(4)

Teaching and developing the army's nature and traditions is a task with an objective, scientific basis, and is not arbitrary and subjective. That is because, first of all, there is a dialectical relationship among the past, the present, and the future. Marx wrote, "Man creates his own history but does not do so in accordance with his arbitrary desires or under conditions he selects, but in accordance with definite, direct, existing conditions which are the legacy of the past. The traditions of past generations bear very heavily on the minds of people who are now alive."(5) On the basis of that Marxist thought, comrade Pham Van Dong also pointed out that "With regard to our people, as well as to the other people, the past, the present, and the future are bound together. The past explains the present and the present prepares for the future."(6) Thus the teaching of the army's nature and traditions must be carried out not only to remember the glorious past but, even more important, to serve the present and the present revolutionary missions. Bringing to life the fine traditions must be intended to inspire and increase strength in order to do a better job of fulfilling missions and increase the pride and sense of responsibility of the later generations in inheriting and further developing the undertaking of previous generations. Thus if anyone thinks that teaching the army's nature and traditions is a "looking backward" task, that is not only a mistaken viewpoint but is also incorrect with regard to theory and practice.

In the teaching of traditions, Karl Marx taught that the "resurrection of the dead" should be intended to praise the new struggles, not to avoid having to resolve the new struggles in the actual situation."(7) Affirming Marxist-Leninist viewpoints in the task of teaching traditions, comrade Pham Van Dong said that "The past is living more beautifully than ever in the epic of the present time, and the present is sowing precious seeds for bright tomorrows."(8)

Our enterprise of building socialism and defending the socialist homeland is in the first phase of the period of transition to socialism. Our people have achieved initial accomplishments but still must overcome many difficulties and deprivations and undergo many sacrifices. Teaching, forging, and developing the working class nature and fine traditions is even more necessary and is very timely. But that viewpoint and understanding is not yet uniform among all cadres and party members. Some people are still wavering and question whether, in the situation of the economy still being beset with many difficulties and the continued existence of negative phenomena in society, the policy of teaching the army's nature and traditions is timely and can resolve problems, or whether it is necessary to "begin with resolving problems regarding living conditions." That way of thinking is entirely inappropriate to the spirit set forth by the Fifth party Congress, so it will inevitably lead to an attitude of passivity, negativism, and rightism in action.

We all know that the Fifth Party Congress regarded "meeting the most urgent and necessary needs, and gradually stabilizing and further improving the material and cultural lives of the people" as being is the most important of the four general economic and social goals of the 1980's. But our party also completely

rejects the viewpoint that "the cultural level of society is mechanically dependent on the level of economic development," and has indicated that "beginning today" and "in the present phase," the building of a new culture and the new man (in which teaching and developing the army's nature and fine traditions are an important content) is something that can and must be achieved step by step and part by part," in order to begin to create a society that is beautiful with regard to its way of life and relations between people. To think that because there are still many deprivations education with regard to the army's nature and traditions would "have no effect" is clearly not to correctly understand the role of the ideological-cultural revolution vis-a-vis the enterprise of building socialism or to understand the dynamism of ideology on a revolutionary and scientific basis. Therefore, intentionally or unintentionally such people undervalue the role of the ideological work and of the party-political work.

There are also opinions that in the present era science and technology are undergoing storm-like development and our army is promoting conventional, modern development so there is fear that emphasis on the army's nature and traditions will create a psychology of conservatism and empiricism, and impede the mission of conventional, modern development. Such concerns are entirely baseless and are even very incorrect. That is because the working class nature is always a foremost basic factor determining fighting strength of our army and all new-style armies led by the party of the working class. The other basic factors are very important and indispensable, but only on the basis of the working class nature can their effect be brought into play. Therefore, the more the development of a conventional, modern army is promoted the more it is necessary to pay attention to building and developing its working class nature, which cannot be neglected or regarded lightly for even a minute. That is a very basic viewpoint of our Party in its line toward building the people's armed forces.

Furthermore, it is necessary to see the valuable examples which are representative of the fine nature and traditions of our army, which even after several decades are still "lighthouses" which light the way for future generations. But as Marx said, "The dead are resurrected to praise the new struggle, not to study in order to copy the old struggles." (9) Teaching, forging, and developing the good nature and traditions is not to "restore the past" but, most important, to apply them in actual missions and use the existing revolutionary spirit and good traditions to serve the present and develop them under new conditions.

Thus unifying knowledge and viewpoints regarding teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions are very important. Only by creating such unity throughout the army, first of all in the ranks of the command cadres and political cadres, can the task of teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions, a major content of the party-political work at present, bring about real, good results. That is not an easy task but requires continuous struggle to overcome vague knowledge and viewpoints, baseless fears, and incorrect thoughts.

Here it is also necessary to deal with the relationship between the working class nature of the army and its fine traditions. Its working class nature and

traditions are two unified contents but are not equal. The army's working class nature is a factor which ensures that it differs completely in nature from all armies of the exploiting, ruling classes. It is not an abstract factor but is manifested in all spheres of activity of our army and in the conduct of all cadres and enlisted men. In the course of time, things that are in accord with the army's working class nature are affirmed and become rules, customs, moral standards, etc., while traditions are carried on and developed from the present generation of military personnel to other generations of military personnel, in the process of fulfilling the roles, functions, and missions assigned by the Party and state. Those are traditions of the army. Thus the army's working class nature is the root. Traditions are lively, rich manifestations of the army's working class nature in actual life. By means of the army's fine traditions its working class nature is affirmed and continually developed.

Only with correct knowledge and viewpoints regarding the relationship between the army's nature and its traditions can guidance of the teaching, forging, and development of that nature and those traditions be comprehensive and effective. All violations of the army's traditions inevitably weaken its nature. The results of strengthening its nature are manifested in maintaining, bringing into play, and developing its traditions. Being concerned every day and every hour with teaching traditions and bringing them into play in all spheres and in the actions of the unit and the conduct of military personnel is a very great responsibility of the command and political cadres. It is also a matter of teaching and bringing into play the army's working class nature in actual daily life in the units.

## II. Unifying Contents on the Basis of Practical, Revolutionary, and Scientific Viewpoints

As discussed above, the class nature of our army is a working class nature. On the basis of that class nature and carrying on and developing the traditional essences of the nation, our army has built extremely fine traditions. The army's nature and traditions are relatively stable factors which are tied in with the process of our army's formation, development, and existence. But stability is not stagnation. The contents of the army's nature and development are continually developing, along with the development of the situation and the revolutionary missions of our army and our people's armed forces. Furthermore, when speaking of the army's nature and traditions one should not think that the boundaries of their contents are limited to the spheres of politics and morality. The army's nature and traditions are manifested in all of our army's actual activities and in the system of conduct of the cadres and men. Therefore, their contents encompass many aspects and spheres and are continually developed and never dry up but are always fresh and bright, blossoming, and bearing fruit.

Comrade Le Duan, on the occasion of our army's 35th anniversary, said that "The popular, revolutionary nature of our army must be manifested in its combat objectives, organizational structure, and even in its strategy and tactics." Under the light of that guidance thought the Political General Department concretized the basic features which manifest our army's working class nature.

The Vietnam People's Army, organized and led by the Vietnam Communist Party is an army of the working class and people of the nationalities in Vietnam, and is a sharp and reliable tool of the proletarian dictatorship state and a solid pillar of the socialist collective mastership system. At the same time, it is a stalwart army of proletarian internationalism.

The combat stands of the VPA are the absolute revolutionary stands of the working class: resolutely opposing all enemies of the nation and of socialism, eliminating all rule by the exploiting classes, building a new socialist society, and attaining the revolutionary goals of the Party and the legitimate aspirations of the people: national independence, socialism, and communism.

The VPA was organized and developed in accordance with the Party's line and principles regarding the organization and development of the people's armed forces, and is under the direct, centralized, and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, permanently and directly the Political Bureau, with leadership, command, management, and internal relations which fully manifest the revolutionary, democratic, centralized, highly unified nature of the working class.

With the line and military thought viewpoints of the guiding party, in its combat activities the VPA has firmly grasped and creatively applied the revolutionary military science and art of Vietnam, a military science and art that is built on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and carries on and develops to a high degree our people's tradition of fighting the enemy and defending the nation, combined with the selective study of the experiences of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, in order to defeat all enemies.

Materials of the Political General Department set forth nine contents which conceptualize the fine traditions of our army and armed forces. As we know, those contents are:

1. Limitless loyalty toward the homeland, the Party, and the people; hatred of the imperialists, the expansionists, and all forces opposing the interests of the working people; and readiness to sacrifice for the independence and freedom of the homeland and for socialism.
2. Being determined to fight and win, knowing how to fight and win, being brave and resourceful in combat and diligent and creative in labor, having a high degree of vigilance and combat readiness, fulfilling all missions, overcoming all difficulties, and defeating all enemies.
3. Maintaining flesh-and-blood relations with the working people; going all-out to serve the people; respecting and basing activities on the people; fighting and winning victories with the people; and attaining the goal of the troops and the people sharing the same will.
4. Close internal solidarity, cadres and enlisted men being truly equal politically and loving one another as brothers, and unanimity from top to bottom.
5. Strict, voluntary discipline and a unity of thought and action.



6. Self-reliance and economy in building the army and the nation, respect for and protection of public property.

7. A revolutionary way of life that is imbued with collectivism, truthfulness, modesty, simplicity, optimism, and culture.

8. Enthusiastically studying, always wanting to progress, continually improving political quality, combat skills, and work ability, and mastering Vietnamese military science and technology and modern science and technology.

9. Having a spirit of noble proletarian internationalism and close, brotherly, heart-felt international solidarity.

Those glorious traditions arise from the working class nature our Party has built for the army. At the same time, they are also the continuation and development of the nation's traditions of patriotism, indomitability, and steadfastness, and uniting to build and defend the nation, and the tradition of resolute, absolute revolutionary struggle of the working class and the Vietnam Communist Party.

Its working class nature and glorious traditions have become a basic factor creating the peerless strength of our army.

In the course of 40 years of combat, development, victory, and maturation under the leadership of the Party, our army and armed forces have continually struggled and constantly maintained, stressed, and strongly developed their good nature and traditions. The cadres and enlisted men, as well as our entire population, are extremely proud because our army has always been worthy of the praise of President Ho Chi Minh: "Loyal to the nation," "Loyal to the Party, filial toward the people, and prepared to fight and sacrifice for the independence and freedom of the homeland and for socialism. It fulfills all missions, overcomes all difficulties, and defeats all enemies."

Today, in the new revolutionary phase, the phase of building and defending the socialist homeland, it is even more important that our cadres and men further strengthen their working class nature and bring into play the glorious traditions of the army, in order to continually increase their fighting strength, fulfill the missions assigned by the Party, the state, and the people, and be worthy of the glorious appellation "Troops of Uncle Ho" and of being "one of the basic factors ensuring that our homeland will always endure and our people will always be independent and free." (10)

In the new phase of the revolution, as our Party has indicated, the Chinese expansionist and hegemonistic clique has become a direct, dangerous enemy of our people. The Chinese aggressor army is now the strategic operational object of our troops and people. The socialist revolution in our country, in the initial phase of the period of transition to socialism, is taking place fiercely. The struggle between ourselves and the enemy, between positive and negative, and between progress and backwardness in society are intertwined and extremely complicated. Our armed forces must both contribute all of their will and talent to promoting the socialist revolution and successfully build

socialism and, along with the entire population, cope with the many-sided war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, in league with the U.S. imperialists. At the same time, they must be prepared to cope with the contingency of the enemy starting a large-scale war of aggression, and to solidly defend the socialist homeland.

In order to fulfill those great revolutionary missions our Party has stressed that "It is necessary to continually strengthen the army's working class nature and cause the army to be completely loyal to the socialist homeland, unite closely around the Party Central Committee, be closely bound to the working people, absolutely obey the leadership of the Party, be prepared to fight, fight victoriously, strongly defend the socialist homeland, and enthusiastically work to build the homeland and fulfill international obligation."(11) It has also pointed out that it is necessary to "Continue the campaign to build a revolutionary people's army with an iron-like will to win, tight discipline, a strict work style, an increasingly high level of professionalism and modernity, and a constantly perfected level of combat readiness, which is always prepared to fulfill all missions assigned by the homeland."(12)

The contents of those traditions both reflect the actual situation of our army during the past 40 years and respond to the development of the revolutionary situation and missions and the army's situation and combat and development missions in the new phase; they praise and study the glorious history of the past and "resolve the new struggles" in the actual situation and do a truly good job of fulfilling the extremely great revolutionary missions assigned by the Party and state to our army and armed forces.

The nine contents of traditions that have been generalized are common to the entire army. But that does not mean that all units everywhere are limited only to those contents. On the basis of the common traditions of the army as a whole, each military region, corps, armed forces branch, combat arm, institute, locality, unit, etc., because of differences with regard to missions, mode of action, and process of formation, maturization, and victory, must study, recapitulate, and discover its own traditions. Those separate traditions are not outside the common traditions but are lively manifestations of the common traditions, with all their rich variety, and make the common traditions more specific, varied, and rich, and enable them to continually develop. Therefore, the determination of specific traditions in each place cannot be a simple, arbitrary matter. It is necessary to firmly grasp the situation of the unit, the developmental process of the organization, and the actual political missions at present, and there must be correct viewpoints and a correct attitude toward building and developing traditions. It must be understood that there are very beautiful traditions of the masses or of a certain combat arm or unit which are accurate reflections and have value in guiding action, virtue, and conduct, but under the new conditions at present are no longer universally appropriate. New conditions usually give rise to the seeds of new traditions. That is a logical development of a law-like nature. That situation demands that the command and leadership organs must be very agile and not conservative, and there be promptly created and developed new traditions which are appropriate to the conditions of the new equipment, the new fighting methods, and the new missions in war to defend the homeland, with requirements regarding raising the level of professionalism and modernity.

On the basis of the matters discussed above it can be seen clearly that the requirement of unity with regard to the contents of our army's working class nature and glorious conditions is extremely important. At the same time, there must be practical viewpoints and revolutionary, scientific viewpoints in order to apply those contents in a manner appropriate to the actual situation of each place and unit, in order to enrich and contribute to developing the nature and common traditions of our army.

### III. Unify Some Major Matters in Actual Guidance

1. In actual guidance, it is first of all necessary to unify the objects of teaching, forging, and developing the class nature and glorious conditions of the army.

There are some opinions that high-ranking and middle-ranking cadres, who have been steeled and challenged over the course of many years and have contributed to building the army's nature and traditions, are people who teach and forge the army's nature and traditions and are not objects of education and forging. Young officers and enlisted men, who are young and have little time in service, are the objects of that work. That opinion, of course, is incorrect. Because of that viewpoint, in a number of organs with high concentrations of middle-ranking and high-ranking officers, recently the task of teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions has been carried out perfunctorially and has attained few results. Some units, while being concerned with the young cadres and enlisted men, have neglected the middle-ranking and high-ranking cadres, or have "carried out" that task toward the latter category superficially or mechanically, like that toward the young generation, which has adversely influenced the education of cadres and enlisted men.

Therefore, it is necessary to clearly realize that all cadres and enlisted men in our people's armed forces are objects of the task of teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions. There are no exceptions.

In actual guidance, it is necessary to give all-out attention to teaching the army's nature and traditions to young officers and the great majority of the enlisted men, for they have not yet experienced much steeling and challenging but one the generation which follows in the step of the older generation in the glorious enterprise of maintaining and developing the nature and traditions of our army.

Educating each of those categories with regard to the army's nature and qualities must be carried out by means of many lively, rich measures which are appropriate to the special psychological characteristics of youths. Only that method is not coercive, creates interest, and brings about useful, real results. One of the factors importantly and directly influencing them is the good example set by the cadres who have gone before, most of whom are now command and leadership cadres in the units. Such cadres are both good examples for the young generation to follow and skilled organizers who do a good job of teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and tradition in the units. The higher ranking the cadre, the greater the effect of the example that is

set. Therefore, teaching the army's nature and traditions to that category must receive all-out attention. At the same time, it is also necessary to help the cadres increase their organizational ability so that they can be capable of effectively teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions in the units. However, the methods of educating and forging such cadres must be appropriate to their age bracket and levels if they are to be effective. The forms and methods used to educate the young generation cannot be employed unchanged. Education is more than just attending a political class. With regard to that category, first of all it is necessary to stress a sense of responsibility and consciousness of self-forging. Especially, it is necessary to pay attention to the educational roles of the party chapters, the basic-level party organizations, the upper echelon, and the collective.

2. The object of the work of teaching, forging and developing the army's nature and traditions is thus extremely broad and its contents are very comprehensive.

It is not only a responsibility of the political organs and political cadres, but is also a responsibility of the entire army and, most directly and on a daily basis, of the cadres and organs of all echelons and sectors. We understand that under the guidance of the ideological work and the organizational work by the Party Central Committee and the command cadres, political cadres, and political organs at all echelons and in all basic-level party organizations play an extremely important role in consolidating and developing our party's class nature and glorious traditions. The results of the education work must be combined results of the positive participation by all cadres, including the command, political, rear services, and technical cadres. In the people's army there is no activity which is not closely tied in with the educational work and the ideological work. Therefore, if they are to carry out any task successfully all officers must know how to do the educational work and must regard themselves as soldiers on the ideological front. They must know how to evaluate and examine any event with a correct viewpoint and a correct political attitude, and not be lenient in the face of negative, unwholesome acts. That means participating positively in developing the army's nature and traditions and in struggling against negative things that erode that work. To have a combined viewpoint in the education work is to know how to closely combine the education work with military training, with combat readiness and combat, and with the other tasks. That is because actual military activity is also an environment in which to inculcate such noble moral values as courage, patient endurance, initiative and creativity, discipline, etc. It is a matter of strengthening class solidarity, comradeship and mutual assistance, consciousness of collective mastership, a sense of responsibility, etc.

Educating people in actual struggle and actual labor, in political missions and in actual daily life, is the most correct combined educational viewpoint. The same is true with regard to teaching the army's nature and traditions. For that reason, all cadres in all branches must also be educators, and the results of education are combined results and the responsibility of all cadres, not only the political cadres and the specialized education cadres.

3. Education has a very great importance, but what kind of education is effective? That is also a matter of very practical significance in guidance.

It must be realized that the class nature and glorious traditions of our army arise from the leadership and revolutionary line of the Party, and from our economic-social system. Therefore, education regarding the army's nature and traditions must be combined with profound education regarding the internal and external lines, military line, economic line, stands, and policies of the Party.

The studying of those contents has a very great significance with regard to teaching troops to be loyal to the homeland, to the socialist regime, and to the Party, and creates a solid basis on which the cadres and men can endeavor to develop the fine revolutionary traditions of the Party, the nation, and the army.

The glorious history of the Party and the example of the heroic struggle of party members give rise to legitimate pride in cadres and men of the beloved party, give youths deep confidence in the leadership role of the Party in the enterprise of building and defending the homeland, and encourage them to advance to firmly grasping military science and art and military science and technology. Studying the life and activity of Uncle Ho has a strong effect on the generations in forming the noble political-morale qualities of warriors fighting for communist ideals.

Education regarding the army's nature and traditions must be tied in with propagandizing the accomplishments of our people in the enterprise of building socialism. The examples of selfless labor of the working class, collective peasants, and socialist intellectuals, and the accomplishments in the struggle to fulfill the Party's economic-social norms serve to develop socialist patriotism and strengthen the people's sense of responsibility and their spirit of collective mastership in the enterprise of defending the accomplishments of the peaceful labor of our people.

The heroic history of our people's army, with its glorious combat, is a very important educational content with regard to pride in the revolutionary and combat traditions. The introduction of specific examples regarding loyalty to the obligations of military personnel, to the oaths of honor, to the revolutionary heroism, etc., of past generations has an educational, inspirational, and motivating effect on cadres and enlisted men, so that they will struggle to achieve new accomplishments and bring the fine traditions into play in fulfilling the missions that are assigned.

We understand that traditions are taught not only to recall the heroic past but, more important, to strengthen people's sense of responsibility toward the present and future. Therefore, it is necessary to praise models of courage, creativity, and devotion in combat, study, work, etc., while at the same time overcoming the shortcomings and deficiencies and further promoting the fulfillment of actual missions. Its implementation should not be monotonous and coercive, but must employ many forms, such as attending class, listening to reports on the situation, youth forums, meetings with heroes and emulation

warriors, artistic performances, activities with local youths, military-civilian solidarity conferences, young officers conferences, the reading of publications, and film viewing.

During the past several years our army has expanded its network of museums, tradition rooms, and Ho Chi Minh rooms. If used cleverly and properly, those cultural installations can have very great educational effect in teaching the combat traditions of the army and the unit. The organizations of practical, useful communication of the historical dates of the Party, the state, and the army, and the traditional dates of the armed forces branches, combat arms, corps, and units, are very good opportunities for promoting the teaching of traditions to troops.

In addition to the above-mentioned contents and forms, it is also necessary to realize that life in the army is life with organization and tight discipline. Such daily activities as military and political training, labor, and other work are very challenging. All aspects of daily life are disciplined and uniform. It provides conditions and a very favorable environment for teaching political values, morality, and skills, in order to teach and develop the fine traditions.

In sum, the teaching, forging, and development of the army's nature and traditions are extremely rich and varied, and are tasks carried out continually, every day and every hour, by means of all actual activities in the army. An extremely important matter is that it is necessary to pay much attention to the ideological contents of each of those forms and measures with regard to the knowledge and sentiment of the cadres and men. It is necessary to go all-out to avoid forms that are boastful and heavy on the propagandizing of accomplishments, without grasping the basic requirements: the ideological contents of the teaching of tradition.

4. Strengthening the leadership of the Party, ensuring the solid leadership of the Party under all circumstances, and enabling the entire army to strictly implement the political and military lines of the Party are basic, indispensable factors in continually strengthening our army's working class nature and developing its glorious traditions.

The nature, traditions, and combat of the army are directly manifested in its activities, especially in the basic-level units.

In the army's basic units, in order to strengthen that basic factor a key matter is building truly pure and strong basic party organizations. Strong basic party organizations are the framework for building strong basic units. Only with strong, pure party organizations can the army's working class nature be manifested.

Therefore, there must be close guidance and specific measures in order to build pure and strong party bases and strengthen the combativeness and vanguard role of the party organizations, of the party members as a whole, and of each party member, so that they can serve as the backbone in building comprehensively strong units and enable all activities of the unit to manifest the working class nature and overflowing vital force of our army's glorious traditions.

The actual situation has demonstrated that wherever the basic party organizations fully understand the lines and policies of the Party and state, maintain the Party's principles and activity systems, carry out criticism and self-criticism, distinguish between right and wrong and positive and negative, struggle resolutely against acts which violate the army's nature and traditions, be concerned with education and management regarding the qualifications of party members, protect the strength of organizations, defend the lines and pure revolutionary nature of the Party, be concerned with the material lives and morale of the troops, closely guide the building of a strong Youth Union (and the national defense trade union), and know how to guide those organizations in operating in correct accordance with their functions, such units are certain to bring into play the army's nature and fine traditions, build a strong unit, and outstandingly fulfill all missions.

Its working class nature and glorious traditions are basic factors which create the peerless strength of our army. The task of teaching, forging, and developing the army's nature and traditions has an extremely great significance. They are a part, an important content, of the party work and the political work in the people's army.

In advancing toward the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Army, the entire army is making outstanding efforts to illuminate and further develop the image of "the troops of Uncle Ho" in the new revolutionary phase."

With ardent socialist patriotism, the entire army is determined to advance to attaining outstanding new accomplishments in combat and combat readiness and in study and labor, and further improve its fighting strength and combined quality so that it can, along with the entire population, defeat the many-sided war of destruction of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and be prepared to defeat any war of aggression they wage, no matter what its scale, and solidly defend the socialist homeland.

#### FOOTNOTES

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4. Op. cit.

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6. Pham Van Dong, "Ban ve van hoa, nghe thuat" [On Culture and Art], 1964, p 162.

7. "Cac Mac " [Karl Marx], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 293.
8. Pham Van Dong, "Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, tinh hoa va khi phach cua dan toc, tuong tam cua thoi dai" [President Ho Chi Minh, the Essence and Spirit of the Nation, the Conscience of the Era], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 15.
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10. Le Duan, "Tien buoc duoi ngon co cua Dang" [Advance Under the Banner of the Party], People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, p 73.
11. "Van Kien Dai Hoi V" [Documents of the Fifth Party Congress], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1983, Vol III, p 89.
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5616

CS0: 4209/150



MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EXPERIENCES OF ARTILLERY TROOPS IN FIGHTING CHINESE RELATED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 84 pp 63-66

[Article by Lt Col Nguyen Dinh Thach: "Some Combat Experiences of the Artillery Troops in Fighting Chinese Troops Shelling and Land Grabbing Along the Northern Border. " ]

[Text] One of the hostile acts of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists against our country is to use artillery to fire indiscriminately into residential areas, schools, hospitals, roads, etc., thus committing many bloody crimes. Our artillery troops have deservingly punished them for those acts.

Many of our artillery units have retaliated promptly and very accurately, attained high combat efficiency, and economized in the use of ammunition. From the units that have fought well we can isolate some principal experiences:

1. Preparing in advance artillery combat plans that are appropriate to all scales of artillery shelling and land grabbing by the enemy.

In their schemes to wage a many sided war of destruction, along our northern border the Chinese expansionists have many operational schemes on different scales: they have used artillery to shell a number of areas or have used artillery on a large scale to commit crimes, organize local forces and border defense troops to grab a number of high-altitude areas in the border region or have used main-force units to attack deep into our territory.

With each plot and specific act of the enemy troops in each area, we must prepare in advance artillery operation plans to retaliate against and punish the enemy, or to support the infantry as effectively as possible. Each of the plans must be appropriate to each operational scheme and scale of sabotage and land-grabbing by the enemy. It is necessary to clearly confirm the following contents:

- The specific missions of the artillery troops.
- The use of forces (which forces, units, and types and calibers of artillery should be used, how those forces should be moved, where the units' firing positionns should be, etc.)
- The fighting method of the artillery troops (method of preparing firing

elements or firepower plans, the task of preparing to fire, the support work, etc.).

It is necessary to continually monitor, discover, and correctly grasp the plots and schemes of the enemy, in order to correctly implement the predetermined plan and effectively fulfill the missions assigned, without being passive or using ammunition wastefully.

It is necessary to prepare for both small-scale fighting and large-scale fighting, in order to retaliate promptly against the enemy artillery and punish enemy troops who commit crimes on differing scales. Only thereby can the mobilization of artillery troops be appropriate and attain high combat effectiveness.

2. Actively expand the system of artillery observation and fully utilize the other reconnaissance capabilities and sources in order to discover and confirm the artillery targets.

The artillery forces, from the military region organs to the artillery regiments and brigades, must positively deploy observation posts. All battalions have set up company and battalion observation posts and has triangulation posts, including short-base triangulation posts. In military region X one regiment organized dozens of observation posts of the various kinds. That is an all-out effort. The observation posts of the units cooperate with one another and do a rather good job of spotting the important targets and the location of enemy artillery which is firing.

The deployment of the observation posts must concentrate on the key points, which some places account for 60 percent of the total number of observation posts in the operational area. Thus most of the targets have been spotted and firing adjustment has been well served.

The units have also made full use of the facilities at hand, such as using stopwatches to determine range and assist in damage assessment by the triangulation posts. In order to ensure the use of stopwatches and attain high effectiveness it is necessary to organize training in the methods of expertly using the various kinds of stopwatches at hand.

Discovering and accurately confirming the artillery targets is one of the most important missions of the artillery troops, for all activities of the artillery troops are ultimately aimed toward a single goal and requirement: sending artillery shells to the correct targets at the right moment. Therefore, the commanders at all levels, including the commanders of combined combat arms, must pay adequate attention in order to attain high effectiveness when firing artillery. In order to do a good job of discovering and accurately confirming the artillery objectives, especially the artillery positions, command posts, and observation posts of the enemy, there must be effective support by such forces and combat arms as sappers, technical reconnaissance, military intelligence, air force, the local people's armed forces, the people of the border region, etc., which must be combined and subject to the command of a single organ.

3. Continually discover, adjust, and supplement in order to perfect the determination of artillery troops.

The defense of the border is a permanent, long-range task. The discovering and confirming of targets does not take place in a short period of time, as in campaigns which are carried out in a large-scale war, but is carried out continuously in a process of maintaining combat readiness and defending the nation. In their plots to wage a many-sided war of destruction against our country the enemy troops continually change their force deployment and change their schemes. Their criminal acts are also very wily and they are continually carrying out feints, constructing false targets, and changing their operational laws.

Therefore, it is necessary to continually discover additional new targets, continually reconfirm the old targets that have already been discovered, and by means of the different sources of reconnaissance information and the activities of the enemy study, verify, and eliminate the false targets and the targets moved elsewhere by the enemy, in order to promptly adjust the targets of the artillery troops in each period of activity. Only thereby can targets be confirmed with a high degree of reliability to ensure retaliation against the targets which are committing crimes.

During the recent period many artillery units have done a good job of carrying out continuous reconnaissance, constantly studying and readjusting targets, and discovering additional command posts and new artillery bases, enemy artillery positions that have been moved, and their false artillery positions. On that basis, new firing plans have been drafted, so that as soon as enemy artillery commits crimes our artillery accurately retaliates against the preselected targets and soon forces them to cease firing.

If we do not carry out continuous reconnaissance or continually readjust the targets that are discovered, when the enemy uses artillery to shell us we will only retaliate against the targets included in the old plans, so the effectiveness of our firing will be very low or even entirely wasted.

4. The artillery troops must retaliate immediately but must attain high effectiveness. If they do not firmly grasp the targets they must resolutely refrain from firing.

Economizing in the use of artillery shells is a very important requirement, a very basic viewpoint in the use of artillery in combat. Of course, when it is necessary to deservingly punish the enemy we are prepared to drop a firestorm on their heads. When the artillery troops retaliate they must do so accurately. By expending few shells it is still possible to destroy many war facilities and kill many of the enemy. Therefore, when we do not fully grasp the targets we resolutely refrain from firing. If success is not certain we resolutely refrain from firing. We continually improve and increase the effectiveness of the firing elements by using observers to adjust fire, especially when supporting infantry fighting the enemy's land grabbing.

In the recent fighting artillery units 4 and 8 attained a high ratio of targets hit with observers adjusting fire. The results of artillery firing were

confirmed in most of the battles. That is a major advantage in the artillery fire commanding of the commanders of those units.

In order to ensure effective firing the commanders at all echelons must meticulously guide and organize the preparations of artillery troops. On the part of units which have just moved up to the front from the rear and have not yet participated in the fighting, or of detachments which have just been sent to a new artillery base, the preparatory work must receive even more attention.

One of the tasks intended to ensure that the artillery troops retaliate immediately and with a high degree of effectiveness the firing command information network must be well organized. In the event that it is necessary to cooperate closely in order to give priority to using artillery firing command at the important times. It is necessary to organize a network of firing command via both facilities: wired and wireless. Furthermore, it is necessary to fully utilize the support of the civilian, posts and telecommunications, and broadcasting organs in relaying information and repairing communications equipment and facilities. All-out efforts must be made to ensure that the wired communication network does not pass through many intermediate stages or is roundabout, for that could easily result in tardiness. Only if the wireless communications network is organized very rationally can it be effective.

##### 5. Concern for organizing artillery mobility in order to preserve forces.

During the recent fighting, because they grasped the operational laws and correctly predicted the plots of the enemy troops, before the enemy could shell us with artillery and commit crimes many areas promptly moved the artillery bases. In the course of combat they also continued to move artillery to new firing positions. Some operational zones made arrangements for 85 percent of the artillery troops to move to new fighting positions. Therefore, they were able to preserve all of their artillery forces and suffered no losses, although the enemy troops fired thousands of artillery shells into our artillery bases.

Because the work of organizing defenses to defend the border have been carried out over a long period of time, it is unavoidable that the enemy troops would discover some of our artillery bases, just as they will be discovered when our artillery retaliates for their artillery shelling and land grabbing. The artillery units at the front understand that very clearly because of the artillery shelling by the enemy troops. Thus preparing in advance and organizing the movement of artillery before and during the fighting is an indispensable task. We cannot deploy artillery in the same positions year after, even though when moving them difficulties are encountered in organizing messing facilities and living quarters in the new locations, as well as in looking after and managing the installations in the old locations.

5616  
CSO: 4209/150

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROBLEMS OF WARTIME MOBILIZATION DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 84 pp 1-14

[Article by Maj Gen Trieu Huy Hung: "Some Problems in Preparing the Nation To Resist Aggression and Carry Out Wartime Mobilization "]

[Text] Preparing the nation to resist aggression and to mobilize the army in accordance with wartime requirements is one of the major missions of the revolution. In that regard we have initial experience: some of that experience was accumulated in the period of the anti-French resistance war, some was gained by the north during the period of the anti-U.S. war for national salvation, and other experience was gained by the nation as a whole in the two wars to defend the homeland against the Chinese aggressors. But we do not yet have much experience in preparing for and carrying out large-scale mobilization. We must learn while doing.

This article presents a number of problems vis-a-vis preparing the nation to resist aggression and the basic contents of army mobilization.

I

The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress affirmed that "Our country is in a situation of both being at peace and having to prepare for a many-sided war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in league with the U.S. imperialists. At the same time, it must be prepared to cope with the possibility of the enemy starting a large-scale war of aggression."

Based on the situation of the new revolutionary phase, the Fifth Party Congress set forth two strategic missions:

- First, successfully building socialism.
- Second, being prepared to fight and solidly defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland.

The Political Report of the Fifth Party Congress pointed out that "The mission of maintaining readiness to fight to defend the homeland demands constant vigilance toward the plots and acts of war of the reactionaries in the Beijing ruling circles and the war-loving imperialist powers, and the mobilization of

the greatest possible efforts on the part of our entire party, population, and army in resolutely defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction while ensuring that our country is always prepared and is sufficiently strong to defeat the enemy under all circumstances."

Those are contents and requirements of the mission of defending the homeland in the present situation. Those contents are closely related and affect one another. The mission of defending the homeland is tied in with the mission of building the nation and is affected by the mission of developing the nation, while at the same time affecting that mission. In preparing the nation to resist aggression in the present situation it is necessary to correctly resolve the relationship between preparing in accordance with the basic, long-range requirements and preparing in accordance with the urgent, permanent requirements.

Preparing the nation to resist aggression must be based on the special characteristics and requirements of war to defend the homeland. We must prepare to defeat the aggressor troops of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in league with the U.S. imperialists. They have a large army and great resources. They are next to us on the ground, at sea, and in the air. They are allied with the other reactionary powers in the region and may combine an attack from without with creating internal rebellion. We must resolutely defeat the enemy from the very beginning no matter what the scale of the fighting, and must defend every inch of land of the homeland, defend the people, defend all accomplishments of the revolution, defend the rear areas of each theater, of the nation as a whole, and of the three Indochinese countries, and make all efforts to limit the war with regard to time and space. We wage war in a common defensive status that has been prepared and increasingly strengthened in wartime in each locality, throughout our nation, and all over Indochina, and there are conditions for bringing into play the great effect of that common battlefield position from the very beginning of a war. The war will take place fiercely from the very beginning and in the course of the war, with many urgent, complicated situations: the form of the war will be that of their being both a front line and intermingling between ourselves and the enemy. We will both have to fight enemy troops attacking from the outside and oppose enemies carrying out sabotage and creating internal rebellion. In the course of war to defend the homeland, especially at the beginning of the war, in order to meet the extremely great demands of the war it is necessary to make meticulous preparations even before the war begins, for only then will it be possible to meet the requirements of the first part of the war and during the course of the war.

In order to ensure that the nation is always prepared and is sufficiently strong to defeat the enemy under all circumstances it is necessary to make preparations with regard to the principal aspects: preparing the people, preparing the armed forces, preparing the economy, preparing civil defense, and preparing the battlefield position of people's war.

To prepare the people is to make political-morale preparations, to build and bring into play the socialist collective mastership right, to carry out education to increase patriotism and love of socialism, to enable the people to clearly understand the enemy and hate them, and to be prepared to arise and

defend the homeland and build an increasingly rich and strong nation. The people must be prepared, so that they have the necessary knowledge of modern war, know how to take steps to cope with war and serve the military activity, know how to capture spies and commandos, shoot down airplanes, and fight enemy troops landing by air or sea, know how to organize a wartime way of life, maintain social activities under wartime circumstances, etc.

Preparing the armed forces is preparing and organizing wartime forces, and preparing to mobilize the army. It is stockpiling reserves of equipment, materiel, and technical facilities for fighting by the army, preparing the battlefield, and organizing monitoring of the enemy.

The armed forces are prepared by building extensive mass armed forces, building a conventional, modern people's army, both main-force and local troops, with the necessary number of high-quality regular troops, combat-ready troops and forces which do economic work but are prepared to become combat units, and by building powerful reserve forces which are always ready for mobilization in order to restore and expand the army's organization according to the requirements of war and the strategic plan.

Economic preparation is combining economic construction with national defense in a strategic economic deployment, in determining the direction of economic development, in the policy of sector and territorial organizational structures, and in long-range and short-range plans to develop the national economy. It is ensuring the gradual development of the economy while also gradually strengthening national defense capabilities, preparing the national economy in order to have war reserves, and support the mobilization of the army, and make up for losses during the first phase of the war. It is preparing all conditions for maintaining the pace of production and mobilizing high capacity in wartime, meeting the many great needs of the armed forces, and at the same time meeting the minimum, essential needs of the people in wartime.

Preparing civil defense is preparing all conditions for protecting the lives and property of the people, protecting the state organs and economic installations, limiting damage caused by enemy raids, preparing to overcome the aftereffects of enemy raids, preparing to urgently restore the production installations damaged by the enemy in order to maintain continuous and effective production by the national economy and maintain the ordinary activities of the people in wartime.

Preparing the battlefield position of people's war in accordance with the predetermined strategic plan, which encompasses many defensive lines, all battlefields, all strategic provincial units, the district military fortresses, the systems of integrated combat clusters and combat villages, the three types of troops, the national defense installations, and the rear area, rear services, technical, transportation, communications, public health, and other bases.

Those preparatory tasks are closely related and must be carried out simultaneously throughout the nation and in each locality and base.

In addition to doing a good job of preparing all tasks it is necessary to draft readiness plans so that when war breaks out an all-round mobilization can be carried out, including the mobilization of the army, the mobilization of the economy, and the mobilization the entire nation on a wartime footing, in an organized manner, in order to take the strategic initiative from the very beginning and throughout the course of the war.

When examining the matter of preparing the nation to resist aggression and mobilize the army in wartime in the present circumstances of our nation it is necessary to note that our country is both at peace and must defeat the enemy's war of destruction, which is now being promoted by means of many aggressive armed activities in the northern provinces. Therefore, some of our forces have been mobilized to meet the requirements of that situation. It is also necessary to speak of our volunteer units, which are continually fighting on the battlefields of friendly countries in Indochina. Therefore, when a large-scale war of aggression is waged against our country we will not have to change over to a wartime status from a completely peacetime status, as in many other countries.

## II

### Basic Contents of Army Mobilization

In order to defeat a large-scale war of aggression and attain the strategic goals of war to defend the homeland, we must have large and strong armed forces, both a people's army and mass armed forces. We must have a powerful people's army that is numerically large and of high quality to stop the enemy and carry out counterattacks, and to attack the enemy on the front line. But before a large-scale war breaks out maintaining such a large army would place a heavy burden on the national economy, one that even the economies of the developed nations could not bear.

However, due to the special situation of our nation, which must cope with the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists who, in league with the U.S. imperialists, continually create tension and may at any time start a large-scale war of aggression, we must maintain a standing army with the necessary numbers and high quality, in order to defend the nation, fulfill international missions, and be prepared to retaliate against sudden enemy attacks in the air, at sea, or on the land, ensure that the enemy troops are stopped, carry out mobilization, transfer the nation to a wartime status, and completely defeat the enemy's war of aggression.

At the same time, it is necessary to build powerful reserve forces with large numbers -- many times those of the regular forces -- and tight organization, with high quality and fighting strength equivalent to that of the regular forces, and be ready to mobilize them according to the requirements of developing the army's organization in modern war to defend the homeland.



In wars to liberate and defend the homeland in the past, we developed the armed forces in many ways.

Prior to the August Revolution the Liberation Army units, the Bac Son guerrillas, the Ba To guerrillas, etc., were revolutionary armed units which were created by concentrating outstanding people in the self-defense units and the mass associations, and party members in the localities served as the backbone.

After the success of the August Revolution, in addition to organizing extensive military and self-defense forces we rapidly developed the army throughout the nation. The method of organization and building was to take in the cadres and enlisted men from among the party members and the revolutionary masses who had just arisen, by means of a system of voluntary enlistment.

In the course of the resistance war against the colonialist French aggressors, with the slogans of simultaneously fighting and building and becoming stronger as we fight, we developed the militia and self-defense forces, the local troops, and the main-force troops. The method of organizing and building the army was to both form new units and transform some of the concentrated guerrilla units into local troops and some of the local units into main-force units (that practice was called "concentrating troops"). While relying principally on voluntary enlistment, we also promulgated a military obligation system.

During the anti-U.S. resistance war, in order to fulfill the mission of struggling to liberate the south and defend the north, in 1960 we promulgated and widely implemented the Military Obligation Law and began to prepare for military mobilization. But because that was a new task and had not been carried out very long, we had to urgently organize forces to fight the liberation war in the south and oppose the war of destruction in the north. The methods of organizing and developing the army during that phase were to mobilize the demobilized, transferred, and discharged military personnel, form them into companies and battalions, quickly train them, and send them south to fight, and to recruit new troops, form new infantry battalions and regiments and technical combat arms, and take some cadres, technical specialists, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men from the combat-ready regiments and divisions to supplement the cadres, specialized personnel and new recruits to form second regiments or divisions, which could participate in the fighting only after a longer period of training.

In war to defend the homeland against the Chinese aggressor troops the basic method of developing the army was like that during the liberation war, for there was little time to prepare forces.

The methods of developing armed forces during the past revolutionary periods were in accord with the specific conditions at those times.

Now the situation is far different. After the historic victory of the spring of 1975 our nation was independent and unified. We have a complete nation and are building a system of socialist collective mastership, and there is time to

build and accumulate forces. Those are new conditions and capabilities which enable us to organize and build armed forces and to organize and build the army in accordance with the requirements of the missions, the strategic objective of which is defending the homeland.

The methods of organizing and building the army in the past are still very valuable experiences which must be applied creatively in order to develop forces in the course of war to defend the homeland. Furthermore, we must also realize that the method of developing forces in the past required a long period of time. Ordinarily it would take many months to form an infantry division or combat arm and bring it into combat when the cadres and specialized technical personnel already exist. There are also some units which participated in the fighting only a few months after being organized but their combat effectiveness was usually not high. Thus that developmental rate did not meet the requirement of the strategic goals of war to defend the homeland.

In war to defend the homeland, in addition to millions of militia and self-defense unit members, who will play a role when the enemy reach the localities (and some will supplement the army), we must have an army with very large numbers which has modern equipment and fights skilfully, so that it can be sent to the front to stop the enemy, carry out counterattacks, attack the enemy, fight on a large scale immediately, and fight effectively in space and time that differ from the past. If that is to be accomplished the method of organizing the army must be to "have a complete structure that is balanced between the regular forces and the reserve forces, with the necessary numbers and increasingly higher quality," as the Political Report of the Fifth Party Congress affirmed.

With that method of organizing the army we must continually maintain a standing army with moderate numbers while at the same time building powerful reserve forces so that when war breaks out within only a very short period of time we can mobilize great military forces capable of defeating the enemy troops.

In order to build powerful reserve forces, the first task is to determine the composition, quantity, and organizational structure of the army in wartime. All mobilization plans are based on that determination. On the basis of organizing the army in wartime, the army is organized in peacetime, both regular forces and reserve forces. In peacetime the army units are divided in two types: combat-ready units and mobilized units.

The units which are continually ready to fight are the units which in peacetime normally have the full complements of troops and equipment called for by the wartime table of organization. At present, a number of those units are directly fulfilling combat missions and are continually in a very high status of combat readiness, such as the units on the front line, on islands, and along the coast. Because of combat, the requirement of maintaining a high degree of combat readiness, and natural losses and losses due to other factors, the number of troops is usually only sufficient to ensure a certain ratio and the units must be continually supplemented in accordance with the requirements of the present mission, and when there is a large-scale war and a mobilization order they must be supplemented so that they can have the table of organization according to the requirements of the new mission.

The mobilized units have two organizational forms: complete units (RG) and permanent cadre units (KTT). The RG and KTT units are organized in peacetime and are mobilized or filled out in wartime, when the situation is urgent and the war has begun. In addition, there are the units which are formed after a war begins and in the course of the war.

To mobilize the army is to change it from a wartime table of organization to a peacetime table of organization, in accordance with the strategic intentions and plans, and to mobilize reserve military personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy to supply to the army, in order to restore the wartime table of organization and set up new units and supplementary units in wartime. Army mobilization is a principal component of the strategic development of armed forces.

The first mission of army mobilization is to provide sources of mobilization for the RG and KTT units in order to restore them to their full wartime table of organization, in accordance with the plan to mobilize the units and bring them up to full strength in a permanent combat-ready status. That is a very basic mission, for those units are forces which attain the strategic goals of the initial period of the war.

Another important mission of army mobilization is mobilizing reserve forces to form new units and replacement units.

Army mobilization is divided into two phases: preparing for mobilization and carrying out mobilization.

The phase of preparing for mobilization is the phase of building reserve forces in peacetime, beginning with the drafting of mobilization plans and ending when the mobilization order is received from the state. That phase may be short but it may also be very long, but whether long or short it must be carried out very urgently and continually supplemented so that the organization of reserve forces can be as complete as possible. In that phase, the military organs, the state organs, and the mobilized units have the following missions:

- Fully registering and closely and permanently managing the mobilization sources.
- Each organ, locality, and unit must draft an army mobilization plan and continually adjust and supplement its mobilization plan.
- Organizing mobilized units, including the organization of permanent cadres, the assignment of reserve military personnel, and the distribution of army equipment and technical facilities of the national economy to the mobilized units, and closely managing the troops, equipment, and facilities that have been provided. It is necessary to pay all-out attention to organizing and perfecting the permanent cadres of the mobilized units, for if there are no cadre teams or if they have insufficient numbers or quality, the mobilized units cannot be built.
- Accumulating stockpiles of weapons, equipment, ammunition, military clothing, military equipment, foodstuffs, medicines, medical equipment, etc.,

to ensure that each mobilized unit can be built up rapidly in accordance with the wartime table of organization.

-- Preparing command posts and organizing a communications and liaison system with sufficient people and facilities to continually protect the communicating of mobilization orders and mobilization command at all echelons and in all circumstances.

-- Continually organizing mobilization training for the cadres and organs at all echelons so that they can be expert in mobilization, and regularly organizing training for the mobilized units in accordance with Article 40 of the Military Obligation Law.

-- The district and provincial military organs must prepare to concentrate the mobilized forces and means of transporting them to turn them over to the mobilized units. The mobilized units must prepare and organize the reception of mobilized personnel.

-- Preparing to protect mobilization (at present continually defeating the war of destruction waged by the enemy has a positive effect on protecting mobilization).

-- Carrying out the party-political work among the reserve forces.

-- Inspecting the local military organs and mobilized units with regard to their mobilization readiness status.

The phase of carrying out mobilization is a phase of changing over the army from a peacetime status to a wartime status, beginning with the receipt of the state mobilization order and ending when the mobilized units have been restored to a wartime status and are prepared to accept missions. In this phase, the army organs, the state organs, and the mobilized units have the following missions:

-- Promptly relaying the state's mobilization order to the army units and to the state organs at the central and local levels.

-- The district military organs urgently relay the mobilization order to all reserve military personnel and the owners of the technical facilities of the national economy, and concentrate mobilized personnel and transport them to the army units in accordance with the mobilization plan.

-- The army units must organize the reception of mobilized personnel, rapidly stabilize their wartime table of organization, carry out joint training, and bring the units into a status of readiness to accept missions.

In order to carry out army mobilization in accordance with the plan and with the required numbers and quality it is necessary to ensure that mobilization command is timely and solid, to tightly protect the mobilization, and to carry out the party-political work continuously and extensively both within the army and among the people.

The Council of Ministers decides whether there will be a general mobilization or a partial mobilization. When it decides to carry out a limited mobilization the mobilization of the army is carried out in a region or among a number of army units with limited mobilization of personnel. When it decides to carry out a general mobilization the army mobilization is carried out throughout the nation and in all army units, with very large numbers of mobilized personnel.

In order to build powerful reserve forces which are ready for mobilization according to the requirements of modern war it is necessary to firmly grasp and do a good job of carrying out the following principal tasks:

1. Continuing to propagandize, teach, and organize the good implementation of the Military Obligation Law.

Propaganda and education must be extensive and deep in the army and among the people. Army officers, party cadres, and cadres of the mass organizations and state organs must fully understand the spirit and contents of the articles of the Law in order to organize its full and correct implementation. Youths (including those in the army), civilians of military obligation age, and the people in general must clearly understand the spirit and contents of the Law so that it can be strictly implemented.

While carrying out propaganda and education regarding the Military Obligation Law, carrying out universal military training, calling up youths to register to fulfill their military obligations, calling up youths to active duty, discharging military personnel, etc., it is necessary to enable youths to fully understand that the military obligation consists of three phases: preparing to serve on active duty, serving on active duty, and serving in a reserve status. All citizens, especially youths, must be prepared so that they have correct thought and understanding, and fulfill their obligations in each phase.

2. Registering and managing mobilization sources.

Mobilization sources include reserve military personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy. The reserve military personnel include reserve officers and noncommissioned officers and reserve enlisted men. The technical facilities of the national economy include transportation facilities and other facilities and equipment of the national economy that may be supplied to the army.

The registration and management of reserve military personnel include registering and managing the reserve officers and registering and managing the reserve noncommissioned officers and enlisted men.

Reserve officers are discharged officers who are still in a reserve status and discharged noncommissioned officers who have been given additional training and commissioned as reserve officers. Those two sources of reserve officers have served on active duty so their quality is good.

Another category consists of higher school and college students who have taken the reserve officers training program and been commissioned as reserve

officers, and party cadres and cadres of the state organs who have taken the reserve officers training program and been commissioned as reserve officers. Those officers have specialized technical knowledge but do not yet understand the army or know how to command, so they must in turn be called to serve on active duty, as stipulated by the Officers' Law, and only then assigned to the mobilized units.

Reserve noncommissioned officers and enlisted men include first-class reserve military personnel and second-class reserve military personnel, as stipulated by Article 37 of the Military Obligation Law. The first-class reserve military personnel are the basis on which to create mobilized units with fighting strength equivalent to that of the regular units. The tight management and correct use of the military specialties of first-class military personnel has a decisive significance with regard to the fighting quality of the mobilized units.

Therefore, when receiving recently mobilized youths the regular units are responsible for educating, training, and forging them so that they can become military personnel with good combat skills and professional specialties. If that is to be accomplished it is necessary to ensure that they complete the annual military and political programs. Before they are discharged they must be educated so that they can clearly understand that they must fulfill their military obligation in a reserve status until they are 50 years old (in accordance with Article 2 and Article 38 of the Military Obligation Law), be prepared to return to the army when there is an order to carry out concentrated training or a mobilization order, and must prepare all documents so that when they return to their localities they can quickly register to enter the reserve status.

The technical facilities of the national economy which may be supplied to the army must be fully registered and closely managed, especially the technical facilities which the Council of Ministers has assigned in the form of mobilization norms to the sectors and localities. The technical facilities mobilized for the army must be the best ones, along with sufficient repair equipment and replacement parts, which have been kept in good working order. If damaged they must be replaced by other facilities of the same type, capacity, and effect (according to Resolution 166/CP).

Only with the registration, management, and accumulation of the mobilization sources can there be a material basis on which to draft mobilization plans, build the reserve forces, and carry out the mobilization of the army. Accumulating and managing the mobilization sources are very meticulous, detailed, and continuous tasks, year after year, of the army and state organs. The army mobilization sources increase in number and improve in quality every year, and are the material bases for restoring and expanding the wartime table of organization and supplementing the army during a war.

### 3. Drafting army mobilization plans.

The army mobilization plan is the total of all plans to develop the army's organization in wartime, plans regarding the building of standing forces and

reserve forces, and plans regarding the mobilization of the technical facilities of the national economy in support of army mobilization. When drafting plans regarding the mobilization of reserve military personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy it is necessary to fully consider the requirement of developing the army in accordance with a strategic plan. At the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration maintaining the uninterrupted activity of the national economy in wartime and the requirements of production and combat of the basic level and the localities.

The army mobilization plan also includes a party-political work plan and plans regarding cadres, technical equipment, rear services, finance, etc., drafted by the functional organs.

The army mobilization plan of the Ministry of National Defense is approved by the Council of Ministers, which breaks it down into parts and assigns missions and norms to each ministry and general department under the central echelon regarding supplying reserve personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy to the army in accordance with the mobilization order. The missions and norms regarding the mobilization of reserve military personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy are state laws which the sectors and localities are responsible for obeying unconditionally.

On the basis of the army mobilization plan approved by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who assigns norms to the sectors and localities, the Minister of National Defense assigns mobilization preparation norms to each general department, armed forces branch, combat arm, military region, corps, etc. The general departments, armed forces branches, military regions, and corps must draft mobilization plans for its organs and units.

The ministries and general departments of the Council of Ministers and the people's committees of provinces and municipalities directly under the central level (including the military organs) must also draft plans to supply mobilization sources to the army when there is a mobilization order and organize specialized units for the army in wartime, in accordance with norms assigned by the Council of Ministers.

The drafting of mobilization plans is the most basic task of the mission of preparing for army mobilization, for all tasks regarding preparing for mobilization and carrying out mobilization are based on such plans. The drafting of mobilization plans must be specific, accurate, and based on the actual situation. The more specific, accurate, and realistic they are the more dynamic they will be during mobilization.

However, the actual situation is continually changing, so the organs drafting army mobilization plans must continually grasp the situation and reflect it in the plans, in order to promptly adjust and supplement them.

#### 4. Organizing mobilized units.

The organization of mobilized units includes organizing the permanent cadre teams, assigning reserve military personnel and technical facilities of the national economy, and stockpiling weapons, equipment, ammunition, military

clothing, military equipment, food, medicine, medical equipment, materials, finances, etc., in which organizing and building the permanent cadre teams is the most basic task. The missions of the permanent cadre teams are:

- Building and managing the cadre team and bringing the level of the cadres and technical personnel up to that of a conventional, modern army.
- Maintaining the unit's weapons, equipment, and materiel stockpiles.
- Cooperating with the local military organs in the reception of mobilized personnel.
- Managing the reserve military personnel and the technical facilities of the national economy that have been allocated to the unit.
- Organizing the training of reserve military personnel, including the training of reserve officers who are been assigned to the unit, carrying out unit training maneuvers, and applying development and management measures in order to continually raise the unit's level of mobilization readiness and combat readiness.
- Preparing to receive mobilized personnel to restore the unit's wartime table of organization when there is a mobilization order.
- Carrying out the party-political work vis-a-vis the cadre team and the reserve personnel.
- Organizing and preparing defense of mobilization.
- In addition, they may be assigned responsibility for training reserve officers.

In order to fulfill those missions the cadres and personnel of the cadre team must have quality equivalent to that of the cadres and personnel of the units which are continually in a combat-ready status. At the same time, they must know how to expertly prepare and carry out mobilization, know how to build close relations with the localities, and know how to organize training, develop and manage reserve military personnel, and manage the technical facilities that will be added to their unit.

The first-class reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men joining the mobilized units must meet the stipulated number and quality norms. The assignment of military personnel to the correct military specialties must be made a basic principle. If there are insufficient reserve military personnel with the required military specialties people whose military specialties are similar to those required may be assigned. If there are no reserve military personnel with the required military specialties people without such skills may be assigned to simple positions, but they must be given specialized military training so that they can fulfill their missions.

On the basis of accumulating military specialties all-out efforts must be made to restrict the mobilization area of each mobilized unit to facilitate



continuous management and training, carry out mobilization rapidly, and avoid having to transport mobilized personnel long distances.

After the mobilized units are fully assembled the tight, continuous management of the reserve military personnel and technical facilities that have been allotted them is a very important mission of the cadre team. There are three management methods:

-- Every month cadres visit the basic level and meet with the reserve military personnel after their production or study.

-- The cadres work with the district military organs in calling up reserve military personnel for training in order to carry out regular political education or specialized military training.

-- Calling up reserve military personnel for long-term training and maneuvers (in accordance with Article 40 of the Military Obligation Law).

In order to facilitate the management of reserve military personnel and build reserve forces along the lines of building a conventional, modern army, the reserve military personnel assigned to mobilized units or augmented reserve units must be organized separately. Before the mobilization it is possible to mobilize reserve military personnel to participate in the local military work without affecting mobilization readiness. Reserve military personnel who have not yet been assigned to a mobilized unit may be brought into the activities of the militia and self-defense units, but when necessary they can be withdrawn immediately for assignment to a mobilized unit.

#### 5. Mobilization training and training of reserve forces.

Mobilization training includes training for army cadres, Party cadres, cadres of state organs, and cadres of the mass organizations; training for cadres specializing in mobilization work; and training for cadres and enlisted men of the cadre teams of mobilized units.

Mobilization training for the army cadres, Party cadres, cadres of state organs, and leadership cadres of the mass organizations with regard to knowledge of army mobilization is intended to unify their knowledge and thought and enable them to prepare and carry out mobilization and create a basis on which to build powerful reserve forces which are large numerically, have high quality, and are always prepared for mobilization in accordance with the requirements of modern war to defend the socialist homeland.

The training method is to organize study and participation in the mobilization exercises. The schools training army cadres must introduce army mobilization contents into their training programs.

Mobilization training for the cadres and organs specializing in mobilization work, including local military organs and the cadres responsible for mobilization in the state organs with regard to professional army mobilization matters, is intended to continually raise their ideological and professional levels with regard to both preparing for mobilization and expertly carrying out mobilization.

Mobilization training for cadres and enlisted men of the cadre teams of mobilized units must raise their political, military, and army management ability levels to those of cadres of units in a permanent combat-ready status, while also carefully training them with regard to preparing for and carrying out mobilization. Attention must be paid to all aspects: organizing the unit TO & E, managing the mobilization sources, organizing camps to receive mobilized personnel, and knowing how to train reserve military personnel and organize unit maneuvers.

The training of reserve forces includes the training of reserve noncommissioned officers and enlisted men who have been assigned to the mobilized unit and firmly grasping military specialties. The training methods are either concentrated training or short-term training at the basic level which does not interrupt production and is carried out by the mobilized unit cadre team at the basic level.

On the basis of reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men who have been assigned to their military specialties, concentrating reserve military personnel in the mobilized units for long-term training (in accordance with Article 40 of the military obligation law) is a very basic measure that is essential for raising the combat-readiness level of the reserve forces. The training programs must be practical and appropriate to the situation of the reserve military units, and may consist of the following contents: practice in carrying out mobilization, political education, training in new military subjects, and practice in detachment, company-grade unit, and field-grade unit tactics.

During the next few years the mobilized units will take turns participating in mobilization maneuvers, including carrying out maneuvers, joint training, and combat maneuvers.

In order to carry out high-quality, long-range concentrated training the preparatory work must be complete and meticulous. There must be plans, training curricula, materials, instructors, drill fields and lecture halls, weapons and combat equipment, military clothing, military equipment, foodstuffs, medicine, etc.

### III

#### Responsibilities of Echelons and Sectors in Army Mobilization

Army mobilization is the principal measure of the strategic deployment of the armed forces in time of war, in accordance with the strategic intentions and plans to defend the homeland. Therefore, army mobilization is a mission of the entire party, population, and army, and especially is a direct mission of the managing cadres of the party, the government, and the army. Therefore, each cadre must truly understand and truly participate in that task.

In the army, the managing cadres, especially the heads of organs and units, must understand clearly that building up the army includes building up both the standing forces and the regular forces. They must understand that they are

most responsible for organizing and carrying out army mobilization, and must set aside much of their time and intellect to ensure that the mobilized units promptly take form and develop, thus fulfilling the plans that have been drafted.

The local provincial and district military organs must regard the mission of army mobilization as a function and as one of their principal missions. The comrades commanding the provincial and district military organs must directly grasp and manage the army mobilization work, and must organize the implementation of the mission of preparing for and carrying out mobilization locally. The military region chief of staff helps the military region commander guide the provincial (or municipal) military organs with regard to the military work. The mobilization organization office is the organ which directly assists the military region chief of staff in guiding provincial military organs with regard to the mobilization work.

The political, technical, and rear services organs must participate in drafting mobilization plans, building up reserve forces; and tightly managing the mobilization sources, be as concerned with building the mobilized units as with the units on a permanent combat-ready footing, and ensure that the mobilization units are ready for mobilization and have a high degree of combat readiness.

The governmental organs, the sectors, the echelons, the economic and cultural bases, and all citizens have a responsibility toward army mobilization. All sectors, echelons, bases, and citizens have missions and obligations in peacetime and also have missions and obligations in wartime. In fulfilling their peacetime missions and obligations, all echelons, bases, and citizens must participate in preparing for the mobilization of the nation's army and economy so that they can be ready for wartime service.

The sectors and echelons are responsible for drafting plans to supply mobilization sources to the army and for ensuring that plans are fully carried out.

In the sphere of management of all organs and bases there are cadres, workers, and personnel who are in the military obligation age bracket. Therefore, all sectors, echelons, and bases are responsible for leading, educating, and managing them, creating conditions for them to fulfill their military obligations, helping them register to fulfill their military obligations, carry out orders to serve on active duty and fulfill their active duty service, fulfill their mission of serving in a reserve status, and be prepared to carry out mobilization or concentrated training orders.

Many sectors, localities, and bases have technical facilities in the category of those supplied to the army when there is a mobilization order. They must use and maintain them well and assign people of military service age to operate them in order to facilitate the mobilization. They must fully register the technical facilities and observe regulations regarding practice, inspection, and management in order to prepare the technical facilities for mobilization. The sectors and localities responsible for creating specialized units for the army in wartime must fully carry out that mission.

Army mobilization plans are closely related to the economic mobilization plans and the task of preparing for army mobilization is closely tied in with preparing for economic mobilization and with the mass proselytizing work. Therefore, while carrying out preparations for army mobilization the sectors, echelons, and bases must fully understand the viewpoint of combining the economy with national defense and combining developing the nation with defending the nation.

The heads of organs and bases and the chairmen of people's committees at all levels are directly responsible for organizing the implementation of the combat readiness missions and for solidly defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland, which includes the army mobilization work. All echelons must perfect their organs doing mobilization work. The cadres specializing in mobilization work must be reliable politically and must maintain absolute secrecy with regard to the mobilization policies, plans, and reserve forces. Those are state secrets and party secrets which are directly related to victory in war.

5616

CSO: 4209/149

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### PROVINCE GETS MORE STATE, COOPERATIVE STORES, COUNTERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 84 p 1

[Article: "Transformation and Management of Market -- Quang Nam-Da Nang Gets Many More Stores and Counters of State Commerce and Marketing Cooperatives"]

[Text] Compared to the end of 1983, presently in the market in Quang Nam-Da Nang the numbers of stores and counters of the state commerce and of marketing cooperatives have increased by over 15 percent and nearly 20 percent, respectively. The network was expanded at the same time as the formula of doing business based on a two-price mechanism and strengthening market transformation and management was adopted, with the socialist commerce making more and more progress in controlling goods. By the end of the 3rd quarter, the socialist commerce had controlled a volume of goods nearly twice as large as the total volume in 1983, with the quantities of goods obtained locally accounting for more than 44 percent of the total quantity of goods purchased. As a result, the province had a commodity fund that ensured supplying relatively in time and sufficiently the eligible people with goods at stable prices and in accordance with the fixed-quantity standard and acquired additional goods that were sold at commercial-business prices, as well as contributed to better control of cash. In the social market, retails by the state commerce and marketing cooperatives accounted for nearly 50 percent. As for pork, beef and buffalo meat, the socialist commerce totally controlled the market.

The transformation of private business was stepped up; nearly 6,000 households which had been doing business at bus terminals, in front of markets and on sidewalks were transferred to production. The state commerce and marketing cooperatives have employed in many ways more than 2,000 small business people who were professionally and technically capable and properly carried out the transformation policy of the state. The persons who have been issued business permits are being put into teams in accordance with the lines of goods involved in order to ensure their doing business in full compliance with

the management and guidance of the local administration. Some large households doing business in food and beverage and services have been doing joint business with the state commerce, which for the first time has brought about good results in many aspects of market management.

The district, ward, subward and village market transformation and management boards, in coordination with a number of sectors concerned, were doing control work on a timely basis and succeeding in discovering and handling many cases of speculating, smuggling, making counterfeit goods and doing illegal business. The goods that were recovered in only the last few months had a total value of nearly 8 million dong. At the same time, the province was firmly dealing with a number of state economic organizations which had secretly sold goods in the free market and thus created difficulties for the management of goods and prices.

5598

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## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### SOCIALIST COMMERCE REINFORCED, MORE TAX COLLECTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Dec 84 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Transformation and Management of Market -- Hau Giang: Good Initial Results in Placement of Small Business People; Dong Nai: Additional Business Households Subjected to Management and Tax Collection"]

[Text] The City of Can Tho (Hau Giang Province) has acquired initial experience in joint-enterprise cooperation and in using small business people in the food and food and beverage enterprises and services. There are now less business people than before, including in commercial and food and beverage enterprises, and all of them are subjected to state inspection and control. More than 100 households dealing in fish, pork, chickens and ducks have accepted to serve as retail agents selling the same goods for the state commerce. The uniformity of market management and collection of industrial and commercial taxes is now more strict. So far Can Tho has basically transformed the small business people dealing in the goods that are under uniform state management and currently is reorganizing markets to create stable locations where farmers can sell their own products.

In Long My and Vi Thanh Districts, the socialist commerce basically is the master in the food and beverage market.

At the end of the 3rd quarter, Dong Nai Province has collected 461,705,000 dong of industrial and commercial taxes, or 74.87 percent more than the same period last year. Long Thanh, Chau Thanh, Tan Phu, Xuan Loc, Long Dat and Xuyen Moc Districts already fulfilled their tax collection plans for the entire year. The provincial tax collection sector attached importance to measures designed to fight undercollection of taxes, such as reinforcing the control of business-license tax payment among business households. In the first phase of control, it discovered 1,088 newly-formed households among the 11,490 households that had been checked and collected more than 4,779,000 dong of additional taxes. The tax office of Xuan Loc District was selected to

work on a trial basis with committees and sectors to inspect and check all plowing and earth-loosening machines in the district for the purpose of collecting business license, business income and equipment registration taxes. The sector was applying by-the-book management to tax collection to replace the method of collecting fixed taxes that had been used in the past so as to discover and adjust in time the turnovers of business households for more accurate computation of taxes and thus to ensure fairness and rationality. The results of final accounting in 40 bricks- and tiles-making installations in the Municipality of Bien Hoa showed that their actual turnovers based on their books were more than 66 million dong, instead of nearly 52 million as they had declared, and more than 1.2 million dong of additional taxes were later collected for the state. As to the collectivized production sector, the tax collection office provided guidance for actual checking of turnovers of individual installations through their bank accounts. In the case of 7 installations in Bien Hoa, their total turnovers were found to be actually nearly 13 million dong, instead of nearly 4 million as they had declared, and the additional taxes collected from them amounted to more than 634,000 dong.

5598

CSO: 4209/165



## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### EDITORIAL STRESSES NEED TO DEVELOP SOCIALIST COMMERCE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Dec 84 pp 1, 4

[ Editorial: "Developing Socialist Commerce " ]

[Text] Thoroughly understanding the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee, all provinces and municipalities have been making many efforts to consolidate, strengthen and expand the socialist commerce, which includes the state commerce and marketing cooperatives. These efforts are reflected in many fields: organizing manpower, building a purchasing and wholesale and retail network and providing service activities; building the material and technical base; and reinforcing the ranks of cadres, strengthening education and control, and raising the responsibilities and revolutionary qualities of management cadres and sales personnel. Almost all districts have established their own commercial corporations. The socialist commercial network has been extended to subwards, villages, hamlets and streets and for the first time there has been a division of business activities between central and local corporations and between the state commerce and marketing cooperatives; 96 percent of the villages throughout the country have had marketing cooperatives. The number of laborers in the state commerce has increased by 9 percent, mainly for the purchasing task and partly for retail sales. Many localities combined all three educational, economic and administrative measures and for the first time succeeded in heightening the positive aspects and repelling the negative phenomena among commercial cadres and civil servants. By taking uniform and combined measures and at the same time stepping up transforming the privately-operated commerce and strengthening market management, the socialist commerce has made quite obvious progress in controlling the goods. Compared to 1983, the domestic trade sector has purchased 60 percent more agricultural, forest and marine products and industrial goods; the prospects are good that it could overfulfill the 1984 plan by more than 20 percent. As to pork and sugar, the quantities purchased reached record levels. Consequently, the supplying of the necessary goods in standard quantities to cadres, workers, civil servants, the armed forces and collective business organizations was much better than

before. The total retail sales of the socialist commerce in the market increased by 40 percent compared to 1983 and by nearly 20 percent over the plan goal. This increase was made in both the state commerce and the collectivized commerce, in both pure commercial activities and public food and beverage service. Many lines of goods which were available at business prices helped to control prices set by private business people and prevented major price fluctuations in the market. The results that were obtained from serving production and everyday life in recent months further affirmed that, while production was not well developed and goods were not available in large quantities, if the socialist commerce were consolidated, strengthened and expanded and if there were efforts in the right direction in business and service, it would be totally capable of moving toward being the master in the market and properly playing the role of an effective housekeeper of society as a whole.

To develop the socialist commerce is a regular long-term task and also an immediate and urgent one. The socialist commerce plays an extremely important role not only in ensuring the supply of goods to serve production and the life of millions of laborers but also in the transformation and management of the market. It is the basic force of the organized market and the staff and effective tool of the socialist state in the struggle between two roads on the distribution and circulation front. It must achieve a timely review of the recent experience, quickly develop its strengths, overcome its weaknesses, strive to control at any cost the absolute share of goods for the state and bring goods directly to laborers, whom it must serve with a civilized, courteous and honest attitude.

To build the socialist commerce must be carried out in a well-organized and well-planned manner, with close association among wholesale and retail organizations in the same system, among wholesale and retail organizations dealing in the same line of goods and between the state commerce and marketing cooperatives in the same area of activity and under the unified management of a single state organ. One of the shortcomings of the socialist commerce that need to be overcome early is the fact that it has not yet developed the combined strength available in connection with the total volume of goods, the formula for service and the material and technical base; its organization was still excessively scattered and had many contact people and intermediaries; and the business and service mechanisms were still heavily administrative, bureaucratic, indiscriminate, inactive, insensitive and inflexible. The immediate efforts of the commercial sector must be concentrated on fully appreciating its own force and strengths; having positive plans and measures aimed at achieving early division of work and business levels on the basis of locations, lines of goods, wholesale and retail; and firmly switching from the administrative and indiscriminate business formula to economic accounting

and socialist enterprise. The organizational structure and managerial mechanism of every line of goods, locality and level -- from provincial and municipal to district, ward, subward and village levels -- must be built early. The harmonious combination of business involving various lines of goods in each area of activity and the close and smooth integration among localities must be stepped up. Continue to apply different forms of transformation suitable for the privately-operated commerce, including the forms of joint enterprise and cooperative enterprise between the state commerce and business people. For the state commerce, the central corporations have the task of developing the centralized strength of the state in controlling and distributing goods, moving toward seizing all sources of goods being circulated throughout the country and supplying on a timely basis the retail commercial organizations with goods. Expand the form of having agents among corporations and between the state commerce and marketing cooperatives. Build and strengthen district commercial corporations and ensure fulfillment of their functions -- purchasing, retailing goods and serving production and everyday life in the district. The collectivized commerce must be perfected and developed in terms of organization, number of cooperative members, shares and operating network; it must resolve better any policy matters to help marketing cooperatives to be fully capable of fulfilling their task as agents purchasing and selling goods for the state commerce and at the same time doing their own productive and processing business, providing services and serving better and better in their area of activity.

The task of stabilizing the standard of living and restoring order on the distribution and circulation front is requiring the continued growth and strength of the socialist commerce.

5598

CSO: 4209/165

## AGRICULTURE

### PROVINCES START WINTER-SPRING WORK FOLLOWING HARVEST

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 84 p 1

[Article: "Northern Provinces Complete Harvest of Tenth-Month Rice; Southern Provinces Harvest 20 Percent of Rice Crop, Switch to Winter-Spring Season Work"]

[Text] The northern provinces have so far completed the harvest of the tenth-month rice and are switching the focal point of their work to the winter-spring season. As of 5 December, they have sown 78,191 hectares of land to produce rice seedlings, an increase of 5.8 percent over the same time last year. Except for a small area of seedlings being damaged by harmful insects, thanks to favorable weather conditions the seedlings have been quite good. However, compared to the growth of seedlings the pace of soil preparation was rather slow. First plowing was completed in only 401,478 hectares, or 96.4 percent compared to the same time last year. In the next 1-2 weeks, if the weather continues to be warm as expected and seedlings grow quickly, the northern provinces are concentrating every effort on stepping up soil preparation, determining in a positive manner the areas to get dry and wet plowing so as to take appropriate measures to retain water in the wet-cultivation areas and getting fully prepared for transplanting rice seedlings of the right maturity at the best time so as to avoid having to use overgrown seedlings and seedlings that have branched.

Due to flooding rains early in the season, the areas devoted to many kinds of winter-spring vegetables and subsidiary food and industrial crops were reduced and the pace of cultivation decreased. The northern provinces have grown subsidiary food crops in 120,928 hectares, which show a 7 percent increase over the same period last year but remain low compared to the need to get grain ready for the coming preharvest period; vegetables and beans have been grown in only 38,736 hectares, or 87.8 percent, and industrial crops in 9,304 hectares, or only 65 percent compared to the same period last year.

The tenth-month rice harvest in the southern provinces is urgently going on. Again as of 5 December, these provinces have completed harvesting only 361,582 hectares, which in spite of an increase over the same period last year show just 20.4 percent of the total tenth-month crop area. The Mekong River delta provinces have completed their harvest in only 11.1 percent of the cultivated areas. The southern provinces have also grown subsidiary food crops in 38,485 hectares of land, an increase of 10.4 percent over the same period last year; vegetables and beans of all kinds in 16,159 hectares, 14.2 percent increase; and industrial crops in 8,401 hectares, 12.7 percent increase. The pace of soil preparation was quite good: 389,369 hectares of land have received the first plowing, an increase of 39.4 percent over the same period last year. However, due to the fact that the winter-spring sowing and planting schedule is about to be over, the need to complete harvesting the tenth-month rice and planting the winter-spring crops is a very urgent one. In addition, a number of localities which have suffered from the drought are encountering flood. Many areas in An Giang Province have resorted to growing rice without transplanting it in order to comply with the schedule for growing the winter-spring rice crop.

5598

CSO: 4209/165

## HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

### BRIEF

EXPANSION OF BROADCASTING NETWORK--In recent years the broadcasting and TV network of Song Be Province was strengthened and further developed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Starting with only a wired-radio station, now the province has a provincial radio station, 8 district-level and 82 local wired-radio stations. It has also built 20 TV viewing locations in the rubber plantation and highland areas. The broadcasting network of Song Be has been closely reporting on the political tasks of the locality and good models in production and combat and has received praises and commendations. [Text] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 84 p 1] 5598

CSO: 4209/165

PUBLICATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF OCTOBER VPA JOURNAL

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 84 p 72

[Text] A Document of Very Great Theoretical and Practical Value pp 1-2

(Editorial)

Grasp the Laws, Renovate Economic Management pp 3-39

(Speech by Le Duan [LEE ZUAANR])

Teach, Forge and Develop the Working Class Nature and Fine Traditions of the People's Army in the New Revolutionary Phase pp 40-52

(Article by Lt Gen Dang Vu Hiep [DAWNGJ VUX HIEEPJ])

First Days of the Resistance War of the Soldiers and People of Hanoi Against the French Colonialists pp 53-62

(Article by Lt Gen Hoang Phuong [HOANGF PHUWOWNG])

Some Combat Experiences of the Artillery Troops in Fighting Chinese Troops Shelling and Land Grabbing Along the Northern Border pp 63-66

(Article by Lt Col Nguyen Dinh Thanh [NGUYEENX DINH THACHJ])

The Border Expansion Policy of the Chinese Dynasties Toward Our Country pp 67-70

(Article by Hai Duong [HAIR ZUWOWNG])

CSO: 4209/150

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